


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# Arms Control Disarmament

A QUARTERLY  
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
WITH ABSTRACTS  
AND ANNOTATIONS



VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1


WINTER 1968-69

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VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1  
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# Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH  
ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



Prepared by the  
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION  
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## PREFACE

*Arms Control & Disarmament* attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

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The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."



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Sci RR.....	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm.....	Slavic Room

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## I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

### A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

- 1 Achminow, Herman F. [OUR CONTINENT'S FUTURE] Die Zukunft unseres Kontinents. Politische Studien, 19, Sept./Oct. 1968: 560-571. H35, P66, v. 19

Constructs a systematic model of Europe's future for the next 10 to 15 years--a model which does not need to materialize if statesmen learn through it the chances to turn spontaneous developments to political benefit. Events since 1945 have proved that not the United States--the world's most powerful nation--but the Soviet Union constitutes the most dynamic factor in world policy. Achminow considers the variables in future policy, especially the active coexistence policy, and the possibility of a conventional third war around 1975. The model excludes the ultimate victory of communism, for it is unlikely in the next decades that the Soviet-American balance of power will radically change in the Soviet favor. The area which comprises Western Europe, the Soviet Union with its satellites, and the United States is decisive for Europe's future. Crises outside this area will influence the Continent's future entirely differently than those occurring within.

- 2 Alvik, Trond. THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIEWS ON CONFLICT, WAR, AND PEACE AMONG SCHOOL CHILDREN. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1968: 171-195. AS9, J6, 1968 Bibliography: p. 192-193.

This article continues a line of thought presented by Peter Cooper in Journal of Peace Research, no. 1, 1965, by relating the formation of "war" and "peace" concepts in children to some of Jean Piaget's developmental dimensions. A total of 114 subjects in the age groups 8, 10, and 12, chosen from different socio-economic levels, were interviewed with a fairly comprehensive instrument containing among other items a set of questions designed to tap ability of reciprocal reasoning. (1) The subjects seem to know much more about war than about peace. For both concepts they concentrate upon the "concrete" aspects (war as fighting, killing, dying, weapons; peace as respite and inactivity) rather than upon the more "abstract" aspects (war as a conflict situation; peace as something which must be actively obtained and maintained). (2) The relation is greater between ability of reciprocal reasoning and the concrete aspects, than between ability of reciprocal reasoning and the more abstract aspects of war and peace concepts. (3) Socio-economic level is related to conception of concrete aspects of war and peace, but subjects from high socio-economic levels do not necessarily conceive of peace as something which must be actively obtained and maintained more than do subjects from low socio-economic levels. On the basis of these findings the author hypothesizes that the subjects may not have been given the opportunity to apply their growing mental capacities to the development of an active peace concept, and that much more can be

done in this direction through education. (Abstract supplied, modified)

- 3 Birnbaum, Norman. THE CRISIS IN MARXIST SOCIOLOGY. Social research, v. 35, summer 1968: 348-380. A1.S53, v. 35

Surveys recent developments in Marxist thought on social classes, the state, culture, philosophical anthropology, and methodology. Birnbaum contends that Marxist social thought is currently enmeshed in an intellectual crisis so profound that it threatens the very foundations of Marxism. He traces the roots of this crisis to the exhaustion of the possibilities for internal development of the traditional Marxist categories and to historical changes that have so transformed social realities as to make earlier Marxist formulas inapplicable to the present. Four puzzling features of modern history challenge traditional Marxist analysis: the failure of capitalism to follow its predicted course; the appearance of unexpected structural characteristics, e.g., social classes, in Socialist societies; the unaccountable growth of nationalism among the "proletarians" of the Third World; and the emergence of unexplained new mechanisms of imperialist domination and exploitation in the West. Additionally, Marxism has been shaken by its encounters with advanced forms of bourgeois thought not evidently subsumable under any of the inherited Marxist formulas. It may be that none of these problems can be solved satisfactorily without transforming and transcending the Marxist heritage, and if this is the case then "the crisis in Marxist sociology may mark the beginning of the end of Marxism."

- 4 CHINA BRIEFING [by] Frank E. Armbruster [and others. Chicago?] University of Chicago Center for Policy Study [1968] 72 p. D8777, S5, C44674

Partial contents,--Contributors,--The Cultural Revolution: I, by Tang Tsou,--The Cultural Revolution: II, by John Wilson Lewis,--The Maoist impact on China's foreign policy, by David Mazingo,--China and Vietnam, by John Wilson Lewis,--China's conventional military capability, by Frank E. Armbruster,--Fellows of the Center for Policy Study.

Selected presentations from a briefing session organized by the University of Chicago Center for Policy Study and the Johnson Foundation of Racine, Wisconsin, to provide an opportunity for "give-and-take" probing between China experts and journalists. The first two chapters analyze the causes and implications of the Cultural Revolution, whereby Mao Tse-tung attempts to control dissidents in the party bureaucracy by rallying the support of students, peasants, workers, and soldiers. Mazingo explains the influence of Mao's doctrine on China's foreign policy and asserts that its strong "anti-imperialist" nature will not soon be modified despite possible shifts in internal politics. Lewis briefly summarizes the history of China's participation in Vietnam, and the final chapter contains estimates of

the potential strength of China's armed forces, concluding that the Chinese capability for offensive action is very small in contrast to their enormous capability for defensive action.

- 5  
Dallin, Alexander, and Thomas B. Larson, eds. SOVIET POLITICS SINCE KHRUSHCHEV. Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall [1968] 181 p. (A Spectrum book) DK274. D28

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents. --The Soviet Union in the post-revolutionary era: an overview, by Richard Lowenthal. --Reforms in government and administration, by Jerry F. Hough. --Politics and ideology in the post-Khrushchev era, by Wolfgang Leonhard. --Economic policy and economic trends, by Alec Nove. --Soviet military policy after Khrushchev, by Thomas W. Wolfe. --Foreign policy perspectives in the sixties, by Vernon V. Aspaturian. --Soviet perceptions of the United States, by William Zimmerman. --Glossary.

Background papers on major areas of Soviet policy and politics in the post-Khrushchev era, which were solicited for but not included in Thomas B. Larson's study Disarmament and Soviet Policy: 1934-1968. The authors' assessments show the significant differences in the interpretation of the general direction and political orientations of the Soviet leaders in the period. These differences are not only interesting but natural, since it is extremely difficult to evaluate the factors because of the contradictions, ambiguities, and lack of simple answers, which are characteristic of the present phase of Soviet development.

- 6  
Draper, Theodore. WORLD POLITICS: A NEW ERA? Encounter, v. 31, Aug. 1968: 3-16.  
AP4. E44, v. 31

The "era of bipolarity," based on the premise that Russia and the United States were the only two centers of world power, is being eroded. This erosion is significant because the small nations have managed to resist the superpowers. In most cases, nationalism has been the force responsible for fragmenting bipolarity. This indicates that the world may be experiencing a period of resurgent nationalism. If this nationalism performs a positive function, the past will merely be substituted for the present, but if it is negative, the past will probably serve as a transition to a different balance of forces. In the latter case, the 1960's will be merely a transitional period leading to a new system of international relations lying somewhere between the system of the 1930's, when Europe was the center of world politics, and that of the 1950's, when Europe became a vacuum in world politics. Suggestions regarding implications of the present changes include the liberation of Eastern Europe not by American power but by the East European nations themselves, the withdrawal or significant reduction of the American and Russian armed forces in Europe, and the solution to the German reunification problem, which will ultimately depend more on the decisions of East and West Germany than on the pressures from other nations. A power struggle will reappear in Spain, Japan will return as a dynamic element in Asia, and the prewar Little Entente, composed of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, will be reestablished, although not necessarily by formal treaty arrangement. Asia and Africa will head in the same historical direction. The

United States and Russia decided not to reach a showdown over Africa, and this will eventually hold true for Asia, with the Vietnam War representing the end of Western intervention. Both the Communists and the free world will reconsider and reformulate the entire meaning and practice of communism. The cold war will continue, with no significant change in Soviet-American relations, and the "great issue of the new era" will be influence and society rather than power and security--a greater importance being attached to influence than power and to an internal examination of the social order in each country. The revolutionary ferment of the 1960's may end in a revolutionary period comparable to that ushered in by the Bolshevik Revolution, and Europe will play an increased role in world affairs.

- 7  
THE ELEVENTH HOUR. Intelligence digest, v. 30, Oct. 1968: 1-2. D410. R47, v. 30

A great effort by the Soviet Union to undermine the very foundations of Western Christian civilization is increasingly evident in Central Europe, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Africa north of the Zambezi, and Latin America, and in the aid extended by the Soviet Union to the civil strife in the United States. The Western World is now very near to a choice between submission and nuclear war. If the Soviet Union attacks West Germany, the only effective immediate response of which NATO will be capable is to use nuclear weapons because available conventional forces are totally inadequate. Meanwhile the military potentials of U.S. allies, Free China, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are ignored, and friendly nations fighting against aggression are abused, treated with contempt, or mortified. The people in Britain and the United States are deprived of their powers in Parliament and Congress, politics are in the hands of pressure groups, legislation is irresponsible and saps the foundations of freedom, and venal public media brainwash the public into acceptance of these practices. The Western Powers have been unable to decide to attack communism since 1933, when it had 17 supporters, to the present time, when it controls 40 percent of the world. What could then have been a minor attack, would now be the biggest and most far reaching operation in history. But today the balance sheet is still favorable. If the West mobilizes its immense moral and material wealth, puts the rule back into the hands of the people, tells them the facts and gives them the truth, coordinates all anti-Communist movements, and supplies the key opinion makers throughout the world with factual, convincing information, the Communist threat could not only be met but could be destroyed.

- 8  
A FRESH VIEW OF EUROPE. European review, v. 16, summer 1968: 29-34. AP4. E78, v. 16

Reviews papers presented at the first All-European Conference of Editors of Opinion Forming Journals, held in London in May 1968. Includes excerpts of the session that followed the presentation of the papers.

Considers the possibilities of all-European political unification and economic integration. Egon Boshart argues that Europe's division into two opposing competitive political and economic systems is a barrier for continental growth and unity, within the framework of an all-European security system. Gilles Martinot discusses the problem of European political unity without a unifying power, pointing out the realization of a

## I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

European federation will be a difficult and long-term enterprise, composed of many stages. Zdenko Stambuk reviews European economic problems, stressing that, although national economic antagonisms exist, all European nations stand to gain from the establishment of European economic independence and inter-European economic and commercial exchanges, including trade with Eastern Europe. Concludes that the greatest possible degree of political and economic integration is essential.

- 9  
Galbraith, John Kenneth. **THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE**. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 427 p.  
HC106.5.G33

Partial contents. --Change and the industrial system. --The imperatives of technology. --The nature of industrial planning. --The technostructure. --The corporation. --The general theory of motivation. --The goals of the industrial system. --Prices in the industrial system. --The management of specific demand. --The regulation of aggregate demand. --The nature of employment and unemployment. --The control of the wage-price spiral. --The industrial system and the union I. --The educational and scientific estate. --The industrial system and the state I. --The industrial system and the cold war. --Education and emancipation. --The future of the industrial system.

A study of the modern industrial system, which is composed of those large industrial corporations brought into being during the last 70 years to exploit the potent combination of advanced technology, elaborate organization, and massive capitalization. Galbraith argues that the requirements of a large-scale manufacturing firm are the same no matter what its ideological environment, and consequently all advanced industrial systems are converging toward a single structural model, which he calls the New Industrial State. Thus in Communist countries there are strong trends toward autonomy for productive enterprises, while in capitalist systems the market has been superseded by a planned economy in which the corporation becomes a part of the penumbra of the state. This convergence of industrial systems is good in that it tends to drain all substance from the ideological quarrel between capitalism and communism and thus opens the way for such urgent measures as disarmament. On the other hand, the fusion of the industrial system with the state threatens to subordinate personal beliefs and all higher goals to the needs of production. The New Industrial State is the outgrowth of technological and organizational imperatives beyond the capacity of man to control, and Galbraith believes that only vigorous political activism among the "educational and scientific estate" can block the inherent tendency of the industrial system to subordinate all other purposes to its own.

- 10  
GREAT STRATEGIC CONCEPT. Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1967. 50 p.  
DS740.4.G7

Contents. --Great strategic concept. --We are fearless. --The nature of U.S. imperialism as a paper tiger --seen from its repeated failures, by Jen Ku-ping. --The fatal weakness of the military strategy of U.S. imperialism, by Jen Ku-ping. --U.S. imperialism's strategic dispositions of pulling down the Western wall 'to repair the Eastern wall, by Jen Ku-ping. --The people's revolutionary strategy will triumph over U.S.

imperialism's counter-revolutionary strategy, by Tung Ming. --Study the "talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong."

Compilation of articles that praise Mao Tse-tung's thesis that imperialists are paper tigers and forecast the revolutionary peoples' ultimate victory over their reactionary enemies. The United States is said to have prepared the way for its own doom by alienating the masses; its armed strength will be of no avail when the people "awaken" and unite in a worldwide struggle against imperialist forces.

- 11  
Hamilton, Richard F. **A RESEARCH NOTE ON THE MASS SUPPORT FOR "TOUGH" MILITARY INITIATIVES**. American sociological review, v. 43, June 1968: 439-445. HML 275, v. 33

Attempts to identify the major sources of support for more aggressive military initiatives in limited war. Hamilton uses material drawn from studies of the 1952 and 1964 elections to determine the preferences of various social groups for "tough" or conciliatory policy alternatives in the Korean and Vietnam wars. He finds that the upper middle class is markedly more prone than the lower class to favor a tough policy. This finding contradicts the generally held view--derived from the work of S. M. Lipset--that aggressive attitudes are a characteristic of lower class authoritarianism. Hamilton also finds a suggestive positive correlation between the tough attitude and the amount of attention devoted to mass media, particularly newspapers and magazines.

- 12  
**HANDBOOK ON COMMUNIST CHINA**. Intercom, v. 10, Sept./Oct. 1968: 16-80.  
Z7164.I3148

Contents. --The Cultural Revolution: upheaval in Communist China. --Map of Communist China. --Who's who . . . twelve major figures in the Cultural Revolution. --Milestones in U.S. policy towards Communist China. --Trading with Communist China: a basic question for U.S. policymakers. --What countries recognize which China? --Communist China in the UN. --Citizen groups stimulate study and discussion of U.S. - Communist China relations. --Polls reveal how Americans feel about Communist China. --A critical guide to curriculum units on China. --Films on Communist China. --Bibliography of recent books on China.

A background briefing, study guide, and bibliography on Communist China. The text is devoted primarily to an analysis of the origins and meaning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and to a survey of recent U.S. diplomatic and trade policy vis-a-vis China. The bibliography covers only recent publications and includes sections on general background, the Cultural Revolution, China and the United States, China and the United Nations, foreign policy, arms control and nuclear weapons, personal accounts, reference works, bibliographies, U.S. government publications, and periodicals.

- 13  
Hoffmann, Stanley. [THE IDEA OF A "EUROPEAN EUROPE": PROPOSALS ON THE FUTURE OF ATLANTIC COOPERATION] Die Idee eines "europäischen Europa." Vorschläge für die Zukunft der atlantischen Zusammenarbeit. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Apr. 25, 1968: 275-285. D810.E86, v. 23

Asserts that the existing plans for European reunification have little chance for realization in the near future. Hoffmann discusses, among other things, De Gaulle's notion of a "Europe of fatherlands," Brzezinski's concept of Atlantic cooperation for the reunification of Europe, and the need for reorganization of NATO.

14

Hunebelle, Danielle. FIFTY YEARS FROM NOW. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 215, Oct. 1968: 35-37. APA, R2164, 1968

Interview with Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener of the Hudson Institute.

Reviews a number of the predictions made by Kahn in *The Year 2000*. He foresees a world sharply divided between the developed and underdeveloped nations, with the latter housing 75 percent of the global population but lagging far behind the advanced nations in economic output. People in the post-industrial societies will enjoy more leisure but less individual freedom. The United States and the Soviet Union will remain the world's top two economic and military leaders, followed in descending order by Japan, West Germany, France, Great Britain, and Communist China. Kahn estimates that about 15 nations will possess nuclear arsenals by 2000. Although he warns that proliferation could lead to limited nuclear exchanges among the lesser powers, he concludes that a relatively stable world political climate will substantially decrease the feasibility of global nuclear war.

15

Hveem, Helge. FOREIGN POLICY THINKING IN THE ELITE AND THE GENERAL POPULATION. *Journal of peace research*, no. 2, 1968: 147-170. ASS, J6, 1968

Notes: p. 168-170.

This article presents a profile of the peace thinking of a Norwegian elite sample, and tests some hypotheses derived from Galtung's center-periphery theory. Data were collected in 1967 by interviews and questionnaires, mostly structured, among a foreign policy elite sample and--for comparative purposes--among a so-called opinion-maker sample. These data are to some degree compared with Norwegian opinion survey data. The main findings are that the elite's peace thinking, as shown by its operational peace profile, is centered around stability, evolutionary change, and gradualistic peace policies. Middle-range or regionalistic policies are preferred to long-range (globalistic) and short-range (intra-national or individual); tough policies to soft (or "idealistic") ones. The so-called projection hypothesis derived from the center-periphery theory is given substantial backing, and it is established--although with some important modifications--that the elite may be seen as an ultra-center of society. (Abstract supplied)

16

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY. Edited by Arthur S. Hoffman. Bloomington, Indiana University Press [1968] 206 p. (Indiana University international studies) JX1395, I57

Lectures "delivered in 1965-66 during the inaugural year of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy, as its first major effort at public service." Bibliographical references included in "Notes" (p. 199-206).

Partial contents. --Introduction, by Robert F. Delaney. --Educational and cultural relations, by Charles Fraskel. --Communication analysis and comprehensive diplomacy, by Bryant Wedge. --Public opinion research, by Lloyd A. Free. --Problem solving: the behavioral approach, by Karl Deutsch. --The importance of national cultures, by Margaret Mead. --The role of groups: contributions of sociology, by Lewis Coser. --Psychology and psychological operations, by Daniel Lerner. --The language of international communication: semantics and linguistics, by Harry Maynard. --International news media, by Robert Manning. --Communications to open and closed societies, by Howland H. Sargeant. --The convergence of social systems, by John Scott.

Explores "the ways in which both governments and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on other governments' foreign policy decisions." Specialists in psychology, sociology, anthropology, public opinion, and communications discuss the application of their disciplines to the new "public" diplomacy. While the experts sometimes presented conflicting views of the world situation, they all apparently agreed that closer collaboration between students of human behavior and professional diplomats would greatly improve international understanding.

17

INTERVENTION AND WORLD POLITICS. *Journal of international affairs*, v. 22, no. 2, 1968: ix-x, 165-281. JX1, C6, v. 22

Partial contents. --Editor's foreword. --The concept of intervention, by James N. Rosenau. --Intervention and international systems, by Oran R. Young. --Intervention among developing states, by I. William Zartman. --Reflections on intervention, by Max Beloff. --Nonintervention and conditional intervention, by Andrea M. Scott. --Political outcomes of foreign assistance: influence, involvement, or intervention? by Howard Wriggins. --American foreign policy and the decision to intervene, by Adam Yarmolinsky. --After Vietnam: security and intervention in Asia, by Vorton H. Halperin. --Book reviews.

Articles on the theory and practice of intervention. Rosenau proposes an operational definition of intervention that stresses its "convention breaking" and "authority oriented" characteristics. Young suggests that intervention can be defined only in relation to specific historical contexts. He recognizes that interventions are a major feature of modern international politics but believes that through system changes their frequency can be reduced. On evidence drawn from African and Arab politics, Zartman argues that intervention is "an inherent adjunct of nation-building, regionalism, and revolution" and points out that normative and analytic theories based on Western experience are inapplicable in underdeveloped regions. Beloff predicts that the United States will have to continue to intervene in the affairs of other states and calls upon it to abandon "the rhetoric of Wilsonian idealism" in order to construct a realistic intervention theory. Scott recommends that a legal code to govern interventions be drafted, based on the principle that intervention is often legitimate but ought to take place under international constraints. Wriggins warns of the subtlety of the problems encountered in the use of economic and military assistance to influence other states, while Yarmolinsky suggests two ways to improve the rationality of decisions relating to inter-

# 1. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

ventions. Halperin calls upon the United States to reassess its global security interests as preparation for the formulation of a more realistic intervention policy in Asia. The book reviews are critiques of recently published studies of subjects relevant to specific problems of intervention theory and policy.

18

Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE STANDARD WORLD. In their The year 2000: a framework for speculation on the next thirty-three years. New York, Macmillan [1967] p. 221-247. illus.

CB160.K3 1967

Projections for the international political system in the last third of the 20th century. The authors have constructed a "standard" or "surprise-free" world for the year 2000 by extrapolating current trends in international politics. They assume that the world today is in a situation much like that of Europe in 1815--at the end of a long period of violence and disruption and at the beginning of a long period of relative peace and security. This assumption rests on two others: that the détente between East and West is permanent, and that the arms race will continue but not reach a point of instability. Within this general framework, the authors discuss in greater detail the political prospects for China, the Soviet Union, Germany, Japan, Afro-Asia, and Latin America. They also discuss the problem of nuclear proliferation, speculating that Japan probably will become the sixth nuclear power and that by the 1990's there may be as many as 50 others. Although the arguments against nuclear proliferation are not decisive, the prudent statesman must assume that the harmful consequences are likely to outweigh the beneficial ones.

19

Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. THE YEAR 2000: A FRAMEWORK FOR SPECULATION ON THE NEXT THIRTY-THREE YEARS. New York, Macmillan [1967] xxvii, 431 p. illus.

CB160.K3 1967

Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Introduction, by Daniel Bell.--Change and continuity.--Comments on science and technology.--Some "surprise-free" economic projections: a quantitative scenario.--Postindustrial society in the society in the standard world.--International politics in the standard world.--Some canonical variations from the standard world.--Some possibilities for nuclear wars.--Other twenty-first century nightmares.--The international system in the very long run.--Policy research and social change.

Speculations on the course of world history in the last third of the 20th century. The authors believe that systematic speculation of this type can assist the policymaker to reach decisions that will make the desirable future more likely and the undesirable less likely, while at the same time putting him in a position to deal with whatever contingencies actually arise with maximum flexibility. The intent of the present work is prophetic and heuristic rather than apodictic; it is meant to serve as a broad framework for later, more detailed studies of specific problems. In their concluding remarks, the authors assert that "man's increasing Faustian power over nature (including man) poses the central predicament of the modern age. Man has gained enormous power over the forces of nature,

but this power has itself become a natural force that threatens to destroy humanity. The Faustian urge to overpower the environment, or even human beings when they stand in the way of progress, ought to be moderated, and institutions that protect freedom of choice and dissent ought to be preserved.

20

Leont'ev, Ley A. [ON THE THEORY OF CONVERGENCE] Über die Konvergenztheorie. Sowjetunion heute, v. 13, Sept. 1, 1968: 19-20.

DK266.A2S784, v. 13

In the past few years the word "convergence" has become commonplace in the political writings of Western economists, sociologists, "politicians," and "sociologists" to denote the mutual assimilation of the capitalist and socialist systems and the increasingly similar development trends of the two. The convergence theory is bizarre in the face of contemporary reality, which testifies to the progressive polarization between the "forces of socialism, peace, and democracy on one hand, and those of reaction, imperialism, and war on the other." The hostility of all its exponents to socialist ideology--the "scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism"--betrays the central message of assimilation between the two systems. The theory was clearly devised to abate the historic commutation of capitalism by socialism when all other anti-Communist means have failed. Its advocates fail to realize that the Socialist revolution spreading throughout the world engenders "not from outside influences such as wars or the 'export of revolution'" but from growing contradictions within capitalist society itself. Convergence theorists believe in the alleged ideological decolorization of the systems as a means to eliminate wars and dissolve the Socialist society, but they consider limited wars, such as in Vietnam, compatible with peaceful coexistence between socialism and capitalism. This theory is a part of the global strategy of world imperialism. It may find some support among nominal Marxists, but none among the true ones.

21

Martin, Alexander. [FOCUS WORLD POLICY] Blickpunkt Weltpolitik. German foreign policy, v. 7, no. 4, 1968: 303-308.

DD261.4.D353, v. 7

Lauds books published by the East German foreign relations institute (Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der Deutschen Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaften 'Walter Ulbricht,' Potsdam-Babelsberg): Herbert Kröger's German Borders and European Security; Klaus Bollinger and Hans Maretzki's USA Global Strategy in Europe; Renate Wünsche, Diethelm Weidemann, and Horst Westphal's Foreign Policy of Afro-Asian States; Harry Wunsche's The United Nations; and Gerhard Reintanz' Cosmic Law.

22

Merritt, Richard L., and Donald J. Fuchala, comps. WESTERN EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS: PUBLIC OPINION STUDIES AND EVALUATIONS. New York, Praeger [1968] 552 p. illus. (Praeger special studies in international politics and public affairs) D843.M393

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Analysis and commentary on the USIA Western European data collection: The USIA surveys: tools for policy and analysis, by Richard L. Merritt. International images and USIA research, by Leo P. Crespi.--pt. 2. The USIA West-

ern European data collection: NATO and the defense of Europe. Arms control and disarmament. General attitudes toward disarmament. Perception of efforts toward disarmament. Ban on conventional weapons. Use of atomic weapons in war. Bans on atomic weapon production and use. Inspection: the "open skies" proposal. Nuclear diffusion. Disengagement in Europe. Specific international issues: The United Nations. German issues: reunification. The Suez crisis. The Cuban missile crisis. The Sino-Soviet dispute. Eastern Europe.

Introduces to the research community data gathered during the U. S. Information Agency's international public opinion survey and demonstrates the usefulness of these data both to governmental analysts and social scientists. In part 1 the authors have used USIA survey data; therefore the articles, which are concerned with various aspects of international affairs, demonstrate both the relevance of international survey research and techniques for data processing and analysis. Part 2 includes, in tabular form, a categorized inventory of questions asked in France, West Germany, Italy, and Great Britain, from 1952 to 1963. It is hoped that these data will contribute to an understanding of the processes involved in international politics.

- 23  
Organski, A. F. K. *WORLD POLITICS*. 2d ed. [rev.] New York, Knopf, 1968. 509 p.  
JX139L C7 1968  
Bibliography: p. 493-509.

Partial contents. --Nations and nationalism. --The nature of national power. --Natural determinants of power. --Social determinants of power. --The balance of power. --The balance of terror. --The power transition. --Collective security. --International organizations.

Argues that an approach to world politics requires a framework for organizing data. The overall patterns of modern world politics result from sharp differences in modernization--social, economic, and political--among and within nations. The shift in distribution of world power among states caused by this differential modernization is an underlying cause of war and conflict.

- 24  
Quaroni, Pietro. 'OPEN DOOR TO THE EAST' SWINGS SHUT--THE WHYS. *Atlas*, v. 16, Nov. 1968: 24-26.  
APL A83, v. 16  
Translated from *Die Zeit*, Hamburg.  
Newsp

Western Europe's policy of pursuing détente with both Russia and the East European countries contains an inherent contradiction. If the West maintains closer ties with the satellite nations, they become independent, the Soviet Empire in East Europe is threatened, and Russia is alienated; thus, closer ties with Russia can be maintained only if détente is not pursued in this area. Regardless, West Europeans should cultivate closer relationships with the satellites and understand that détente is impossible as long as the hard-line Russian Communists are in power. Further, the West should not underestimate the ideological elements of Russian policy and should realize that developments within Russia--growing alienation between the people and the party--are responsible for the Soviet leaders' refusal to allow liberalization in Eastern Europe.

- 25  
Russett, Bruce M. COMPONENTS OF AN OPERATIONAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE FORMATION. *Journal of conflict resolution*, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 285-301. JX190i J6, v. 12  
References: p. 300-301.

Two major theoretical perspectives are evident both in the small group literature on n-person coalitions and in traditional international politics literature. One stresses relative power, as in balance-of-power theories and in the size principle. The other emphasizes cultural, political, or economic bonds. This paper shows how these strands may be brought together, and considers barriers to testing the theory. Episodic games, deterrent situations, situations of imperfect information or high uncertainty, where the costs of gaining the decision are high or where bargaining costs are high, would mitigate against successful prediction from the theory. Measurement problems include gauging national power on an interval scale, the effect of distance on power, and the degree to which the power of an alliance can be indexed by the sum of its component actors' power. Perceptions of power may vary from the objective measures scholars devise. The difference between peacetime and wartime alliances, and between zero-sum and non-zero-sum situations, must also be examined. (Abstract supplied)

- 26  
Servan-Schreiber, Jean Jacques. 1984 IN THE EAST . . . A SOVIET DANGER NOW. *Atlas*, v. 16, Oct. 1968: 20-22.  
APL A83, v. 16  
Translated from *L'Express*, Paris.  
Newsp

While the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia "is a pale thing" in comparison with nuclear war, world catastrophe will not necessarily be avoided by ignoring this crime. If Soviet leaders are capable of miscalculating in the current military intervention, they may miscalculate in future decisions that upset the atomic status quo--an equilibrium possibly just as precarious as the Bratislava agreements. The serious consequences of the Soviet actions are that U.S. - U.S.S.R. relations may be crucially altered, and Soviet foreign policy and foundations of the nation's security have been placed "in a frightful light." The invasion, which represents a return to orthodox fanaticism as the basis of Soviet foreign policy, has affected countless structures; e.g., the possible *modus vivendi* between the two Germanies. The deeper connection between such seemingly unrelated political mileposts as the decadence of the American presidential elections, the troubling effects of the *Humanae vitae* encyclical, the May explosion and June panic in France, and the aggression against Prague lies in a return to the past through fear of what the future holds--a retreat to the established order. This indicates that the world "no longer knows what to move toward, or where to look for hope." The return to Stalinism is "the culminating point of a year rich in disillusionment and retrogression."

- 27  
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Zentralkomitee. [FROM ERICH HONECKER'S REPORT ON THE CONSULTATIVE MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES IN BUDAPEST] Aus dem Bericht Erich Honeckers über das Konsultativtreffen der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien in Budapest. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 405, 1968: 29-36.

DD261. D4, v. 20



# I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Excerpts from the Mar. 21, 1968, report to the 5th plenum of the Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee on the Feb. 26--Mar. 5 meeting. Reprinted from the Mar. 22, 1968, issue of *Neues Deutschland*.

Stresses the meeting's praise of the Soviet Communist Party's "leading role" in the international Communist movement. Honecker notes the prevailing opinion at the meeting that the common policy of all Communist parties, based on fundamental Communist goals, takes precedence over their particular policies, dictated by local or national considerations. By their one-sided appeals for what they consider "equal rights, autonomy, sovereignty, and independence," some delegations displayed a tendency to yield to the pressures of bourgeois ideology. This can only harm proletarian internationalism.

28

Strausz-Hupé, Robert. **THE RED STRATEGY OF INDIRECT APPROACH.** *Freedom & union*, v. 23, Sept. 1968: 6-7. JX1901.F6, v. 23

In waging the cold war against the free world the Communists have adopted the strategy of indirect approach, an age-old policy that enables a smaller power to weaken a stronger one by attacking only the most vulnerable positions of the latter. It is the strategy of revolutionaries and is particularly suited to totalitarian regimes since it is based on secrecy and deception. Although Americans should not "look for a Communist under every bed," they must remain vigilant against the penetration tactics of the Communists and recognize the vulnerabilities within the democratic system. Totalitarianism has no place for ethics and takes advantage of the openness of a free society by encouraging the alienation of significant social groups. Despite the Communists' failure to date to undermine American society, there is no reason to believe that they will not patiently continue directing their cold war arsenal--"insurgency, warfare-by-proxy, penetration, espionage, subversion, sabotage, blackmail, assassination, and open and hidden propaganda"--against the United States.

29

Wleck, David T. **THE VIOLENCE OF MAN: REMARKS ON KONRAD LORENZ: ON AGGRESSION.** *Diogenes*, summer 1968: 103-123. AS4.D5, 1968

Violence is a dominant theme in human history, and Konrad Lorenz has advanced the hypothesis that its source is instinctual aggression. At present there is no way of confirming this hypothesis directly; Lorenz' evidence is indirect and in the form of conjectures about the instinctual endowment that early man would have required in order to survive. These conjectures are plausible enough, but in the last analysis the concept "aggression" is too imprecise a term to be useful for either ethical or biological explanation. Imprecision leads to confusion of ethical and culturally variable concepts with biological and genetically coherent ones, which in turn vitiates Lorenz' treatment of the relationship of aggression to culture. He has overlooked the possibility that problematic violence is in a large degree "not internal to individuals but has some externalized in institutions" or that it may be reactive and historically or culturally conditioned. He

has ignored man's capacity to choose between psychologically indifferent means, including violence, and failed to consider man's ethical situation in nonethical communities such as the army. These considerations would seem to undermine any thesis that war is a result of individual aggressiveness or that the answer to war is individual or social psychotherapy. What man must learn is how to cope with the products of civilization, not his animal instincts. Lorenz has neglected another aspect of man's nature: the impulse to create. This creative "instinct" bears looking into, for destructiveness in man cannot "be overcome except by a more powerful principle, and it is no longer believable that Reason is that principle."

30

Wohlstetter, Albert. **THEORY AND OPPOSED-SYSTEMS DESIGN.** *Journal of conflict resolution*, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 302-331. JX1901.J6, v. 12  
References: p. 330-331.

The paper examines the bearings on international relations theory of opposed-systems designs: systems analyses done to aid decision-makers in national and international organizations in choosing policies on arms and arms control. Such studies concern the choice of complex ends--and means to accomplish ends--that stand a good chance of being at least partially opposed by some governments. Like systems engineering, opposed-systems design has a large and important technological component. While operational research deals with specified equipments and organizations in the face of opposition similarly constrained, opposed-systems design considers alternative objectives, longer time perspectives, a wider variety of technical and organizational means, more varied environments, and more uncertainties. The paper describes the relation of the theoretical models used in opposed-systems design to various traditional and behavioral or quantitative theories of international relations: theories of foreign policy decision, theories of the balance of power, etc. Connections and contrasts are displayed in particular by reference to an extended example of the effects of distance on "power." (Abstract supplied)

31

Yost, Charles W. **THE INSECURITY OF NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.** New York, Council on Foreign Relations [by] Praeger [1968] 276 p. D443.Y63

Partial contents. --The breakup of the old order. --Underlying causes of national insecurity. --Challenge and response in Europe. --Challenge and response in East Asia. --The crisis of modernization and the north-south confrontation. --Where do we stand? --The conduct and misconduct of international relations. --Curbing confrontations. --Organizing international security. --Bibliographic notes.

Maintains that, despite all the scientific discoveries of the past half century, little has been done to correct or control the insecurity of nations. Yost believes the arms race has made nations more insecure than ever before and that the obsolete means world leaders use to promote security do more to promote insecurity. Yost concludes that the arms race must be slowed down to decrease international tensions and insecurities.

## B. FOREIGN POLICIES

32

Augstein, Rudolf. [BREZHNEV'S TEARS] Breschnews Tränen. Spiegel, v. 22, Aug. 26, 1968: 20-21. AP30. S66, v. 22

Regards the recent Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as an event fraught with long-range consequences for international, especially inf'abloc, relations. Augstein considers Soviet political behavior Janus-faced--toward both peaceful evolution and violence. Since the Soviet Union is already saturated with conquests, West German and Western foreign policies should appeal to the former Soviet trait. The German Federal Republic and NATO should therefore deemphasize their military postures vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc.

33

Barzel, Rainer. TOWARD RECONCILIATION WITH POLAND. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Aug./Sept. 1968: 258-259. DB200.7. S74, v. 16

Excerpted from the book Gesichtspunkte eines Deutschen [Viewpoints of a German] published in 1968 by Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf.

DD257.4. B34

Dr. Barzel shows that it is impossible to meet simultaneously the demand made so often, that the Oder-Neisse Line be recognized as Poland's Western boundary and that the "GDR" be recognized as a sovereign state. A sovereign state cannot determine the boundary between another sovereign state and a third party. In all of the Allied postwar agreements--with full accord of the Soviet Union--it was agreed that Germany continue to exist within the boundaries of 1937 and that the final determination of the western border await the peace conference. Barzel elucidates Bonn's viewpoint on the question of the expellees whose claim to ancestral homelands remains. He feels, however, that a policy renouncing force must lead to a peaceful order in Europe. Thirteen million human beings who lost their homes through no fault of their own have chosen, within the Federal Republic, not to follow the path of extremism, revenge and hatred but are desirous of reconciliation with the Poles in a new Europe which honors human rights and respect among nations. (Supplied summary, modified).

34

Perner, Wolfgang. [CASTRO AND MOSCOW'S LATIN AMERICAN STRATEGY] Castro und Moskaus Lateinamerika-Strategie. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, June 1968: 357-387. D839. A885, v. 19

Castro's interest in exporting the Communist revolution to the Latin American Continent stems from the need which he has felt strongly since the famous 1962 missile crisis--for solid economic support for his regime independent of the Soviet Union. He has high hopes that the success of the Communist revolution, especially in oil-rich Venezuela, may free him from Soviet bondage. The Soviet Union, which conducts a true world-power policy, considers the time not yet ripe for achieving its ultimate goal in Latin America. It concentrates therefore on intermediate objectives: winning the cooperation of existing Latin American governments and the gradual elimination of American influence there. Moscow realistically considers Latin America the most difficult region with which its foreign policy must cope in the Third World.

35

[BONN: CASE OF TENSION: DROP-IN] Bonn; Spannungsfall; Drop-in. Spiegel, v. 22, Aug. 26, 1968: 33-36, 38. illus. AP30. S66, v. 22

Describes the reaction of the West German coalition-government members to the news of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and how the Government's official stand on the crisis was finally formulated. The coalition partners agreed: to continue the West German détente policy toward the East, although for the time being on a "pilot-light" basis only; to postpone signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, because of doubt about the Soviet signatory's good faith; "to increase the defense budget by a hundred million German marks"; and "to put aside all plans for reduction of armed forces in Central Europe."

36

Bradshaw, James S. A POLICY CHANGE TOWARD CUBA? Christian century, v. 85, Aug. 28, 1968: 1075-1077. BR1. C45, v. 85

Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, has outlined stringent conditions for improvement of U.S. and inter-American relations with Cuba, citing specifically a halt to Cuban subversive intervention in the hemisphere and a severance of Cuban-U.S.S.R. military connections. If they were designed to elicit a response from Castro or provoke discussion within the Cuban ruling clique, his remarks failed. In a subsequent statement, Oliver backed off slightly, stressing that the U.S. policy remained unchanged and that conditions for a policy change were nonnegotiable. Thoughts about policy revision, either in the United States or Cuba, probably derive from the popularity of Castro, the failure of the diplomatic and economic embargo to produce a demand for change in Cuba, the sharp reductions in Soviet Cuban aid, the evidence of political tension between Cuba and Russia, the failure of the "revolution for export" policy, and the increasing but unclear evidence of a U.S.-Russian détente. In reevaluating its policy the United States faces the alternatives of continuing inter-American pressure or seeking reconciliation with Castro and encouraging his desire for greater independence from Russia. The former course would risk developing a regime completely subservient to the Soviet Union. For Castro the most important consideration in reevaluating policy toward the United States is the degree to which his internal position would be affected. The outcome of the thinking within inter-American circles and probably within Cuba is impossible to ascertain, but circumstances indicate that some new arrangement might be possible. The United States is willing to talk, and relations seem to be undergoing a review.

37

Brandt, Willy. [FOREIGN POLICY, GERMAN POLICY, EUROPEAN POLICY. PRINCIPAL STATEMENTS DURING THE FIRST YEAR IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE] Aussenpolitik. Deutschlandpolitik, Europapolitik. Grundsätzliche Erklärungen während des ersten Jahres im Auswärtigen Amt. [Berlin] Berlin-Verlag [1968] 168 p. D844. B60

Contents. --This book: preface by Willy Brandt. --Taking over of the Foreign Office (12/6/1966). --Peace policy in Europe. --For the unity of Europe. --German-Rumanian relations. --The complex of rightist radicalism--Prerequisites and effects of a nuclear nonproli-

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feration treaty. --New realities of German policy. --The first hundred days (press conference). --A bigger European Economic Community yields bigger results. --Common interests with Great Britain. --Konrad Adenauer's death. --The Oder-Neisse boundary. --For non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. --The war in the Near East concerns all. --Scandinavia and Europe. --For a regulated coexistence. --For assistance in the Near East. --A second wind for détente policy. --German foreign policy after two World Wars. --Partnership in Latin America. --Improvement and expansion of the European Economic Community. --The first year. --International relations on a community level. --For peace in the Near East. --Words on a day of national mourning. --Not to celebrate an unnatural division. --The responsibility of the Germans for Europe. --Bibliography. --Index.

Chronologically arranged texts of the West German Foreign Minister's public pronouncements from December 6, 1966, to November 30, 1967. Brandt expounds on the need for peace in Europe, based not on the balance of terror but on East-West cooperation that in the long run would "neither preclude nor impede" solution of the German problem. The German Federal Republic supports all provisions of the draft nonproliferation treaty aimed at stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. It declines, however, to accept provisions that would hinder peaceful utilization of nuclear energy by nonnuclear nations.

38

Brezarić, Dr. **CONSOLIDATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA.** Review of international affairs, v. 19, June 20, 1968: 8-10. D839.R4, v. 19

Yugoslavia has been in favor of the progressive effort in Czechoslovakia from the beginning and welcomes the announcement of the May plenum of the Czechoslovak Communist Party that the change in Czechoslovak society and socialism has been completed. The change was made possible mainly through the support of the working class. But some top-ranking officials of the Socialist countries unfortunately cannot recognize that the change was a reflection of a profound internal need of the Czechoslovak people and regard it as an imperialist offensive. They do not understand that this mistrust in the forces of socialism gives an opportunity to the anti-Socialist forces for outbursts against the Soviet Union. The pressures that these people exert, the resulting encouragement of the conservatives, and the false rumors they spread violate the principle of equality of relations among the Socialist countries and Communist parties. Moreover they do not express the feeling of all members of the parties. Many members support the Czechoslovak effort; the front against this epoch-making revolution is broken. The Czechs and Slovaks demonstrate skill, patience, and maturity in negotiations and in the defense of their country's right to non-interference. The leadership-working class contacts they are developing may be crucial if further external pressures are applied. The Czechs and Slovaks have taken the right road to progress, so let them finish their historical task without interference.

39

Burns, Arthur L. **PROBLEMS IN AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, JULY-DECEMBER 1967.** Australian journal of politics and history, v. 14, Apr. 1968: 1-11. DU80.A945, v. 14

Surveys Australia's foreign policy problems caused by the Vietnam War and the impending British withdrawal

East of Suez, particularly the controversy between the two major parties on Australia's commitment to Vietnam. Although the Labor Party modified its intransigent withdrawal policy, it continued to advocate a bombing halt, the recognition of the National Liberation Front, and a clear-and-hold strategy. The Federal Government under Prime Minister Holt maintained a warm friendship with the United States, but after his death in November the Liberal Party began to rethink Australia's Southeast Asian policy in the light of the opposition at home and the British announcement. Despite nationwide interest in Vietnam, Australia's public attitudes were "all overlaid and dimmed by widespread indifference, not to say callousness." Burns concludes that in the face of the British withdrawal Australia must either increase its military expenditures in Southeast Asia or abandon any substantial commitment to that area.

40

Clery, R. **[ASIAN COUNTRIES IN SEARCH OF A NEW EQUILIBRIUM]** Les pays d'Asie à la recherche d'un nouvel équilibre. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Oct. 1968: 1447-1464. D410.R45, v. 24

Reviews U.S. Asian policy from the postwar era to the present and agrees with Ronald Steel's appraisal of the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in this period: "the dedication of Americans to their ideas has launched them into a political world of intervention, in which the excesses are becoming apparent." Clery maintains that a new equilibrium in Asia should not be predicated on anticommunism versus communism but on internal political and economic development and satisfactory relations among Asian countries. He recommends that the United States not engulf the Asian problem so that it becomes an American one, but that it allow Asians to choose their own life while giving them the assistance and protection they need.

41

**[CZECHOSLOVAKIA: ENTRY OF THE TROOPS OF THE FIVE WARSAW PACT STATES UNDER THE PRETEXT OF A REQUEST FOR HELP FROM CZECHOSLOVAK FUNCTIONARIES]** Tschechoslowakei: Einmarsch von Truppen aus 5 Staaten des Warschauer Paktes, vorgeblich auf ein Hilfe-Ersuchen tschechoslowakischer Funktionäre. Archiv der Gegenwart, v. 38, Aug. 20, 1968: 14125-14160. D410.K414, v. 38

Compilation of declarations of Czechoslovakia and the intervening powers, reactions of countries throughout the world, and decisions of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and Government during the period August 20-31, 1968, with a brief summary of Czechoslovak history since 1919.

42

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA: GERMANY AGAIN AT THE CROSSROADS--AND A STORY OF UNHEEDED WARNINGS.** Intelligence digest, v. 30, Oct. 1968: 3-6. D410.R47, v. 30

Discusses the effect of the occupation of Czechoslovakia on the foreign policy and political thought of West Germany. The occupation shattered the West German Ostpolitik of détente, which assumed that friendly relations with the East European countries could be established. This policy was based on an erroneous interpretation of the Soviet principle of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems. The West German politicians overlooked the repeated Soviet

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assertions that no coexistence was possible in the ideological field and class warfare. The other Western countries shared this error and were therefore unwilling to recognize the danger of an occupation, although they were warned by their intelligence services at the beginning of the crisis. This error in evaluation of the Soviet Union's intentions was instrumental in the complete change of the military situation in Europe and made nonexistent the so-called "political warning time," the period in which Soviet leaders might have been dissuaded by diplomatic means and on which the NATO planners were counting. As nobody can trust a government that does not respect treaties it has signed and the danger of war by miscalculation has grown, no guarantee for peace and freedom is left but nuclear weapons. Moreover NATO has been weakened by the theory of "big lift" and other plans, and the hope that Europe will unite and defend itself is minimal. The article gives detailed information on the warnings gathered by the *Intelligence Digest's* correspondent in Bonn and recommends an investigation of the whole matter by a high-level ad hoc body independent of both the intelligence services and the governments concerned.

43

**DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA: REPORTS AND COMMENTS.** Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Sept. 25, 1968: 1-15.

DB39, C87, v. 20

Translated from *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, from Sept. 3 to 8, 1968.

Contents. --C. C. P. Central Committee meets. --At the U. N. --Back in Czechoslovakia. --Husak's report to Slovak Party. --The process of normalization. --Marshall Konev draws parallels. --Attack on the New York Times. --Gribachev chastises Rumanian writer. --Foreign repercussions.

Full or condensed texts of Soviet and Czechoslovak official statements and comments of the Soviet press on the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its repercussion on the world.

44

**DOCUMENTS ON THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA** [Dokumente zu den Ereignissen in der CSSR] Sowjet-union heute, v. 13, Sept. 1, 1968: suppl., 3 - [20] DK266, A28784, v. 13

Contents. --Letter to the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CCP) on July 15, 1968. --Declaration of the Communist and workers' parties of the Socialist countries of Aug. 3, 1968. --Appeal of a group of members of the Central Committee of the CCP, the Government and the National Assembly of the CSSR (TASS Aug. 21, 1968). --Declaration of TASS of Aug. 21, 1968. --Appeal to the citizens of Czechoslovakia (TASS, Aug. 23, 1968). --An unlawful meeting (*Pravda*, Aug. 24, 1968). --Communique on Soviet-Czechoslovak negotiations in Moscow (TASS, Aug. 27, 1968). --Some questions and answers (Press agency Novosti, APN).

Documents on the Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, published by the Soviet Embassy in West Germany in cooperation with the Novosti news agency.

45

**Drabkic, M. CHINA AND THE ASIAN COUNTRIES.** Review of international affairs, v. 19, Aug. 5, 1968: 10-12. DB39, R4, v. 19

The U. S. -North Vietnam negotiations in Paris, the withdrawal of British troops from the East of Suez area, the intensified efforts of India and other Asian states to establish bilateral and international relations indicate that a new constellation may soon appear in Asia. China's internal and international position will undoubtedly play a decisive role in any change, but it is extremely hard to assess. The recent visits of foreign diplomats are indicative of the nation's desire to emerge from its self-imposed isolation and replace its narrow-minded policy with a more flexible approach. China has stabilized its relations with neighboring states and seems likely to adopt a policy of coexistence. The next step might be improved relations with the Third World and later, perhaps, with other continents and countries as well. China might then discover that its political platform of "cultural revolution" and the idea of "world revolution" impede its relations, and that the gains and losses of the previous period should be evaluated and future tasks set. Some of China's postulates undoubtedly deserve the understanding and support of the external world. These are primarily the demand for a place in the United Nations, China's territorial integrity (Taiwan, Quemoy, and Matsu), and trade without discrimination. However China still claims hegemony over the Socialist world and leadership of the international working class movement. Therefore the change in China's foreign policy will be slow. The fundamental characteristic of the process underway in Asia is the struggle the countries are waging against pressure and interference and for complete and genuine independence in foreign policy matters. They want to cooperate with the outer world in accordance with their own national interests. If China continues to behave exclusively and denies the principle of equality in relations with other countries it will face serious loss of prestige in Africa and complete isolation, from which China itself will suffer most.

46

**[FAITHFULNESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL DUTY]**

Vernost' international'nomu dolgu. Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil, v. 49, Sept. 1968: 9-12. U717, R9A27, v. 49

The defense of Czechoslovakia is not an internal affair of the country but a concern of all Socialist countries and a problem regarding the defense of socialism. Socialism and communism are essentially international. National problems can be solved only with regard to the common interests of the Socialist countries and in cooperation with all branches of the international Communist movement. Every country, according to Lenin, must assume a proletarian and class position and not indulge in "neutrality" if fundamental problems of socialism are at stake. As the situation in Czechoslovakia endangered the solidarity and security of the Communist bloc and would have undermined the Warsaw Pact, everyone who understands the interest of socialism must agree that the friendly help of fraternal countries was beneficial to the country and saved it from slipping into the capitalist camp. The new model of socialism that was presented to Czechoslovakia as humanism was aimed at this goal, and thus made a united action of the Socialist countries imperative. The Soviet soldiers came to the country not to interfere in its internal affairs but to protect its sovereignty, independence, and security; they only fulfilled their sacred duty, their weapons were words, not guns, and their behavior expressed their warm feelings toward the population. While the Warsaw Pact is a military organization, it has also a duty to protect the conformity of the social

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and governmental structure of the Socialist states, their Marxist-Leninist principles, faithfulness to the Communist ideals, and international solidarity. It represents a strong wall against subversion and is therefore so strongly attacked by the enemies of the Communist bloc, of which Czechoslovakia is a member.

47

**FORCES OF WARSAW ALLIANCE OCCUPY CZECHOSLOVAKIA.** Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Sept. 11, 1968: 1-17. D839.C87, v. 20

Translated from *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, from Aug. 21 to 26, 1968.

Contents. --The first announcements. --Appeal to Czechoslovak people. --*Pravda* editorial justifies use of troops. --Reports and communiqués. --Appeal from fraternal countries. --*Svoboda* in Moscow.

Complete or condensed texts of official statements, appeals to the Czechoslovak people, and Soviet press reports on the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact armies. Includes full text of the article "Defense of Socialism is the Highest International Duty," the first official justification of the invasion, published in *Pravda* on Aug. 22, 1968.

48

Frankel, Joseph. **COMPARING FOREIGN POLICIES: THE CASE OF NORWAY.** International affairs (London) v. 44, July 1968: 482-493. JX1.I53, v. 44

A case study by Dr. Nils Ørvik reveals several analogies between Great Britain's and Norway's foreign policies since Britain has become a "middle power." Both countries must reconcile their respective geographical pulls--from the United States and Western Europe on the one hand and the menace of Germany and Russia on the other--instead of adopting foreign policies based on a set of preferential attitudes. Both have avoided strategic decisions until they were forced upon them by the course of events. Despite the disparity of resources, both nations are incapable of making adequate provisions for defense. Even with greater public interest in foreign policy, Great Britain has been unable since World War II to formulate constructive policies, while the problems of innovation and adaptation to change are also acute in Norway's Foreign Ministry. The Norwegians, fearful of the disintegration of NATO and not fully trusting Russia, are looking for a foreign policy that will ensure their security. Traditional neutrality has proved of no avail; cooperation with Sweden is unacceptable. "International organization is a weak reed to lean upon," and the value of British naval protection is diminishing. Norwegians have little reason to be pleased with their foreign policy record, although they have had several options; they have lacked the determination and willingness to invest sufficient resources in any one option.

49

Freymond, Pierre. **[SWITZERLAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS]** *La Suisse et l'Organisation des Nations unies.* Politische Rundschau. Revue politique, Revue politique, v. 47, no. 4/6, 1968: 69-78. H1.A16, v. 47

Chronicles Switzerland's relations with the League of Nations and the United Nations and defends its

neutrality policy. Freymond believes the Federal Government should intensify its contacts with U.N. agencies and thoroughly inform the Swiss people regarding U.N. activities. He concludes that Switzerland must maintain its neutral status so that it can continue to serve the world through such organizations as the International Red Cross.

50

Harrigan, Anthony. **CREATIVENESS IN TOTAL DEFENSE.** In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, July 1968: 10-16. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

Stresses the need for willpower, foresight, and innovation to meet the dangers to U.S. security in the next decade. Harrigan calls for creativeness in developing new weapons and military doctrines, in relating political and military means to one another and to the ends of security, and in encouraging public support for foreign policy. He warns against those who mistakenly believe that the United States can safely retreat from its global responsibilities or who advocate defeatist foreign policies and affirms the reasonableness and moral legitimacy of the current U.S. role in world affairs.

51

Hatano, Hirokazu. **SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS TODAY.** Japan quarterly, v. 15, July/Sept. 1968: 309-315. D8801.J274, v. 15

The normalization of Sino-Japanese relations has become a Japanese national issue, with the Liberal Democratic Party openly demanding improvement. While maintaining diplomatic relations with Nationalist China, Japan has recognized the need to continue private trade relations with Communist China. Despite political obstructions, this trade has expanded because of its value to China in speeding up economic development and to Japan in meeting the needs of rapid economic growth. In forming its future diplomatic policy Japan cannot afford to ignore this trade because of its importance for future economic expansion. Unfortunately, a stabilization of relations is prevented by external elements--mainly the U.S. Asian policy, which forced Japan to conclude a peace treaty with Nationalist China and aid in the American military and diplomatic containment of China. It is hoped that during the Vietnam negotiations the United States will reexamine its China policy, because an overemphasis of the Chinese threat may cause a revival of Japanese militarism.

52

Heilbroner, Robert L. **MAKING A RATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY NOW.** Harper's magazine, v. 237, Sept. 1968: 64-71. AP2.H3, v. 237

America's Vietnam dilemma indicates that new policies must be considered for meeting future revolutionary upheavals. Alternative policies could be the withdrawal of all contacts with the underdeveloped world or neutrality toward the revolutionary movements. Neutrality, the most constructive course, calls for halting military aid to reactionary regimes, stopping counter-revolutionary activity, accepting revolutionary nationalist socialism as the most suitable order for guiding many developing nations through initial states of change, and continuing humanitarian programs of food, medical aid, and nonmilitary assistance. In adopting a neutral policy the United States will be accused of aiding an international aggressive

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movement that threatens to engulf the country and of condoning evil for expediency's sake by its acquiescence to the rise of Communist regimes. But the alternative policy of engaging in military actions abroad can bleed America white, and the rise of many nationalistic revolutionary states will probably result in internecine warfare among themselves rather than military action against the United States. Further, although communism has perpetrated evil, if one "cannot and should not seek to minimize the weight on that side of the scale of human suffering, one should also have the courage to pile up whatever weights belong to the other side." America must make the effort to adopt a neutral policy if the Nation will ultimately stand for humanitarianism, open-mindedness, and self-reliance.

53

Hirschfeld, Oswald. [DÉTENTE AND THE OFFENSIVE POLICY] Offensive Politik und Entspannung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Aug. 15, 1968: 370.  
US3.W38, v. 12

Criticizes West German Defense Minister Gerhard Schröder for his opposition to the Kiesinger-Brandt plan that the Federal Government consider a reduction of West German forces to induce relaxation of East-West tensions. Achievement of a détente is among the proclaimed objectives of the Government's Eastern policy.

54

Khalili, Joseph E. SINO-ARAB RELATIONS. Asian survey, v. 8, Aug. 1968: 678-690.  
DS1.A492, 8

By increasing its economic contacts with the Arab countries and playing the theme of Western imperialism, Communist China is challenging the superpowers' influence in the Near East. China wants to gain Arab support for its policies within the international Communist movement as well as toward the West and to use the Arab world as a revolutionary front against the West. However, Arab nationalism and China's ineffectiveness in competing economically with the Soviet Union and the United States have prevented China from realizing its goals. Since the Arab States are already independent, they emphasize national development rather than revolution, so long as they need the superpowers to help them build their countries, the majority of them will remain neutral and nonaligned. Although a long-term Chinese influence in the Near East is improbable, the Chinese can make short-term gains if the Arab world continues on its revolutionary path of hating colonialism and rebelling against the international status quo. Once the Arabs pass this revolutionary stage China's influence will sharply decline. China could, however, successfully penetrate the Middle East by supplying nuclear weapons to the Arabs. If Russia and America continue to withhold these weapons from the Near East, the Arab States may turn to China who, "being ready to wipe out both the West and the Soviet Union from the Middle East and Africa, may indeed lend its nuclear arsenal to them."

55

Klimentko, G. THE G.D.R. INITIATIVE. New times, no. 35, Sept. 4, 1968: 13.  
D639.N483, 1968

In a recent speech approved by the People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic, Walter Ulbricht made some recommendations regarding European

security. He proposed the establishment of normal diplomatic relations among all European countries, admission of both Germanies to the United Nations, signature by West Germany of the nonproliferation treaty, renunciation of the use of force between East and West Germany, and recognition of the existing frontiers and status quo in Europe. He also recommended a treaty to normalize relations between the two Germanies and an exchange of plenipotentiary missions between them provided that West Germany renounces the Hallstein doctrine after the nonuse of force treaty is signed and the existing frontiers recognized. West Germany of course rejected the proposals. The West German revanchists consider the recognition of East German statehood a surrender. They do not want a détente in Europe, will not dissociate themselves from Nazi methods, and support the Sudeten Germans, who strive to foment hatred and grab Czechoslovak territory, thus directly endangering European security.

56

Kudriavtsev, V. INTRICATE EVENTS AND SIMPLE TRUTHS. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 14, Oct. 3, 1968 pt. 1, [item] 2, 1-5.

Slav Rm

Translated from Izvestia, Oct. 2, 1968.

Slav Rm

The events in Czechoslovakia, "a relatively small European country, it would seem," provoked an unbelievable reaction in the whole world. This reaction resulted from the evaluation of the events by the bourgeois leaders, press, and some members of "progressive circles" as fitting into the scheme of interstate conflicts customary for capitalist countries--hence the screams about intervention, violation of the rules on relations between large and small states, spheres of influence, etc. Actually, if considered from the Communist viewpoint, the events are not a clash of interests of great and small powers, but a struggle between two social systems displayed within one state. In such a case, according to Lenin, the formal features of events cannot be placed above their content. Thus it is correct to undermine imperialist states and protect socialist states from being undermined by the imperialists. The imperialist propaganda quite artfully juggles the formal aspects of the bourgeois international law and might temporarily impress some representatives of the progressive circles. But these people will soon realize that the intentions of the West to discredit Socialist ideas must be checked, especially in the Third World where many countries are still choosing their path to socialism. In serious cases risks must be taken for the sake of the future of the Socialist world and the entire world as well. The repercussions of the entry of Soviet armies into Czechoslovakia prove that the main trump of the imperialist camp has been beaten by the far-sighted policy of the Socialist countries. The map of Europe would have been changed in the imperialists' favor had they been able to arrest Czechoslovakia, which has a great strategic value, from the Socialist community.

57

Lerski, George J. THE PAKISTAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE: A REEVALUATION OF THE PAST DECADE. Asian survey, v. 8, May 1968: 400-415.  
DS1.A492, v. 8

The United States very early showed a preference for India over its Moslem rival, Pakistan, but the cold war forced a change of attitude. Faced with

## I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Indian uncooperativeness, the United States had no choice but to make Pakistan the keystone of the containment policy in southern Asia. However, after a period of fruitful cooperation in the late 1950's, the Kennedy administration--with the support of a powerful India lobby of American intellectuals--turned back to the older "India first" policy. Since Pakistan's primary aim in cooperating with the United States was to get support for a favorable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, this new favoritism toward India was bound to have negative consequences for U.S. - Pakistani relations. U.S. aid to India during its confrontation with China in 1962 left the impression that the United States intended to make India the dominant power in southern Asia. But the decisive blow was struck when postponement of the Aid-to-Pakistan consortium in 1965 convinced Ayub Khan that the U.S. would never support a just settlement for Kashmir. Already in 1962 the Pakistanis had begun their rapprochement with China. With its anti-Communist commitments and the Kashmir dispute, Pakistan faced the hostility of the three largest nations in the world and in exchange for this exposure seemed to get nothing from the United States--certainly an intolerable situation. Termination of U.S. military aid to India and Pakistan in 1965 was wise, but in the future economic aid should be predicated on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute in accordance with United Nations resolutions on self-determination. This, plus a joint guarantee of the frontiers of the two states, might succeed in reducing their military burdens to more reasonable levels.

58

Lodge, Milton. "GROUPISM" IN THE POST-STALIN PERIOD. *Midwest journal of political science*, v. 12, Aug. 1968: 330-351. JAL M5, v. 12

This study is an attitudinal analysis of five Soviet elites--the central Party apparatchiki, and four specialist elites: the central economic bureaucrats, the military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. By content analyzing representative elite journals for the years from 1952 through 1965 data were collected to measure the development of gruppovshchina (groupism) since Stalin. The data suggest: (1) the specialist elites increasingly manifest a sense of group self consciousness and ascribed group status, and (2) over time the specialist elites develop a distinct set of policy orientations which differentiates them from the Party apparatchiki and challenges the dominance of the apparatchiki in the Soviet political system. (Supplied summary).

59

Lorince, Gabriel. THE RUMANIAN-YUGOSLAV ENTENTE. *New statesman*, v. 76, Aug. 30, 1968: 248-249. AP4, N64, v. 76

Second article in a section entitled "The Czech Crisis."

Russia may use force to prevent a pro-Czechoslovak Rumanian-Yugoslav entente, in light of Ceausescu's and Tito's reactions to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tito has affirmed that Yugoslavia will defend its freedom no matter where the danger comes from, while the Rumanian leader has announced that an invasion of his country would be considered an act of war. Bucharest took a dangerously uncompromising stand over the invasion, but it had little choice: had Rumania not reaffirmed the inalienable right of Communist parties to decide their own internal course and had it not asserted the principle of equality and noninterference

in domestic affairs, it "would have found itself back under the Russian thumb like Poland after 1956." Rumania has severed its last remaining ties with the Warsaw Pact and Comecon because of its stand against Russia--this it did even without being occupied by "fraternal forces." However, these reactions indicate only part of the price Russia will have to pay for its invasion of Czechoslovakia.

60

Mayer, Peter. COHESION AND CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. A STUDY OF MARXIST-LENINIST CONCEPTS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1968. 256 p. HX44. M365

Contents.--The unity theory vs. socialism in one country.--The Soviet view of the socialist world state: development and control factor aspects.--A consideration of Chinese contributions to "Marxism," including "prolonged struggle" and "revolutionary fervor."--The Sino-Soviet dispute, and some implications for the future of the world Communist movement.--The Soviet Union and East Europe: conflict, support and opposition.--The international Communist movement: a reappraisal of some theoretical concepts.--Bibliography.

An investigation of the historical and ideological sources of Communist discord. Mayer describes the theoretical foundations of the Soviet approach to Communist unity as these were laid down in the Stalin-Trotsky dispute over socialism in one country and then traces the application of this theory in Soviet relations with foreign Communist parties, China, and Eastern Europe. While the central theoretical concept of Marxism-Leninism is "proletarian internationalism," Soviet practice has always rested squarely on the policy of building socialism within the framework of the nation-state. With the appearance of an alternative center of national power in China, a split in the international movement was inevitable, not because the Soviet and Chinese parties each adopted policies designed to "maximize national points of strength, and minimize those which led toward weakness," but because of "the almost pathological Soviet inability to know where to draw the line regarding insistence on the implementation of their own policy wishes and priorities." These matters raise the perennial question of the role of theory in Soviet policy. The specific historical form of the question is, What happens when the partisans of a "single-strand deterministic conception of human history" are brought face to face with diversity? Mayer suggests that the role of theory may be crucial; in decisive respects the bitter schisms that now plague the Communist movement are the outcome of a social philosophy which leaves no room for pluralism.

61

Mayhew, Christopher P. BRITAIN'S ROLE TOMORROW. London, Hutchinson [1967] 192 p. map. UA647. M484

Partial contents.--The continuing crisis.--Peace-keeping and political change.--Peace-keeping and the pound.--Leaving the Gulf.--Leaving South East Asia.--A maritime presence?--'East of Suez' summarised.--Why I resigned.--A single armed service.--Appendix I: SEATO and CENTO.--Index.

Argues for Britain to withdraw East of Suez and offers a program that would assure Great Britain an

honorable place in future world politics. Mayhew contends that Britain's East of Suez policy is anachronistic, counterproductive, too expensive, and its economic and political consequences are a serious hindrance to what should be Britain's role in Europe. The author proposes a 3-stage program that envisions Franco-British nuclear cooperation, German reunification, a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, and arms inspection and control. He concludes that the program is ambitious but not impossible or irrational.

- 62  
Mikhailov, M. EUROPEAN UNITY: THE AIMS BEHIND THE SLOGANS. Soviet Union, no. 10 (223) 1968: 1. DK266.A25574, 1968

The Western world still cannot reconcile itself to the fact that a Socialist and a capitalist Europe is today a political reality, and it tries to draw the central and East European countries into the orbit of capitalism. George Ball, U.S. Undersecretary of State and representative to the United Nations, disclosed the U.S. strategy in his book *The Discipline of Power* and in an interview with a correspondent of the French magazine *Réalités*. He maintains that Western Europe, united in a confederation of states, will gradually draw the East European countries from the Socialist community one by one. This concept clearly ignores the creation of European collective security and the Soviet principle of coexistence between countries with different social systems. The Soviet Union supports a pan-European system of collective security, European cooperation, and the development of mutually beneficial ties between the capitalist and the Socialist Europes. These ideas agreed upon at the Bratislava meeting enjoy the support of many people in capitalist Europe who are sick of the presence of American soldiers on the soil of their countries, and they represent a constructive program for peace and security in Europe. The Socialist countries agreed at Bratislava to pursue a common European policy, rebuff any attempts to revise the results of the Second World War and the existing frontiers in Europe, insist on the invalidity of the Munich agreement, and support East Germany and all forces fighting for democracy and progress. The fight for European cooperation is inseparable from the fight against imperialist attempts, open or covert, to export counterrevolution to East European countries. The conference recommended the convocation of a general European peace congress where the European peoples could make their voices heard, for in this day and age they have a real chance to influence their diplomats and governments.

- 63  
MOSCOW'S REPORTING OF THE INVASION AND ITS CAUSES. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Sept. 11, 1968 18-23. D839.C67, v. 20  
Translated from *Pravda* or *Izvestia*, from Aug. 22 to 25, 1968

Contents: --The role of the media --With the advancing troops --League's reception --First night in town --The secret C. C. P. congress --Unofficial local press treatment --Armed hostilities --All quiet in Ostrava --Examples of resistance and its opponents

Full or condensed texts of Soviet press reports on the events following the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Treaty troops and the resistance of the Czechoslovak population, and interpretations of the causes of the invasion.

- 64  
Nobel, Gentia. [A PROGNOSIS THAT WILL NEVER BE FULFILLED] Eine Prognose, die sich nicht erfüllen wird. Einheit, v. 23, no. 7, 1968: 907-911. HX6.E4, v. 23

Argues with the Zbigniew Brzezinski article published in the January 1968 issue of *Foreign Affairs* and reprinted in the May 29, 1968, issue of the West German *Das Parlament* under the title "Amerika im technetronischen Zeitalter" [America in the Technetronic Age]. Brzezinski's forecast that the world will eternally be divided into elite and second-class nations is "as reactionary and macabre" as some of Mao Tse-tung's ideas and as Lin Biao's thesis of "the world city," comprising Western Europe and North America, and "the world village," consisting of all the other continents. Brzezinski is "one of the fathers of [American] global strategy," designed to subject other nations to nuclear threats and economic exploitation by imperialism.

- 65  
Novoseltsev, I. BONN'S EASTERN POLICY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. International affairs (Moscow) no. 6, July 1968: 27-33. D839.1465, 1968

Attacks Bonn's Eastern policy as being interconnected with U.S. imperialist global strategy. West Germany's attempts at bridge building with the East are indicative of America's weakening position in world politics, and as the U.S. imperialists sink deeper into the Vietnam quagmire "the temptation of 'peacefully erasing' the Western flanks and strongholds of the Socialist community [becomes] more luring." Novoseltsev contends that it is no coincidence that America's escalation in Vietnam has usually been followed by Bonn's peace-loving gestures toward the European Socialist nations, and that despite the centrifugal tendencies in NATO, the United States is unlikely to give up its presence on the Continent or abandon the Atlantic alliance as an instrument of its influence and domination. The author concludes that Bonn wants only to expand its sphere of influence over Eastern Europe but that the Socialist states will resist any such attempt.

- 66  
OUR OPINION [User Standpoint] Der klare Blick, v. 3, Sept. 18, 1968: 1. P&GP RR

States the opinion of the members of the Swiss Eastern Institute (Scheideggisches Ost-Institut) on the occupation of Czechoslovakia, an event they predicted on the basis of the very logic of Soviet communism and which brought such confusion to the ranks of students of world affairs. The path Czechoslovakia took and in which Rumania and Yugoslavia are engaged should be welcomed as it opens the way to a real coexistence. Since a possible alternative to this coexistence is only the long-run a third world war, the contacts with Russia must be continued. But, in destroying the hopeful beginning of a real coexistence in Czechoslovakia, Russia proved that it continues to pursue its imperialist policy of world domination. The Soviet Union uses totalitarianism as an export article backed by enormous power potential, like the fascism of the 1930's. This totalitarianism must be exposed and checked by all possible means.

- 67  
PRESS STEPS UP CRITICISM OF CZECHOSLOVAK DEVELOPMENTS. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Sept. 4, 1968: 1-14. D839.C67, v. 20



## I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

Contents. --Place of national characteristics in socialism. --Krasnaya zvezda on combat readiness and vigilance. --Soviet military leaders confer with G.D.R. and Polish Army leaders. --Czechoslovak talks with G.D.R. and Rumania. --On foreign press response to Bratislava statement. --Reporting on "antisocialist" activities in Prague. --Pravda editorial on socialist solidarity. --The border and the Sudeten Germans. --Rude pravo condemns leaflet attacking militia.

Complete or condensed texts and abstracts of articles from Soviet newspapers on the developments in Czechoslovakia after the invasion by the Warsaw Pact armies.

68

Radovanovic, Ljubomir V. **THE NON-ALIGNMENT POLICY TODAY**. Beograd, Međunarodna politika, 1966. 53 p. (Međunarodna politika. Studies, 1966, no. 13) D639.3.M285, 1966, no. 13

Partial contents. --pt. 1. Non-alignment and active coexistence. --pt. 2. Conferences of the non-aligned. --pt. 3. "After Cairo: Is non-aligned policy ineffective? Is non-aligned policy outdated? Non-alignment--a policy of independence. Non-aligned and developing countries. The principle of peacefulness. Anti-colonialism of the policy of non-alignment. --pt. 4. Immediate tasks. The world disarmament conference. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Against interventionism. --pt. 5. The meeting in New Delhi.

Describes and defends the policy of nonalignment. Nonalignment is "an active, positive and constructive policy which is striving for a collective peace as the only possible basis of collective security." The immediate tasks of the nonaligned countries are to bring about the universal renunciation of the use of force in international relations and to promote the economic and social progress of the developing nations through international cooperation.

69

Rubenstein, A. R. **POWER AND PURPOSE**. In: U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth Military Review, v. 48, Sept. 1966, 3-9. illus. Z6723.U35 v. 48

National power is meaningful only when related to national purpose. Establishing such a relation is a problem of both philosophy and politics. Philosophy because purposes must be articulated in terms of basic values of politics because in a democracy it is necessary to bring about a congruence of purpose with public opinion. In the United States primary responsibility in these matters has devolved upon the President at the expense of the other two branches of the Government. The President's capacity to act is limited, however, by the momentum and inertia of the Federal bureaucracy. This leads to the misperception of the national purpose or to inert programs designed to promote it. The very foundations of Federalistic government are threatened by the resulting misperception of policy and purpose. In order to narrow the gap between the ideal, the decision maker must accurately evaluate the goals, the costs, of all possible courses of action, recognize and understand those forces in the world over which he has no control, be familiar with the instruments of policy, and be disposed and able to follow public opinion.

70

SarDesai, D. R. **INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CAMBODIA, LAOS, AND VIETNAM, 1947-1964**. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966. 336 p. DS448.S24

Contents. --Introduction. --India and the nationalist movement in Indochina. --Collective peace or collective defense? --India, SEATO, and Bandung. --India and the two Vietnams, 1954-1958. --India and Cambodia, 1954-1958. --India and Laos, role in the Laotian crisis, 1959-1962. --The aftermath of the Chinese invasion. --Conclusions. --Notes. --Bibliography. --Index.

Traces India's relations with the Indochinese states and analyzes Sino-Indian relations in respect to South-east Asia, a region of interest to both countries. The major force behind India's postwar foreign policy was Nehru, whose imprint of views was evident on every aspect of government life but on none so exclusively as foreign affairs. SarDesai believes India's postwar foreign policy is dualistic and unrealistic and that it distorts India's attitudes toward the problems of the Indochinese states. The author concludes that India has failed to place the Vietnam War in its Sino-Soviet perspective because it ignores the relationship between China's support of North Vietnam and the Chinese behavior in the Himalayas.

Sawhney, Ratna. **CHINA'S POLICY, INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES**. New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1968. 52 p. fold. map. DS740.4.S25

Partial contents. --Background to modern China. --Analysis of China's policy and intentions. --The war in Vietnam. --China's capabilities. --Bibliography.

Analyzes China's policy, intentions, and capabilities in relation to other Asian powers, especially India, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and assesses its intentions and capabilities from military, geographical, historical, economic, and industrial perspectives. Sawhney concludes that China is firmly resolved to achieve a dominant position in Asia and become a great world power, but he rules out the possibility of a Chinese military invasion of India both in the short and long term. Cognizant of the growing collusion between China and Pakistan owing to their hostile anti-Indian attitudes, Sawhney advocates political and economic cooperation with other Asian nations, sustained by military preparedness.

72

Sayed, Khalid B. **SOUTHEAST ASIA IN PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY**. Pacific Affairs, v. 41, summer 1966, 330-344. DUE, P5 v. 41

Analyzes Southeast Asia's role in Pakistan's foreign policy. Although Pakistan's dominant concern has been to enhance its security and economic development through close ties to one or more of the major powers, it has also pursued these policy objectives to a lesser extent in its relations with Southeast Asia. Since Pakistan joined SEATO in 1954, its policy makers have displayed a pragmatic approach to world affairs. From 1954 to 1962 Pakistan willingly supported U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia. However, Pakistan was dismayed by massive U.S. military aid to India and in 1962 began to diversify its sources of support and turned to Communist China. Now it attempts to maintain friendly relations with both China and the United

States and cultivate relations with the Soviet Union, while deepening its influence in Southeast Asia. Through emphasizing their Islamic bond and developing trade arrangements, Pakistani diplomats are attempting to woo their Eastern neighbors, although not as ardently as many East Pakistanis desire.

73

Schrader, Erich. INDIA'S POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. German foreign policy, v. 7, no. 4, 1968: 283-291. DD261.4.D353, v. 7

Explains the origins and motives of India's nonalignment policy and describes its fluctuations from 1947 until the present. The policy, defined and conducted by India's bourgeoisie, has largely reflected popular sentiment and has been supported by the Communist Party of India, which takes exception to the Government's bourgeois views on international affairs.

74

Schwarz, Siegfried. BONN AND THE POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE. German foreign policy, v. 7, no. 4, 1968: 260-269. DD261.4.D353, v. 7

Suspects Bonn of plans to achieve hegemony over Western Europe, which would endanger the peace in Europe. Schwarz considers the new West German efforts for West European integration in noneconomic areas a means toward that goal.

75

Sharp, Mitchell. CANADA AND THE UNITED NATIONS. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. Canadian weekly bulletin, v. 23, Oct. 23, 1968: 1-2, 6. F1034.A3, v. 23

Address by Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the U.N. General Assembly, stating Canada's position on Vietnam, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, apartheid, the population explosion, and the relation between these problems and the U.N. Sharp believes the U.N. will never become an effective peacekeeping organization until it reflects the world as it is and represents all the nations of the world, especially Communist China, which plays an important part in the international community. Canada is exploring the possibilities of entering into diplomatic relations with Communist China because such a large country must not remain shut off from the rest of the world and unrepresented at the U.N.

76

Skilling, H. Gordon. CRISIS AND CHANGE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. International journal, v. 23, summer 1968: 456-465. D839.I5, v. 23

Traces the origin and progress of the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia, points out that it owes its existence to a delicate balance of conservative, centrist, and liberal forces within the Communist Party, and calls attention to a number of serious tests ahead for the regime in domestic and foreign policy. Czechoslovak policy toward the U.S.S.R. is currently one of "loyal independence," but there is an undercurrent of anti-Soviet opinion as well as strong sentiment favoring a more radical alteration of foreign policy. Barring a major internal crisis in Czechoslovakia itself, the Soviet bloc is unlikely to intervene directly, but other pressures--economic and psychological--can be expected. It is possible that Czechoslovakia

will go the way of Rumania or even Yugoslavia, or that it will make a complete break with the Communist camp.

77

Spence, J. E. [SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBORS: EFFORTS TO BREAK ISOLATION IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY] Südafrika und seine Nachbarn. Die Bemühungen um eine Durchbrechung der ausserpolitischen Isolierung. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Apr. 25, 1968: 286-294. map. D839.E86, v. 23

Points out the dilemma of South Africa's foreign policy in supporting the existing regimes of neighboring countries. The nation's security requires stable regimes of its neighbors, which in turn calls for increased economic cooperation by South Africa. This could cause South Africa to intervene in the internal strife of these countries and thus escalate conflicts there, which might adversely affect the nation's security. For the time being the Organization of African Unity has proved its impotence to seriously threaten South Africa's position in the world.

78

Stockwin, J. A. A. DOMESTIC POLITICAL RESTRAINTS ON JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY. Australian outlook, v. 22, Aug. 1968: 176-189. DU80.A947, v. 22

Rejects recent arguments purporting to show that Japan is about to embark on a radically new and more active foreign policy, probably of a rightwing, nationalistic type. Stockwin argues that Japanese policymaking is subject to strong domestic political restraints and consequently there is likely to be "a great deal of movement, but little real 'progress' in Japanese foreign policy." He describes how these restraints--sharp political divisions between the parties and within the electorate, factionalism in the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), and a tendency of the LDP leadership to subordinate politics to economics--prevent radical new departures in policy on the crucial issues of the nonproliferation treaty, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Okinawa, and relations with China. Although some changes are inevitable, Japanese Governments are likely to avoid fundamental revisions of political or military policy for some time to come.

79

THE TRUTH SHALL WIN [by A. D.] Central Europe journal, v. 16, Aug./Sept. 1968: 251-252. DB200.7.S74, v. 16

Using as his title and point of departure the motto of Thomas Masaryk, first president of Czechoslovakia, who said "The Truth Shall Win," the author depicts the tragedy of the second Republic, the CSSR, which added a second "S" to its name for "Socialist." He analyzes the reasons for the brutal Soviet attack on its brother state in the Warsaw Pact. They are mainly reasons of a geopolitical-strategic nature, but also the fear that Slovak aspirations toward self-determination could spread to Ukraine in the Soviet Union, plus anxiety that with developments in the CSSR the stability of the Ulbricht and Gomulka regimes could become questionable. This event points up the fact that a new third bloc has formed alongside the Communist bloc of the Soviet Union and that of Red China. For the western world it contains the warning, once and for all, that Communism is no joking matter, that we must close

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ranks more tightly so that by sober and realistic cooperation the old slogan can be fulfilled--The Truth Shall Win. (Supplied summary, modified)

80

Vernant, Jacques. [THE EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA] Les événements de Tchécoslovaquie. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, Oct. 1968: 1511-1517. D410.R45, v. 24

Traces Czechoslovak political events from January to August 1967 and analyzes Russia's decision to invade the country. The Russians invaded Czechoslovakia because they feared that Czechoslovak freedom would spread to other East European satellite countries and would vitiate the Warsaw Pact. Vernant believes the invasion will hamper Russia's efforts for nonproliferation because West Germany now will not sign the nonproliferation treaty. The author concludes that the invasion caused the greatest setback for international communism since the Sino-Soviet split.

81

Vetter, Gottfried. [DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN INTERNAL RELATIONS] Zur Entwicklung der innerdeutschen Beziehungen. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, May 10, 1968: 309-319. D839.E86, v. 23

Assesses the impact of West Germany's new Eastern policy on its relations with East Germany. The more Bonn tries to relax its relations with East European nations the more the East German regime resorts to cold war measures toward West Germany, for fear that Bonn's policy might undermine East Germany's position in East Europe.

82

Volgin, M. BRIDGES ON ROTTEN FOUNDATIONS. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, July 31, 1968: 7-8. E 9.C87, v. 20  
Translated from *Izvestiia*, July 11, 1968: 4. Slav Rm

U.S. strategists began recently to implement with zeal the "bridge building" policy that has become an official weapon and new tactical approach in the struggle against the world Socialist commonwealth. This policy is accompanied by a new doctrine based on a differentiated policy toward the Socialist countries, by which the West would establish the closest possible relations with the Socialist countries in Eastern Europe, especially those that American strategists consider "vulnerable." These countries must be given economic aid and concessions in foreign trade, and the West must try "by peaceful methods" to foster nationalism, separatism, and ideological confusion within them. The aim of this economic, ideological, and political sabotage is to produce a split in the Communist bloc, to tear the countries away from it and return them to the sphere of capitalism. When a change occurs in one of them this method would be immediately applied, in addition to "bridge building" techniques and an atrocious campaign of insinuations and outright lies. At present American propaganda seems to operate on two fronts, using ideological sabotage against Socialist countries on one hand, and hampering the growing influence of communism and the Communist movement on the other. This growth was best demonstrated in the Italian elections, in which the Communist Party won about a million votes. Under various pretexts and using various methods, the Americans are trying to persuade the world that communism

is in a crisis and that a "decommunization of Marxism" is underway in Czechoslovakia. The idea is ridiculous and the phrase itself verbal nonsense. Furthermore, trade is being used to build bridges to Socialist countries and to "drive a wedge into the economic relations and cooperation among [them]." In the present situation the machinations of the imperialists must be watched with "high revolutionary vigilance, in order to prevent nationalist and revisionist elements from undermining the world Communist system. The struggle against imperialist ideological sabotage and the effort to consolidate the commonwealth of Socialist countries must be given high priority.

83

Walther, Gebhardt von. [PECULIARITIES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY] Eigenarten der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, June 10, 1968: 381-392. D839.E86, v. 23

A slightly abbreviated version of a lecture delivered on May 9, 1968, to the members of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bad Godesberg.

Soviet foreign policy emanates from an east-Slavic mentality unfamiliar to most Western observers. Its bearers have long been conditioned by the Communist storehouse of concepts and semantics entirely different from the standard ones. No one outside the Politburo really knows what decisionmaking process determines Soviet policy. All this accounts for a gap in understanding between the U.S.S.R. and the West that is much wider than generally supposed. The Russian nation is nonaggressive by nature; its historical experience and traditional distrust of the West explain its pathological security complex and passion for peace. But this people "is unusually critical and suspicious of its own government." Hence the constant need for Soviet leaders to prove to their own people that no facet of their foreign policy endangers peace. The overriding concern of Soviet policy is to avoid uncalculable risks to the nation. With clearheaded realism Russian policymakers evaluate enemy and friend alike solely in terms of power. Compromise, an important element in Western political thought, is totally alien to Soviet thinking, which considers any concession a symptom of weakness, error, or lack of political talent. Russian foreign policy has traditionally combined ideological considerations with those of national interest. Ambivalence between emphasis on Communist ideology and Russian national interests sometimes reinforces, sometimes weakens one or the other. Soviet policy has always tried to keep many options open to best attain its long-range goals. The history of Soviet policy on Germany since the end of World War II demonstrates that it is the most consistent policy in the world, despite all appearances to the contrary.

84

Wettig, Gerhard. [THE ACTION PATTERN OF THE SOVIET BERLIN POLICY] Aktionsmuster der sowjetischen Berlin-Politik. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, June 1968: 325-339. D839.A885, v. 19

Moscow and East Berlin's long-range plan for West Berlin is to sever the city's umbilical cord with the German Federal Republic and Western powers and eventually annex West Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. Soviet and East German propaganda has consistently considered West Berlin's ties with West Germany a violation of the Potsdam Agreement. However, the Communists do not see such a violation in East German interference in West Berlin domestic affairs, which they

advocate on the ground that the alleged revival of nazism and fascism in the city threatens the German Democratic Republic's security. Moscow's new moves against the city, conducted through the East German regime, are much subtler than Moscow's overt actions of 1948-49 and 1958.

85

**WORLD STRATEGIC PICTURE: A WIND OF CHANGE BLOWS IN EASTERN EUROPE** [by] S. G. Cosantoir, the Irish defence journal, v. 28, Aug. 1968: 248-250. map. U1.C8, v. 28

An account of the events leading up to the emergence of Alexander Dubcek as the Czechoslovak National Party leader and a study of Russia's reaction to Czechoslovakia's reform movement. The Soviet Union believes the changes in Czechoslovakia will adversely affect the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and damage Russia's claim to world Communist leadership, already diminished by the withdrawal from Soviet control of Yugoslavia and Albania. Czechoslovakia also offers economic advantages to the Soviet Union by way of the profitable Russian war machine. The author concludes that Russia's leaders are badly divided over Czechoslovakia and that this division could have far-reaching repercussions.

86

**Yost, Charles W. WORLD ORDER AND AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY.** Foreign affairs, v. 47, Oct. 1968: 1-14. D410.F6, v. 47

In the aftermath of Vietnam, Americans may become somewhat reluctant to intervene militarily in the affairs of other states. Yet world tension is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future, and as a responsible world power the United States must do everything possible to limit international conflicts that involve the inter-

ests of the superpowers and could escalate into wider hostilities. Unfortunately during the next decade the United States can expect little help from its allies in checking worldwide violence. Individual European states are unwilling and unable to risk responsibilities outside the Continent. Strong psychological and political factors will most likely inhibit the Japanese Government for many years from assuming a large role in maintaining the security of East Asia. Members of the Organization of American States will be able to participate in peacekeeping activities in Latin America, but nowhere else. Thus, for at least the next 10 years, the Soviet Union will become the United States principal "partner" in maintaining world order. Despite their many unresolved differences, both powers are anxious to avoid situations that could lead to nuclear war and share a joint interest in containing any aggression by China. Because of the high stakes involved, every effort must be made to turn competition between the superpowers into cooperation. American and Soviet leaders should concentrate on ending the arms race and finding solutions to the troubled situations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Since there will be many situations where neither its allies nor the Russians will be willing to cooperate in checking outbreaks of violence, the United States will continue to be confronted with "unilateral responsibilities, arising from previous commitments or from continuing interests, for the maintenance of international security." However, the Vietnam situation has demonstrated to the United States that it must limit its responsibilities to assisting only those countries that are threatened by overt aggression or by unpopular insurgency efforts. In addition to restricting its military and economic support to only competent and representative governments, the United States should seek the support of North Vietnam and Communist China in "neutralizing" Southeast Asia and endeavor to create effective multilateral machinery to keep the peace in the Middle East and Africa.

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

### A. MODERN WAR

87

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT; THE 1967 CAMPAIGN.  
New York, C. Scribner's Sons [1968] 55 p.  
DS127. A77 1968b

Contents. --The Arab-Jewish conflict up to 1964: The Palestine problem. The Sinai campaign of 1956. Arab-Israeli relations 1957-1964. --The June War of 1967: Terrorism 1965-1967. The eve of the war. The course of the war--June 5-10, 1967. The situation at the end of the fighting. --Developments since the war: The aftermath of the war. Events and incidents June 1967-January 1968. Attitudes to the Middle East situation. International moves on the Middle East question. --Select bibliography.

Chronicles the events leading up to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the stages of the war, and the postwar developments.

88

Beaufre, André. BATTLEFIELDS OF THE 1980'S. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 1-17. U104. C155 1968

Although the massive destructive powers of nuclear weapons will probably continue to inhibit their usage in the 1980's, the risk of conventional warfare will by no means be eliminated. Conventional conflicts are particularly likely in the areas of the world not covered by the nuclear deterrent. However, brief confrontations that do not involve the risk of escalation could occur even within the deterrence zone. Furthermore an alteration of the present strategic situation could substantially increase the possibility that major conventional wars could again break out among the big powers. By the 1980's, evolutionary developments should substantially improve the capabilities of conventional weapons. New materials will undoubtedly increase the durability and versatility of existing systems, and new techniques of production should greatly reduce their production costs. Advances in electronics are expected to increase the accuracy of firepower and the efficiency of tracking and interception operations. While the new technology will offer military planners a number of options in the next 20 years, they must make their selections in a framework of uncertainty since the relative values of the new techniques can be accurately determined only on the battlefield. Conventional wars of the future will take three basic forms, depending on whether the adversaries are technically unequal, extremely unequal, or reasonably well matched. When the opponents are technically unequal, the superior power will launch a swift attack to establish a fait accompli before the machinery of escalation is set in motion. Conflict between two markedly unmatched adversaries falls under the category of guerrilla warfare. War between relatively evenly matched opponents is fortunately not very realistic. It "could result

only from a conjunction of grave political disagreements between two developed nations and the neutralization of nuclear deterrence." Such a war could assume the shape of a blitzkrieg or could develop into a prolonged conflict similar to the two World Wars. In the absence of a juridical process for settling disputes, nuclear sanctions must be maintained to impose limits on the conflicts that will inevitably erupt as a result of continued tension in the world.

89

Calder, Nigel, ed. UNLESS PEACE COMES; A SCIENTIFIC FORECAST OF NEW WEAPONS. New York, Viking Press [1968] 243 p.  
U104. C155 1968

Contents. --Introduction, by Abdus Salam. --Conventional warfare: battlefields of the 1980s, by André Beaufre. --Guerrilla warfare: the poor man's power, by Vladimir Dedijer. --Nuclear weapons, 1: the perils of nuclear proliferation, by John Cockcroft. --Nuclear weapons, 2: the outlook for nuclear explosives, by David Inglis. --Aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft: contests in the sky, by Andrew Stratton. --Computers in warfare: the strategic calculators, by Harvey Wheeler. --Undersea warfare: militarized oceans, by William A. Nierenberg. --Chemical weapons: the toxic arsenal, by Marcel Fetizon and Michel Magat. --Microbiological weapons: the infectious dust cloud, by Carl-Göran Hedén. --Self controlling weapons: robots on the march, by M. W. Thring. --Geophysical warfare: how to wreck the environment, by Gordon J. F. MacDonald. --Implications, 1: fears of a psychologist, by Otto Klineberg. --Implications, 2: we have been here before, Philip Noel-Baker. --Summary: the new weapons, by Nigel Calder.

Predicts the effect future weapons and warfare will have on mankind. Unless nations disarm, the future holds a horrifying assemblage of weapons that will be capable of killing all life on earth. A safeguards system can be established with a detection system effective enough so that no country will risk the political ignominy of being caught. And the assumption that China, the main stumbling block to disarmament, will not negotiate is foolish because it has never been tested. Then, once disarmament is achieved, there will be no reason for maintaining chemical and biological research institutions.

90

Dedijer, Vladimir. THE POOR MAN'S POWER. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 18-29. U104. C155 1968

Guerrilla warfare is becoming the only means by which the underdeveloped countries can confront modern military forces with a good chance of success. As long as the nuclear stalemate continues, guerrilla warfare will be the principal military factor of our time as underprivileged nations seek to rid themselves of corrupt governments and Great Power "spheres of influence."

ence." Despite the new weapons available to major powers, guerrilla movements will continue to flourish. The only means of defeating guerrillas is to lay waste the entire country with nuclear weapons. However, because this is an irrational political objective, the only strategy open to regular forces is to eliminate the guerrillas one by one. This becomes costly in lives and materiel and is beyond the resources of even the biggest nations. Unless the political idea can be killed, a well-organized guerrilla movement is indestructible. To eliminate guerrilla warfare it is necessary to dispel the conditions that cause it. The situation in the underdeveloped countries is critical, and unless there is a fresh, concerted effort by the powerful and rich nations of East and West to help these countries, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia will undergo violent revolutions. And because they will most likely not be permitted to take their course swiftly and without foreign intervention, long guerrilla wars will ensue.

91

Dudley, C. E. THE ROLE OF THE GUERRILLA IN INSURRECTIONARY WARFARE. In Royal United Service Institution, London, Journal, v. 113, May 1968: 136-138. U1.R8, v. 113

Examines different ways of organizing revolutionary movements, emphasizing Mao Tse-tung's use of the guerrilla. Dudley notes that although guerrilla units fulfill three basic functions--they serve as a unit of party and army organization, aid in mobilizing the population for war, and fight--the insurrectionary process adopts different functions as conditions demand and remains in continuous flux. But the guerrilla's role on the battlefield is subordinate to his role as a disciple of the ideology he represents.

92

Geyer, Georgie A. WHY GUEVARA FAILED: AN INTERVIEW WITH REGIS DEBRAY. Saturday review, v. 51, Aug. 24, 1968: 14-18. Z1219. S25, v. 51

Cites reasons for the failure of Guevara's guerrilla movement in Bolivia. Lack of the Bolivian Communist Party's support and failure to account for Bolivian nationalism were major factors, along with general failure of the "guerrilla philosophy" throughout Latin America. Modern counterinsurgency methods have proved effective in suppressing rural guerrilla movements, but future revolutionary violence threatens to erupt in the cities.

93

Hillam, Ray C. COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS FROM THE EARLY CHINESE AND JAPANESE EXPERIENCE AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. Orbis, v. 12, spring 1968: 226-246. illus. D839. O66, v. 12

The fundamental lessons of the Chinese Nationalist and Japanese experiences against the Communists are that concrete and realistic counterinsurgency goals must be established and that guerrillas must be isolated and not underestimated. The most important factor in counterinsurgency is political control; rural and social programs are vital to a secure-and-hold military strategy. In 1930, the Chinese Nationalists' military strategy was based on the belief that, with superior numbers, communications, and armaments, the Nationalist army could march into Communist territory and annihilate the enemy force. This strategy played into the

hands of the Communists, who easily defeated these conventional tactics by mobility, intelligence, and efficiency of organization during the three "encirclement campaigns." Consequently, in 1934 the Nationalists effected major changes in their military strategy that made the Communists' military position untenable by the end of that year. The Communists retreated from their main base of operation in Kiangsi for refuge to the caves of Yen-an. However, the Nationalists failed to follow up their military victory in Kiangsi and allowed the Communists to reestablish themselves. Although the Japanese had fought insurgents in Taiwan and Korea, they were not prepared to carry out effective counterinsurgency operations in China until the early 1940's. Their initial strategy was defensive; its aim was to control transportation, reduce insurgent attacks, and induce the guerrillas to attack the network of fortified blockhouses that protected railway and communication lines. This strategy failed because the forts were too dispersed to contain insurgent penetration. But the greatest Japanese and Nationalist failures were in the political area. The Japanese "might have been able to exploit their political devices more effectively" had they been less medieval in their tactics, while the Nationalists' failure to pursue land reform and strengthen peasant organizations contributed in large measure to the ultimate Communist victory.

94

Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR NUCLEAR WARS. In their The year 2000: a framework for speculation on the next thirty-three years. New York, Macmillan [1967] p. 316-332. illus. CB160. K3 1967

Scenarios on nuclear war in the last third of the 20th century. The authors point out that although nuclear war has come to appear less and less plausible there is no guarantee it will not occur. Plausible nuclear war scenarios can be constructed if one assumes as prelude a sequence of events not too different from those that precipitated World War II--a situation in which a temperamentally Hitlerian type exploits the balance of terror to his own advantage and in the meantime drives the world to war. The authors follow these preliminary remarks with outbreak scenarios for Sino-American, Soviet-American, and Sino-Soviet nuclear wars and for the special cases of nuclear war in Central Europe and conventional war combined with nuclear war. They conclude with remarks on the forms of world order most likely to result from various kinds of nuclear conflict.

95

Koburger, Charles W. LOWER SPECTRUM WAR. In U. S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, July 1968: 3-9. illus. Z6723. U35, v. 48

Proposes a theory of lower spectrum, or limited and sublimated, war and a strategy to combat it. Koburger stresses the preponderance of political over military factors in this type of warfare and the crucial role of diplomatic maneuver in both offensive and defensive strategy.

96

Mydans, Carl, and Shelley Mydans. THE VIOLENT PEACE. New York, Atheneum, 1968. 478 p. illus., maps. D842. M9

Partial contents.--The rites of peace.--What is war? --Civil war in China (1945-1949).--Indo-China: the

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fight for a lost empire (1945-1954).--Greece: a classic insurrection (1946-1949).--The partition of India (1947-1949).--The struggle for Palestine (1948- ).--Malaya: The long emergency (1948-1960).--Police action in Korea (1950-1953).--Quemoy-Matsu: the siege (1954-1958).--The Algerian problem (1954-1962).--Revolt in Hungary (1956).--The Suez-Sinai campaign (1956).--Yemen: the battle for South Arabia (1962- ).--Cyprus: "the trouble" (1963).--Revolution in Cuba (1958-1959).--La violencia in Columbia (1948- ).--Terror in Venezuela (1961-1963).--The Dominican upheaval (1965).--Chaos in the Congo (1960-1965).--Angola: "the forgotten war" (1961).--India: the border conflicts (1962-1965).--Indonesia runs amok (1965-1966).--Philippines: the Hukbalahap (1966- ).--Laos: the beleaguered neutral (1954- ).--Vietnam: the continuing war (1959- ).--Arabs vs. Israel: the third round (1967- ).--What is peace?--Index.

Examines the kinds of warfare that have threatened the post-World War II period of peace. Threats to peace have come from "the poor, dark, southern nations" where ideas of liberation, freedom, self-determination, and equality have bred a hope which makes reality unbearable. This era will be cataloged in history "as a period of rebellious outbursts, popular upheavals and bloody rioting--localized sub-wars bred of despair and fought in the name of economic equality."

97

Stein, Michael K. OVERCOMING RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION: A SOVIET VIEW. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Military review, v. 48, Sept. 1968: 49-55. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 48

On the assumption that any future war will involve the use of nuclear weapons, Soviet military planners are giving considerable attention to the problem of what tactics should be used when large zones of radioactive contamination lie across the line of advance of Soviet armies. The early belief that contaminated areas would have to be bypassed has given way to the view that an attack can be pressed directly through these zones. Tactical doctrine stresses the need for a rapid advance to minimize radiation exposure, and specialized items--armored reconnaissance vehicles, protective clothing, and an oral radiation prophylactic--have been developed to aid this kind of operation. Primary emphasis, however, has been on the mental and physical conditioning of the individual soldier rather than on technological innovations. The Soviet military are committed to the doctrine that men, and not technology, remain the decisive factor on the battlefield, and they inculcate this viewpoint in the ranks with the slogan that "a man morally committed to the truth of his cause cannot be stopped."

98

Whiting, Allen S. CHINA CROSSES THE YALU. Stanford: Stanford University Press [1968] 219 p. DS919.5.W5 1968

Contents. --The framework of policy. --Problems and policies. --Russia, China, and the Korean War. --Peking's reactions: June-July. --August: military and diplomatic stalemate. --The United Nations crosses the parallel. --Peking crosses the Yalu. --Motivations behind intervention. --In retrospect.

Examines the extent to which Chinese Communist policies evolved from developments surrounding the

Korean War and the way in which the Korean War illuminates the question of limited war. This study offers insights into "the stability of limitations, the problem of testing their observance by the enemy, . . . the question of how one side communicates to the other the conditions which might induce it to override such limitations," and the role of expectations of enemy behavior. The Korean War clearly illustrates the dangers of communication failure in a limited-war situation.

## B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

99

[AIR-CUSHION VEHICLES WIN THEIR WAY] Luftkissenfahrzeuge setzen sich durch. Wahr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Aug. 15, 1968: 398-400. illus. U3.W38, v. 12

Stresses the versatility of air-cushion vehicles, which have been tested for their military usefulness in Malaysia, Vietnam, on Canadian pack ice and Near Eastern deserts.

100

Archer, Robert D. THE SOVIET FIGHTERS. Space/aeronautics, v. 50, July 1968: 64-72. illus. TL501.A786, v. 50

Reports Soviet achievements in the development and production of air-superiority aircraft. From the devastation they suffered in the two World Wars, the Russians learned the importance of air superiority and began concentrating on developing advanced fighter aircraft shortly after World War II. While the current force of about 3,000 air-superiority and all-weather interceptor-fighters was primarily created to counter the long-range bomber threat of the early sixties, the Russians also recognize its importance in garnering world prestige and its usefulness in local as well as global military operations. Thus, unlike other major powers, the Soviet Union persists in enhancing its fighter capability. If the NATO powers do not respond to the Soviet challenge by developing comparable aircraft, the consequences for the West could be disastrous.

101

Brown, Neville. ADVANCE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. PT. 1. THE THEORY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. In Royal United Service Institution, London, Journal, v. 113, Aug. 1968: 231-234. U1.R8, v. 113

A detailed examination of the structure and component parts of an atom and their function in a nuclear explosion. Included is a discussion on fusion and fission bombs. Brown concludes that the increase in yield per unit from the moderate size fission bombs to the larger of the hydrogen bombs is not as great as might be expected because half of the megatonnage in standard hydrogen bombs "is provided not via the fusion route but via the fission one."

102

Bueschel, Richard M. COMMUNIST CHINESE AIR POWER. New York: Praeger [1968] 238 p. illus., ports. U635.C6B3 Bibliography: p. 217-22

Surveys the background and strength of Communist China's People's Liberation Army Air Force and lists the various types of aircraft deployed by the Chinese during the past two decades. Chinese airpower has always fluctuated with the fortunes of the country; periods of prosperity were accompanied by advances in the air, whereas periods of political and economic instability were accompanied by serious reductions in air power. While Chinese aircraft now outnumber American aircraft in the Far East, they are inferior in quality. Whether China can overcome the "creeping obsolescence" that constantly plagues its aircraft development programs remains to be seen.

103

Burlage, John D., and H. Ray Hendley. NUCLEAR SATELLITE BOMBS. *Ordnance*, v. 53, Sept./Oct. 1968: 165-168. illus. UFL 067, v. 53

The Soviet fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) has advantages: it reduces the effectiveness of U.S. area-defense ICBM early-warning radar systems; possesses greater speed than the ICBM, and has the ability to "dump its lethal load on targets anywhere below its flight path." But Pentagon officials feel that its advantages are outweighed by its disadvantages: less accuracy and payload, greater building and maintenance costs, and greater problems of command and control than ICBM's. Because of these deficiencies in the FOBS, the United States decided to reject building an orbiting nuclear weapons system. In trying to decide why the Russians want a FOBS, the Pentagon concludes that the "bombs would probably be used against U.S. Strategic Air Command bases and 'soft' prime military targets as part of a massive nuclear assault" on the United States. But another possible reason is the Chinese threat. The only U.S. defense against the FOBS is deterrence, but a recent development--an "over-the-horizon" radar system--will provide approximately a 15-minute warning against attack. U.S. officials do not feel that the creation of an orbital bombardment system destroys the nuclear balance, but it does "add more fuel to the nuclear arms race."

104

Christ, Rolf F. [PROBLEMS IN DEVELOPING MODERN COMBAT AIRCRAFT] Probleme bei der Entwicklung moderner Kampfflugzeuge [by] et. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Aug. 15, 1968: 383-391. illus. U3.W38, v. 12

Considers the technological innovations and breakthroughs achieved by Sweden in developing the remarkable weapons system of the SAAB 37 aircraft. The organization and methods of this project provide an example for others to follow.

105

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW COMBAT AIRCRAFT ON A MULTILATERAL OR NATIONAL BASIS [Das neue Kampfflugzeug in multilateraler oder nationaler Entwicklung. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, Aug. 15, 1968: 378-382. U3.W38, v. 12

Refutes the notion that West Germany, on a second-rate power, cannot possibly develop a sophisticated weapons system. With the help of cost analysis the author dismisses the claim that it would be cheaper to produce combat aircraft on a multilateral, West European basis than on a national, West German one.

106

Fetizon, Marcel, and Michel Magat. THE TOXIC ARSENAL. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 128-142. U104.C155 1968

Traces the history of chemical weapons and discloses the underlying trends in their development. Although chemical warfare existed centuries ago, it was not practiced on a large scale until World War I when delivery systems had progressed sufficiently to harm large numbers of the enemy. During World War II gas warfare was limited to incendiaries, but research on all types of chemical weapons continued at an increasingly rapid rate during and after the war. Among the currently available chemical weapons are incendiaries made of phosphorus and oxidizable metal powders; napalm; tear and nausea gases, which generally cause no permanent damage; blister gases, which induce violent reactions and could lead to death or permanent disability; defoliants; and the lethal blood, choking, and nerve gases. Besides the toxic agents, chemical arsenals include a variety of psychic poisons that can cause mental delusions and even permanent madness. In the absence of effective international controls the already awesome destructive potential of chemical weapons could grow even greater. Since chemical weapons are generally an outgrowth of constructive civilian scientific breakthroughs, it appears that the world is faced with the decision to "either eliminate science or eliminate war."

107

Fischer, Karl H. [SAILS INSTRUMENT LANDING SYSTEM FOR V/STOL AIRCRAFT] Instrumenten-Landesystem SAILS für V/STOL-Flugzeuge. Flug Revue, Aug. 1968: 37-38. illus. TL 03.C524, 1968

Varied programs and studies, both military and civil, seek development of avionic systems and displays that may realize the operational potentialities of V/STOL aircraft. One of the most important problems with V/STOL aircraft arises at the landing under bad visibility. One new instrument, the Simplified Aircraft Instrument Landing System (SAILS) of Bell Aerosystems, is handled in our article. The system emerged from the IRATE program specifications. The author first expands on the main components of the system: antenna, analogue computer, and display unit. The report continues with a compilation of the system's advantages for military operation and closes with a resume of the possibilities of SAILS in the civil sector. (Abstract supplied)

108

Hedén, Carl Göran. THE INFECTIOUS DUST CLOUD. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 147-165. U104.C155 1968

Surveys the offensive potential of biological weapons and the defensive problems they will create. Scientific advances in the production and dissemination of biological agents have substantially increased the feasibility of using them to harm the enemy without damaging one's own forces. However, despite certain strategic attractions, biological weapons have not yet been utilized on a large scale because of ethical restraints, unsolved technical problems in their deployment, lack of knowledge of their long-range ecological consequences, and



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inadequacies in biological defenses. Before these inhibiting factors disappear, efforts should be made to rechannel biological warfare research into more constructive areas and institute international controls to prevent the development, testing, and production of biological weapons.

109

Hersh, Seymour M. **CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS--THE SECRET ARSENAL**. New York Times magazine, Aug. 25, 1968: 26-27, 82, 84-87, 90, 92. AP2, N6575, 1968

The U.S. military stubbornly avoids public discussion of its controversial work in chemical and biological warfare (CBW), yet this program is a major component of the U.S. defense effort. Publicly the military is just as evasive about Soviet CBW efforts, although Pentagon officials have testified before Congress that the Russians do engage in extensive CBW research and development. The odiousness of CBW weapons has exposed the program to sharply critical and often emotional attacks. In responding to this criticism Government officials most often use the deterrent argument, but they also contend that current research projects are essential for the development of effective CBW civil defense measures, or that they offer the hope of discovering more humane methods of warfare. Some proponents argue frankly that only with these weapons can the United States expect to hold its own in a major war with China. Critics argue that chemical and biological weapons are superfluous to a country with a nuclear arsenal. Some argue that the effects of these weapons cannot be geographically confined or completely foreseen, while others predict that they will proliferate rapidly among the smaller nations. In the Vietnam War, where riot control gases and defoliants are now being used, critics fear the danger of escalation to the use of lethal agents. Proponents and critics of the CBW program are united on two critical points: that a chemical-biological war must be avoided and that a CBW arms control agreement is one possible way to do this. What is needed at this juncture is "an open, rational public debate of the political and military implications involved." If the public were informed of the terrible potential of chemical and biological weapons then the pressure for ending the CBW arms race would be greatly increased.

110

Inghis, David R. **THE OUTLOOK FOR NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES**. In: Calder, Nurel, ed. Unless peace comes--a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York: Viking Press [1968], p. 43-63. U104, C155, 1968

Although modifications in the capabilities of nuclear weapons will increase their threat to future generations, the greatest danger lies in an increase in the number of these weapons. Despite continuing efforts to improve the efficiency of nuclear bombs, technical and scientific practicalities make it absurd to predict any revolutionary changes in the kinds of nuclear weapons. Bombs can be made larger and "dirtier" or more compact and "cleaner." However, there is a law of diminishing returns for the size of bombs, since a 10-megaton H-bomb can obliterate an area only six times as large as that destroyed by a 1-megaton bomb. Very dirty bombs could be built that could destroy a hemisphere or even the entire world, however, their suicidal implications preclude their construction for at least the foreseeable future. Small

tactical nuclear bombs are feasible but impractical, since they would tend to devastate the territory being defended and could lead to the use of larger nuclear weapons. Although no radically new kinds of nuclear weapons are likely to appear for many years, the world still faces an uneasy future because of the threat from existing nuclear arsenals. The superpowers have already stockpiled the explosive equivalent of well over one million tons of TNT; in the absence of adequate arms control measures these stores could multiply substantially, and many other nations could acquire nuclear weapons. Unless the two countries can be persuaded to halt their nuclear competition "it is conceivable that one day the size of the world's arsenal will be limited only by the available amount of fissionable material."

111

[**IT HOLDS THE PROMISE OF "KESTREL": HAWKER-SIDDELEY HS-1127 "HARRIER"**] Il tient les promesses du "Kestrel": Hawker Siddeley HS-1127 "Harrier." Aviation magazine, no. 498, Sept. 15, 1968: 29-37. illus. TL502, A854, 1968

Describes the structure, component parts, navigation and reactor systems, and flight patterns of Great Britain's military jet airplane, "Harrier." Included is a chronological listing of flight tests.

112

Kelly, Orr. **UNEXPECTED SOVIET ADVANCES IN SUBMARINES STIR REAL CONCERN IN CONGRESS**. Navy, v. 11, Aug. 1968: 6-11. illus. VA49, N28, v. 11

An account of current disputes over U.S. submarine construction, chiefly over modernization of the attack submarine fleet that protects deployed Polaris missile submarines. The question is whether to proceed rapidly with new construction on the basis of available technology or to delay in order to incorporate the advances expected from experiments with electric drive and high speed submarine designs.

113

Lynn, Norman. [**USE OF HOVERCRAFT IN VIETNAM**] Hovercraft-Einsatz in Vietnam. Flug Revue, June 1968: 74-76. illus. TL503, C524, 1968

Operational Vietnam tests lasting eight months proved the US Navy and Army ground effect vehicles to be very successful under fighting conditions. The vehicles were Bell Aerosystems SK-5 built under licence to the British Hovercraft Corporation. Our report covers the hovercraft's mission in the Vietnam War (coast guard, interceptor missions, patrols against infiltration of enemy troops), its weaponry and the evaluation of operational effectiveness. (Abstract supplied)

114

MacDonald, Gordon I. **HOW TO WRECK THE ENVIRONMENT**. In: Calder, Nurel, ed. Unless peace comes--a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York: Viking Press [1968], p. 181-205. U104, C155, 1968

Discusses man's potential for modifying the earth's physical environment in order to obtain national objectives. Both current and potential developments in the geophysical sciences are considered in forecasting.

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weapons systems capable of triggering extreme environmental changes. Although the vast quantities of energy involved in weather systems make it unlikely that man will be able to modify the weather through "brute-force" techniques, scientists will probably greatly expand the present capabilities for working with the instabilities in the atmosphere to manipulate the weather. Advances are also expected in the field of climate control, including techniques to alter the energy of the sun, the nature of the terrestrial surface, and the transparency of the earth's atmosphere to various forms of radiated energy. Future geophysical weapon arsenals could also include methods for inducing earthquakes and tidal waves and utilizing lightning to raise or lower power levels over certain regions of the earth. Eventually hostile nations may be able to wage secret wars by inflicting floods, droughts, storms, and other "natural" disasters upon one another. However, before such weapons are developed, in addition to increasing his understanding of environmental science man must carefully examine the complex political, legal, economic, and sociological consequences of deliberate environmental modification.

115

McGrath, Thomas D. DEEP WATER SONAR TRANSDUCERS. Undersea technology, v. 9, July 1968: 27-30, 32, 36. illus. V210.A1U5, v. 9

Describes recent developments in the design of the deep-sea transducer, a device for generating and receiving underwater sound. For the foreseeable future, sound will continue to be the chief means of underwater communication, navigation, mapping, and surveillance. The increased operating depths of modern submarines and the use of bottomed surveillance devices has created a demand for transducers capable of operating independently of the surface at greater depths and for longer periods of time.

116

McGrath, Thomas D. THE NATIONAL INSURANCE POLICY: ASW COVERAGE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 94, May 1968: 45-56. illus. V1.U8, v. 94

Examines the weaponry, surface vehicles, tactics, and communication systems of antisubmarine warfare (ASW). The main surface ASW vehicles consist of destroyers, ASW carriers, and the P-3 Orion airplane scheduled to replace the P-2 Neptune in current use by the Navy. Since World War II the submarine itself has developed ASW capabilities and today is acknowledged as an essential element in ASW. McGrath concludes that, although present ASW programs are adequate, new programs will be needed in 5 years. Because new systems will require 7 to 10 years for their development, such programs must be initiated now.

117

Mannell, William M. MILITARY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, July 1968: 91-97. Z6723 U35, v. 48

Describes the use of satellite communications by field forces of the U.S. Army that overcome problems created by distance, terrain, and ionospheric and atmospheric anomalies.

118

Mason, John F. NEW E-2A RADAR TO TAKE LESS FOR GRANTED. Electronic design, v. 16, Aug. 15, 1968: 46, 48. illus. TK7800.E437, v. 16

Reveals the development of a new radar system by Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation for the follow-on version of the E-2A spotter planes now operating in Vietnam. The new radar, derived from Grumman's AN/APS-111(XN-1), will detect smaller targets and filter out more ground clutter than the E-2A's present APS-96 radar. In addition to improved operational capabilities, the new system should prove almost four times more reliable than the APS-96 because of an improved cooling system, a more stable transmitter, and increased use of solid-state and microelectronic components.

119

Mason, John F. REDESIGN STRENGTHENS AIR DEFENSE BACKUP. Electronic design, v. 16, Sept. 12, 1968: 25-26. illus. TK7800.E437, v. 16

Reveals Air Force plans for a \$14.5 million modification of its backup intercept or control (Buic) system, a radar monitoring and guidance network that is designed to take over should the Nation's frontline control centers ever be hit by an enemy attack. Two new Buic sites are under construction, bringing the total to 15, and improvements in data processing equipment and techniques should enable the system to double the number of radar inputs it handled previously.

120

Napalm, Louis M. MEDICAL ASPECTS OF NAPALM BOMBING. Yale scientific magazine, v. 42, Apr. 1968: 16. Q1.Y16, v. 42

Napalm is easily and inexpensively manufactured from common chemicals. It is a tough and stable gel, insensitive to changes in temperature and not subject to deterioration in storage. In use, it will adhere to most surfaces on contact and produces a high burning temperature and concentration of carbon monoxide. It is used in incendiary bombs, fire bombs and cannisters, land mines, and flame throwers. Napalm burns are usually deep and extensive. Phosphorus may be imbedded in the wound and continue to smolder long after the initial injury. Nephrotoxicity, respiratory embarrassment, shock, fluid loss, and sepsis are other complications contributing to a high mortality rate. Nonfatal wounds result in severe contractures and deformities. Morbidity and mortality seem to be disproportionately high among children. In addition to burns, carbon monoxide poisoning is a common cause of death. It has been noted that incendiary bombing could be as destructive of human life as nuclear warfare. The saturation napalm bombing raids on Japanese cities caused many more casualties than the nuclear attacks. Burns are the major cause of injury in these large-scale incendiary raids. Not high environmental temperatures and carbon monoxide cause numerous additional casualties. It was observed in Germany that bomb shelters, in particular, developed extremely high concentrations of carbon monoxide.

121

THE NEW SAAR BOMBER COMPUTER. Neuer Bombenrechner von SAAR. Flug Revue, June 1966: 44-49. illus. TL593 C524 1966

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The newly developed bombing computer BT 9 R from Saab is an improvement of the older BT 9 already used by the Swedish, American, French, Danish and Swiss air forces. The BT 9 R has several advantages: exact ground target calculation with the use of Laser range finders; horizontal bombing; and the incorporation of the newest technology in microminiaturization. Our article handles the various operation types (toss bombing, identification point bombing, air-ground missile firing), the fire accuracy of the system and closes with a description of the components of the whole unit. (Abstract supplied, modified)

122

[THE OLD ARMORED BRIGADE IS PHASING OUT: A BALANCE SHEET] La brigade blindée disparaît: un bilan [by] Ecos [pseud.] Revue militaire générale, June 1968; 73-82. U2.R48, 1968

The new armored brigade designed for nuclear warfare will have 50 faster and more powerfully armed combat tanks and modernized atomic artillery that will have an increased launching speed and range and will be free of the limitations of the "Honest John" batteries. It will be charged with obtaining enemy information either through liaison with the divisional reconnaissance regiment or by successive thrusts through any gaps in the enemy line. In postatomic attack and exploitation operations the armored brigade will avoid cover and wooded areas and direct its attack across open country. If the enemy throws in its armored reserves, the armored brigade will signal for anti-tank air support and artillery coverage that will enable it to continue its operation without recourse to a new friendly atomic strike. Although the preliminary phase--initial assault--and the complementary phase--the exploitation operation--have been the subject of detailed study, the hinge phase--the encirclement operation--constitutes the critical point of the whole operation. The mastery of this phase will be a great challenge for those who will have the responsibility for implementing the operations of the new armored brigades.

123

Orlando, J. L. and James E. Meyers. MISSILE STRUCTURES: ANALYSIS AND DESIGN. F. F. Bruhn, editor-in-chief, assisted by J. L. Orlando and J. E. Meyers. Cincinnati, Tri-State Offset Co., 1967; 100 p. illus. T1765, 6, 1307, 1967

A supplement, by J. L. Orlando and J. E. Meyers, to Analysis and Design of Flight Vehicle Structures, edited by F. F. Bruhn, which was first published in 1942 under the title Analysis and Design of Missile Structures.

An introduction to the general field of missile structures with a limited presentation of the preliminary load, stress analysis, and structural design practices of typical boost missiles. Brief technical descriptions of various missiles important to U.S. defense are included.

124

Rosenblatt, Alfred. POTENTIAL OF PHASED-ARRAY RADAR SPURS INCREASING R&D ACTIVITY. Electronics, v. 41, Sept. 2, 1968; 94-103. illus. TK7600 F4384, v. 41

Survey of the immediate and long-range prospects for phased-array radar systems. While this type of radar with its electronically steerable beam is more versa-

tile than the mechanically rotated conventional radar, it is not expected to become operational for about 4 years because of weight and cost problems. Many electronics firms are now studying these problems and with their own or military funds are working on the development of phased-array systems.

125

Rudd, Edwin A. THE PERSHING IS 1-A. Ordnance, v. 53, Sept./Oct. 1968; 178-182. illus. UFI.067, v. 53

Describes the Pershing 1A, which--when it becomes operational--will be one of the most cost-effective weapons of any major weapons system. The Pershing 1A will be more reliable and have greater mobility than its ancestor the Pershing. This second-generation missile system, now mounted on wheels rather than tracks, has an automatic countdown facility, computer devices, and a capability for testing itself and isolating any malfunctions. Rudd also discusses Project SWAP, in which all Pershing ground-support equipment and computer gear needed to fire a missile will be reequipped without any reduction in combat readiness.

126

Scholin, Allan R. A GALLERY OF USAF WEAPONS. Air Force and Space Digest, v. 51, Sept. 1968; 200-227. UG633.A65 v. 51

Lists boosters, missiles, and aircraft deployed or under development by the U.S. Air Force. Each item is accompanied by a brief description of its capabilities, status, and contractors.

127

Shubin, E. EFFECT OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION ON VARIOUS AREAS. In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 440, June 6, 1966. Washington. (Its JPRS 45,578) p. 21-25. P&GT RR

Translated from Starshina Serzhant, Apr. 1966, p. 28-29. Slav Rim

Describes the effects of a nuclear explosion on various areas. The shock wave is greater on the slopes of heights which face the nuclear explosion than on a plain. The destructive force of the shock wave increases in proportion to increases in the slope gradient, while its effect is smallest at the foot of the reverse slope. Military equipment and troops should be stationed on slopes which face in an opposite direction with relation to possible targets of a nuclear attack. Forests, which reduce the action radius of light radiation, and rugged terrain also provide protection against nuclear explosions. However, the stationing of troops in populated areas is bad because of the additional losses that would result from building fragments.

128

Smith, Charles Edward Gordon. IN DEFENSE OF DEFENSIVE WARFARE. Nature, v. 219, Aug. 3, 1968; 537-539. Q1.N2, v. 219

A review of We All Fall Down: The Prospects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, by Robin Clarke.

In writing We All Fall Down, Robin Clarke has proved that a layman can discuss chemical and biological warfare (CBW) without undue emotion, but at the same time he has shown himself to be misinformed on some important issues. Thus his statement that

"one ounce (of *C. botulinum* toxin) would be sufficient to kill sixty million people" is true and yet highly misleading, since the figures are accurate only if the agent were administered in individual doses. He also errs in supporting the view that once an enemy succeeds in starting a local epidemic it inevitably grows to catastrophic proportions. On the other hand, he is right to dismiss the artificial development of new pathogens as very unlikely in the near future. Vaccines against biological weapons do raise some difficult problems, but they are not insoluble as Clarke seems to suggest. His assertion that vaccinating a whole population would be too costly hardly stands up when the cost of this measure is compared with that of ships and aircraft. Clarke estimates that the chance of a biological attack succeeding is about one in three, but this is pure speculation. He argues that the absence of practical defense preparations means that the Government believes CBW is unfeasible, but this is not true. Nevertheless, he may be right in saying that biological warfare is not very attractive militarily because of the unpredictability of its long-term ecological effects. Chemical weapons are much superior in this respect, and some have the added advantage of being nonlethal. Clarke discusses the possibility of an international agreement to prevent CBW, but at this stage the technical problems seem to be insuperable. His alternate suggestion that Britain declassify its own CBW research findings is naive as well as dangerous since it would mean disclosing much valuable information to potential enemies. A nation at war will use any available technique that offers some hope of advantage. With this in mind, Britain has little choice but to prepare itself against the worst eventualities, and the participation of scientists and the medical profession in this work is both ethical and public spirited.

129

Stratton, Andrew. CONTESTS IN THE SKY. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 64-90. U104.C155.1968

Surveys potential developments in aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft and predicts "an ever heavier commitment of scientific and technological resources to military purposes." Since there will be many more possibilities of weapons than even the most economically advanced nations will be able to develop, selections will have to be made based primarily upon an assessment of military effectiveness in relation to costs. Cost-effectiveness analysis is exceedingly complex and is subject to the inaccuracies inherent in assumptions about future technological advancements and actions of potential enemies. However, regardless of its imperfections cost-effectiveness analysis is the best available process for determining defense policies in an era of modern technology and rising weapons costs.

130

SURVEY OF CANADA. Nuclear engineering, v. 11. June 1968. 498-520. FK9001.N75 v.11

Contents: AFEC in Canada's nuclear power program. by J. L. Gray. Ontario Hydro's nuclear activities. Atomic Energy Control Board and Canada's uranium industry resources. Heavy water production. by G. A. Lae. Early operations at the Pickering. The role of the AECL laboratories. by L. H. Haswood. CANDU LEW. by G. A. Poir.

A status report on Canada's nuclear industry. Research activities. Uranium mining and prospecting.

heavy water production, foreign trade opportunities, and power reactor design, construction, and operation are discussed.

131

Thomer, Egbert. [THE GENERAL ARMAMENTS PLAN AND THE NAVY] Der Gesamttrüstungsplan und die Marine. Atlantische Welt, v. 8, Aug. 1968. 2-4. illus. V3.A8, v. 8

Outlines West Germany's plan for modernization of its military equipment through 1977. The plan is flexible enough to allow upgrading every 6 months and provides for substantial improvement of the land forces' flexible response capability and modest enhancement of naval flexible response capacities.

132

Thring, M. W. ROBOTS ON THE MARCH. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 166-180. U104.C155

Robot weapons can change the whole character of war by making "the human soldier completely obsolete." Robot soldiers can seek out and destroy an enemy no matter where he is. They can carry enough fuel to run for a week, operate with impunity in highly radioactive areas, and with lasers or plasma torches blind all human eyes looking at them. In radioactive areas, robots immune also to chemical and biological poisons and napalm, "may be the only means of carrying out the traditional military task of occupying and holding ground." Robot aircraft will dispense with the human requirements of safety design, comfort, and durability that severely restrict destructive payload. The aircraft will be guided by computer systems that will deliver them to their targets more accurately and rapidly and will require no courage to carry out their tasks. Other robot weapons systems will include a walking tank that can be destroyed only by a direct nuclear hit, robot-controlled suicide bombers that will carry conventional explosives and be directed at compact targets such as ships, robot submarines that will travel 3,000 kilometers at depths of up to 600 meters, and nuclear warheads steered by computerized computers responsible for evasion of antiballistic missiles and navigation. Although present automatic guidance and control systems are still primitive, this situation will be altered by the end of the next decade. Future robot weapons systems will integrate information storage, decisionmaking, sensory input, and pattern recognition. In time the human soldier will be recognized as a grave complication in systems design, introducing great penalties of volume, weight, and vulnerability.

133

Weller, Jac. ENEMY WEAPONS IN VIETNAM. Ordnance, v. 53, Sept. Oct. 1968. 172-175. illus. U3.1067, v. 53

Catalogs enemy weapons found in Vietnam, noting that since 1965 the quality and quantity of small arms, mortars, rockets, artillery, and ammunition have improved and increased. Weller concludes that the enemy has not achieved its weapons goals because the free world armies and U.S. aircraft have taken their toll.

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

134

Yates, W. A. ABM RADAR . . . STATUS AND FUTURE. Signal, v. 22, June 1958: 8-11. UGI.M65, v. 22

Surveys the present status and future prospects of ABM radar development. The decision to deploy a thin ABM system is expected to boost the current radar market and encourage further radar research and development to maintain the "one-upmanship" required for the "offense-defense game." A number of projects are already underway that are intended to complement the Sentinel's first-generation large phased-array radars, including the development of an advanced-design array radar, studies of hard-site defense techniques, and studies of mobile equipment for ABM systems. According to a top Air Force official, "the complicated threat and the rapidly growing number of functional responsibilities faced by the radar sensor have vastly complicated the task of planning, producing, and using complicated radar systems."

### C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

135

An, Thomas S. MAO TSE-TUNG PURGES MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Aug. 1968: 88-96. 26723.U35, v. 48

For some years Mao Tse-tung has been involved in a running dispute with Chinese military professionals over military strategy and army organization. The professionals have tended to stress the dominance of technological over human factors in modern war and to mistrust and resent Mao's subordination of military to political authority in the Army. These attitudes explain the resistance of military men to Mao's use of troops for social work and his attempt to replace the hierarchical military organization with a "proletarian democracy." The technological approach to warfare also explains the healthy respect among Chinese military men for U.S. nuclear power and the concomitant recognition of the need for détente with the Soviet Union, whose nuclear strength is the sole means currently available for deterring the United States. Mao, of course, is aware of the significance of nuclear weapons and has pressed forward with their development. At the same time, however, he has insisted that the "spiritual nuclear bomb" of a people's war is adequate to deter or defend against a U.S. attack and has refused to consider détente with the Soviet Union on any terms except his own. The Vietnam War has exacerbated these differences, but Mao seems to have won the upper hand by purging most of those who opposed him. It is fortunate for him that he did so because, with the collapse of the Cultural Revolution, the Army is the only nationwide unifying force left in China.

136

Anderssen, T. THE ROYAL NORWEGIAN AIR FORCE. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, summer 1968: 97-100. UG635.G7A1252, v. 8

Recounts recent developments in the Royal Norwegian Air Force and evaluates its present situation. During the fifties squadrons were doubled in size, new

squadrons added, and tactical airfields increased in size and number; then the Air Force plunged into a period of stagnation. Loss of American military aid confronted military planners with the perplexing problem of reconciling defense requirements with limited national resources. The role of the Air Force was finally redefined in relationship to the air support Norway can expect from its allies in time of crisis. With the uncertainties of its future finally dispelled, the outlook for the Air Force has brightened considerably even though it will never reach the heights it attained during its "prosperous" years. Its interceptor capabilities will probably eventually be phased out, and it will concentrate on the maintenance of a radar warning system, limited numbers of maritime patrol, transport, and tactical reconnaissance aircraft, and a retaliatory force of fighter bombers.

137

ARMED FORCES OF WARSAW TREATY MEMBER COUNTRIES. Soviet military review, Sept. 1968: 22-23. illus. P&GP RR

Describes the Warsaw Pact exercises held in the summer of 1968: operation North, which studied problems "arising from the defence of the socialist countries in the event of attacks from the ocean and sea"; operation Newman, a logistics exercise; operation Sky Shield, which tested the combat efficiency of flyers, radar operators, and rocketmen; and a joint command and staff exercise. The object of these exercises was to develop common methods of carrying out combined land, sea, and air operations.

138

Aron, Raymond. FROM INDEPENDENCE TO NEUTRALITY. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, summer 1968: 267-269. D639.A85, v. 6

General Ailleret's formula, "defense in all directions," is a concise rephrasing of De Gaulle's pronouncement that "France must acquire the capacity to act at any point in the world because she risks being destroyed by missiles launched from any point." The formula is also a summary statement of the military policy of a neutral state, but Gaullist spokesmen have studiously refrained from making this observation. They speak instead of the impossibility of foreseeing the future enemies of France and the need to deter those who might intimidate France or attempt to use its territory in a war France would prefer to avoid. To those who argue that France cannot possibly match U.S. or Soviet weapons technology, the Government retorts with the doctrine of "minimum" or "proportionate" deterrence. To the objection that the strategy will prove too costly, the Gaullists reply that nuclear weapons can be financed by a cutback in conventional forces. This cutback can be made in safety only because France is protected from conventional attack by American and German armies. This means, of course, that French policy cannot be authentically neutral, but even without these considerations, one can detect significant differences between Gaullist neutrality and a genuine neutrality such as Switzerland's. Switzerland does not intervene in the world's conflicts, but "Gaullist France intervenes, at least with words, in every conflict in the world." Whereas the Swiss antagonize no one, it will be only a matter of time before France antagonizes everyone.

139

Atkinson, James D. WHO WILL DOMINATE THE STRATEGIC INDIAN OCEAN AREA IN THE 1970'S? Navy, v. 11, Sept. 1968: 22-26. illus.

VA49. N28, v. 11

Russia's race to achieve strategic superiority is taking place in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area. Russia's exploitation of the political instability endemic to the area signals its intention to fill the political vacuum caused by Britain's withdrawal of forces from East of Suez. Russia is acquiring base facilities in Yemen and Port Sudan and is backing a guerrilla movement against Mozambique, which is located across from the strategic island of Madagascar. In fact, Soviet "national liberation warfare" techniques are being employed wherever possible throughout Africa, particularly along its Red Sea-Indian Ocean coast. On the other side of the Indian Ocean, Russia has been active in India and Ceylon. It has promised India naval vessels, thereby hoping "to lay the groundwork for a Soviet naval air presence in that part of the world," especially in the Andaman Islands. These islands would be advantageous bases for the new Soviet helicopter and/or vertical takeoff and land-based aircraft. Whether the United States will strengthen its naval forces to deter Russia from filling the power vacuum remains to be seen.

140

Baranski, Wojciech. OUR COMMON CONCERN AND COMMON RESPONSIBILITY. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Sept. 4, 1968: 5-6.

D639. C87, v. 20

Translated and condensed from *Krasnaya zvezda*, Aug. 14, 1968. Slav Rm

Vigilance, preparedness, and improved efficient defense are the essential conditions for meeting the new imperialist strategy of intervention, local wars, and political, economic, ideological, and psychological warfare. The primary goal of this strategy is the undermining of the Socialist bloc and world domination. Today the world is indivisible and any conflict can cause a major war. Europe is still a decisive area for universal security. The Socialist countries had to establish the Warsaw Treaty Organization against NATO and the imperialist bloc in Western Europe, as a guarantee of European security. By their deceitful bridgebuilding policy and new Eastern policy the Western Powers try to weaken the solidarity and vigilance of the Socialist bloc, isolate certain countries, and wrest them from the Socialist bloc one by one. As it is the duty of the Warsaw Pact to frustrate these intentions, it gave a helping hand to Czechoslovakia, where creeping revisionism could have undermined the principal foundations of the common defense. The Warsaw Pact is an organization of sovereign states based on equality and fraternal relations. The present situation requires improvement of the defensive capability of every Socialist state and the commonwealth as a whole and a strengthening of political and military cooperation. That is our contemporary program of action.

141

Bobbert, Alfons. [NO SECURITY WITHOUT CREDIBLE CIVIL DEFENSE]. Keine Sicherheit ohne glaubwürdige zivile Verteidigung. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Aug. 1968: 390-396. illus.

3.W395, v. 17

Modern war exacts a heavier death toll from the civilian population than from the armed forces. A

deterrence credibility depends largely on the credibility of the nation's civil defense, which must "prepare and carry out all measures in the civil area for the population's survival of war and for aiding the freedom and ability of the armed forces to conduct operations." NATO's flexible response strategy provides for three gradations of defense: conventional defense, deliberate escalation, and a general nuclear strike. In the first two, civil defense plays the crucial role. In fact military defense without civil defense would be impossible for the German Federal Republic. Yet the nation's outlays for civil defense are completely inadequate. The Federal Republic has so far spent about 160 billion DM for its military defense and only 4.5 billion DM for civil defense.

142

Brown, Harold. THE US STRATEGIC POLICY--DETERRENCE WITHOUT DESTABILIZATION. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Sept. 1968: 56-60. illus.

UG633.A65, v. 51

U.S. military planners must "see to it that nuclear aggression against the US or its allies remains as unprofitable in the future as it is now." Regardless of their attractions, neither a maximum nor a minimum approach to deterrence would be advantageous. While a massive first-strike capability would be somewhat psychologically reassuring, it would not be in keeping with America's image as a nonaggressor nor would it be a practical goal in view of the enormous technological and economic resources now available to the Soviet Union. If the United States maintained just enough strategic weapons to throw some doubt on whether an aggressor could successfully launch a first strike, extensive funds would be released for use in domestic programs. However, large force reductions would seriously weaken America's defensive position and tend to invite an enemy attack. Thus the United States must work to build a strategic force level designed solely to effectively counteract a Soviet first strike. At present the United States could absorb a nuclear attack by Russia and launch a counterattack that would eliminate two-fifths of the Russian population. America's emphasis on the development of new and the improvement of existing weapon designs and systems should keep it ahead of Russia by offsetting any advance made by Russia. The United States has already countered the threat of the Soviet fractional orbital bombardment system by the development of over-the-horizon radars and will use a new air-to-surface missile to protect its bomber forces against improved Soviet air defenses. The development of missile penetration aids and multiple warheads should substantially reduce the effectiveness of the limited Russian ABM system. In response to increases in Russian ICBM's, the United States is working on a superhard missile silo. It is also capable of deploying an ABM system around its missile fields if needed. Improvements in the F-106 interceptor force and deployment of warning and control aircraft should limit the possible level of damage by Soviet bombers. Until meaningful arms control agreements can be concluded with the Soviet Union, the United States must continue to offset any threat to its deterrent forces. Once the Russians are convinced that they cannot achieve nuclear dominance, they may agree to curb the arms race.

143

Brown, Neville. ARMS WITHOUT EMPIRE, BRITISH DEFENCE ROLE IN THE MODERN WORLD. Baltimore, Penguin Books [1967] 159 p. (Penguin special, S252) US647. B86 1967b

Bibliographical footnotes.

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Contents. -- Defence against what? The philosophy of overstretch. The balance between the super powers. The roots of instability. -- Our commitments outside Europe: East of Suez? The Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Indian Ocean. The strategic balance in the Far East. Britain's future role in the Far East-Australasia theater. -- Europe: the first charge: Britain in Europe. The military aspects of European security. -- Our military strength: Our strategic forces. General-purpose land forces. General-purpose naval forces. The cost of defence: the defence budget. The strain imposed. Strategic industries. -- Britain as a middle power: Appendix I. Active service manpower levels. Appendix 2. The supplementary defence White Paper of July 1967.

Suggests a defense posture that would be commensurate with Great Britain's future in world politics. A major decision to be made in the 1970's will be to decide on whether or not Britain will be able to "maintain a viable long-service regular army in the absence of the inducement of fairly frequent postings outside the UK and Germany." If it cannot, Britain may have to resort to a short-service volunteer army. Also, Britain must decide whether to replace its submarine ballistic missile force. Unless the superpowers decide to cut back their nuclear stockpiles, the best European deterrent against a Russian attack would be a mobile land-based system rather than an ineffective ABM network. Brown hopes that by 1980 there will be an integrated European force. "One logical outcome of such an evolution would . . . be the development of a WEU [Western European Union] group within the United Nations." He concludes that the transition of Britain from a great to a middle power will be slow and difficult.

144

Cameron, Robert A. NATO AND THE NUCLEAR REALITY. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Aug. 1968: 52-56. UG633.A65, v. 51

The formation of a NATO nuclear consultation committee may herald a new era of strategic planning in the alliance. While a good deal of effort has been devoted to nuclear problems within NATO its overall strategic thinking has not yet fully adjusted to the realities of nuclear weapons. Since a European second-strike nuclear force would duplicate the capability provided by the Americans, NATO needs only a small tactical nuclear force "that the enemy must overwhelm for his attack to succeed, and which, if overwhelmed would be sufficient provocation to invoke the big stick." NATO can best exploit its nuclear deterrent by abandoning any pretenses to a strategy of flexible response and assuming a nuclear defense posture. At the same time it must improve the arrangements for nuclear weapons control. While "it is still a safe bet that the US will reach the point of desperation sooner than most of its allies," lack of control is difficult to reconcile with an announced policy of nuclear deterrence. Therefore now that the nuclear consultation committee has stimulated thinking on a Europe-oriented nuclear policy, the countries of Western Europe should begin striving for a greater measure of nuclear autonomy.

145

Canstein, Raban, Freiherr von. [DO WE NEED A CONCEPT OF WAR?] Brauchen wir ein Kriegsbild? Wehrkunde, v. 17, June 1968: 287-290. UC.W396, v. 17

History abounds in national or international successes and failures engendered by, respectively, the right or wrong concept of war. An optimal concept of war requires that defense potential, will, and credibility be in accord. A modern concept of war depends largely on weapons efficacy. Contemporary development of war technology projects a picture of war so forbidding that a great war between industrial nations is simply out of the question as a rational means of policy. One may assume that all-out war will never happen. Limited wars are increasing, and the growing interdependence of nations and the conflict of interests between the big powers will enlarge the shock waves each local war generates. A faraway war may easily spread to Europe, a force field of those interests. German security requires a growing sensitivity to extra-European events, and thus Western and West German concepts of war should be diversified and multilayered. A distinction must be made between the NATO concept of war for Europe and the American concept for "worldwide engagement." The latter should certainly be better differentiated.

146

CHALLENGES TO DOD'S TIGHT REIN ON NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBS. Space/aeronautics, v. 50, July 1968: 8-30, 32. TL501.A786, v. 50

Alarmed by the increasing strength of the Soviet submarine force, Congress and the Navy Department are pressuring Defense Department officials to improve U.S. undersea warfare capabilities. Despite assurances by former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that the Nation's submarine forces will adequately counter Soviet advances, legislators and Navy submariners fear that the U.S. force of 101 first-class nuclear-powered submarines envisioned for 1973 will not offset the estimated Russian force level of 200 nuclear submarines. The armed services committees of both Houses have joined longtime submarine crusader Vice Adm. Hyman G. Rickover and the new Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Thomas Moorer, in attempting to convince the Pentagon of its error in costing out the development of higher performance attack submarines. "Stennis' boys," backed by L. Mendel Rivers, "the patron saint of submariners," recently authorized an extra \$33.9 million for submarine construction and development, and Rickover persuaded the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to release \$8 million for the development of a reactor for an advanced submarine. If the pressures continue the Defense Department may back down in its refusal to build more and better submarines, particularly since it is based largely on findings by systems analyst Alain Enthoven, who, as one of McNamara's proteges, may not carry so much weight under the administration of the more pragmatic Clark Clifford.

147

Decorney, Jacques. WHERE IS AMERICA? Far Eastern economic review, v. 61, Aug. 15, 1968: 318-320. illus. HC411.F18, v. 61

Deplores the American bombing of Pathet Lao-held areas and claims that American military leaders in Asia cannot justify intrusions into Laotian territory in search of "40,000 North Vietnamese" troops. Decorney contends that the "government of national union" for Laos, envisioned in the 1962 Geneva agreements, is not feasible because the Vientiane government is powerless against the Pathet Lao. The Laotian problem can be settled at Paris only if the Americans acquiesce to the demands of both Hanoi and the Pathet Lao and stop the raids.

148

Delmas, Claude. [THE CZECHOSLOVAK AFFAIR AND NUCLEAR LOGIC] L'affaire tchécoslovaque et la logique nucléaire. Revue politique et parlementaire, v. 70, Sept. 1968: 5-8. illus.

H3.R4, v. 70

Reviews Russia's postwar diplomatic efforts to consolidate communism in Eastern Europe and discusses Czechoslovakia's strategic significance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Delmas believes Russia invaded Czechoslovakia to guarantee that Czechoslovak territory will be available for medium-range missile bases. The loss of such territory because of ideological heresy is crucially significant in view of the Soviet Union's inferiority in submarine missiles of the Polaris and Poseidon type. The author concludes that the Soviet Union knew that America would not intervene in Czechoslovakia because it is strategically unimportant to the United States and NATO.

149

Eliot, George F. RED DREAM OF EMPIRE. Ordnance, v. 53, Sept./Oct. 1968: 150-153.

UFL 067, v. 53

Russia's nuclear capability has provided the nation with greater maneuverability. No longer must Soviet imperial expansion depend upon piecemeal expansion of its land frontiers; now the Russians can acquire an overseas empire dependent only upon "seaborne lines of communication with the homeland." The Soviet Navy, applying this newly found freedom to today's Soviet aims--the realization of "the eternal Russian dream centering on the Turkish Straits, the Middle Eastern region, and the warm waters of the Indian Ocean"--has emerged in a new and active role. Indications of increased Soviet naval power are the Black Sea Fleet's acquisition of two large amphibious-assault ships, each with a troop capacity of 2,000 or 3,000 marines, resembling LPH-types capable of both airborne and waterborne assault operations; the passage, during 1967, of 167 Soviet warships into the Mediterranean with only 62 return passages; and the visits of Soviet warships to Bombay and ports in Iraq. British evacuation of Aden and the scheduled withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and Singapore in 1971 would create a Western power vacuum and encourage Soviet ambitions. The presence of the Soviet Fleet in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf would increase Soviet prestige and influence in the Middle East and along Africa's East Coast, enable Moscow to bring increased pressure on Iran to accept Soviet arms and economic aid rather than American, possibly lead to Soviet influence in India, balancing and outflanking Red China, and pose a threat to the United States and the free world. The United States, preferably with Britain and Australia, must prevent an increase of Soviet naval influence in this area.

150

Erickson, John. [CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN SOVIET WAR DOCTRINE] Konventionelle Kriegführung in der sowjetischen Kriegstheorie. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Aug. 10, 1968: 533-542.

D839.E65, v. 23

Stresses the Soviet interest in dual conventional forces: one for use within the Soviet bloc's military alliance, the other for use as a means of power politics. Although the roles of these forces have not yet been clearly defined in strategic terms, Moscow's new interest in them indicates that Soviet general strategy is not merely defense oriented.

151

Flandrin, Henri. [NUCLEAR PEACE AND DETERRENCE] Paix nucléaire et dissuasion. Revue militaire générale, June 1968: 53-68.

U2.R48, 1968

France will not achieve a minimum deterrence threshold until its strike forces have a reliable survival capacity. Of the three weapons systems in the French strategic strike force, only its surface-to-surface ballistic missiles have a real deterrent value. Its nuclear submarines will not be operational until 1975, and its Mirage IV's have limited deterrent use. This force already stretches the national budget to the limit. If the effort were made to provide all capabilities indispensable for a self-sufficient nuclear arsenal, the cost would plunge France into bankruptcy. A European nuclear defense pool would solve France's nuclear credibility gap, but a prerequisite would be a European political union.

152

[FRENCH THERMONUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS] Les explosions thermonucléaires françaises [by] J. G. Perspectives, v. 24, Sept. 14, 1968: [item 1] 4.

HC10.P4, v. 24

Comments on the functional possibilities for France to incorporate its H-bomb into an operational weapons system. The bomb could be integrated into the ground-to-ground missile system, which would necessitate construction of corresponding launch platforms, or it could be used in the nuclear submarines scheduled for completion in 1975. The bomb will probably not be incorporated into both weapons systems simultaneously because of the prohibitive costs. Whatever is in store for the French H-bomb, it signifies that France is now a full-fledged nuclear power.

153

Fritsch, J. [GERMANY'S STRATEGIC CONCEPTS] Conceptions stratégiques allemandes. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, June/July 1968: 1034-1046.

D410.R45, v. 24

West German strategists will have to rethink Germany's strategic doctrine in view of America's disengagement from Europe, the withdrawal of Allied troops from the Federal Republic, and the widespread belief that there is no threat of a Soviet invasion. Germany's strategic doctrine, which is based on "forward strategy" and nuclear deterrence, has become obsolete because of the shortage of conventional troops in Europe and a loss of faith in flexible response. An effective "forward strategy" would require twice the number of conventional forces stationed in Europe today, and a viable flexible response strategy for Germany would entail possession or copossession of nuclear weapons. Some German leaders are advocating an independent German force within a European atomic force as an alternative to the present doctrine, while others maintain that NATO will continue to afford the only security against invasion. A denuclearized West Germany could solve its strategic problems and might be a good idea in light of NATO's adverse political, military, and economic effect on Germany.

154

Geisenheyner, Stefan. FAF--PIVOT OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Oct. 1968: 80-83. illus. UG633.A65, v. 51



## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Assesses the strength and capabilities of the French Air Force. In addition to serving as the backbone of De Gaulle's nuclear deterrent policy, the Air Force provides substantial tactical support for the ground forces. Currently the principal deterrent role is filled by the well-equipped, highly trained strategic bomber forces, but by 1973 land- and sea-based missiles are expected to replace the supersonic Mirage IV bombers. The Mirage IV's will then be moved into the Tactical Air Command, implementing its squadrons of Mirage III fighter-bombers, interceptors, and reconnaissance planes. Besides its strategic and tactical forces the French Air Force has an Air Defense Command, a Military Air Transport Command, an Air Force Schools Command, and an Air Communications Service. With its efficient organization, excellent equipment, and top quality personnel France's air arm is a "powerful instrument of defense" that is "up to the standards of the best air forces of the world."

155

Glyn, Alan. **WITNESS TO VIET NAM: THE CONTAINMENT OF COMMUNISM IN SOUTH EAST ASIA.** London, Johnson, 1968. 316 p. 12 plates (1 fold.), illus., maps, ports. DS557.A6G59

Analysis of the Vietnam conflict covering the background, conduct, and implications of the war. Brief profiles are presented for each of the key Vietnamese personalities involved in the struggle for power in South Vietnam, followed by an examination of significant political and military operations. Glyn concludes that American aid was essential to prevent a Communist takeover in South Vietnam and stresses that the American presence in Southeast Asia must be continued in the post-Vietnam period if the region is to remain free of Communist domination. In addition to concluding defense agreements with the nations of Southeast Asia, the United States must strengthen these governments against Communist inroads through extensive economic aid programs.

156

Harrigan, Anthony. **PENTAGON'S CIVILIAN PLANNERS THINK 'LITTLE' WHEN IT COMES TO U.S. FLEET.** Navy, v. 11, Aug. 1968: 18-22. VA49.N28, v. 11

Blames the "accountant mentality" of Pentagon systems analysts for an inadequate U.S. response to an increasingly aggressive Soviet naval strategy and estimates the kinds and quantities of naval forces the United States will need to meet this threat in the 1970's and 1980's.

157

Harrigan, Anthony. **THE SOVIET SEA POWER CHALLENGE: NATO IN THE AGE OF HYDROSPACE.** NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, June/July 1968: 18-21, 23. illus. UA646.F5, v. 13

Rebuts the thesis that modern technology has reduced the significance of seapower. Harrigan argues that this view makes the mistake of conceiving seapower in the too-narrow terms of big ships and big guns without recognizing its broad geopolitical basis and the variety of its component elements. The view also overlooks the adaptability of naval forces to new technology, which should be evident from recent progress in areas like deep-sea exploration, nuclear power, naval gunnery, sea-based airpower, and riverine warfare. Recent breakthroughs in the exploration of the seabed raise the hope of exploiting the resources of the ocean

floor, and this promises an additional expansion of the role of seapower in the modern world. Thus the Soviet seapower challenge is real, and ways must be found to meet it.

158

Hickmott, John R. **THE LAST DITCH.** Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, summer 1968: 107-108. UG635.G7A1252, v. 8

Advocates of the withdrawal of British forces from the Middle and Far East obviously do not remember the lesson handed down by American experience in the two World Wars and do not see that Britain's isolationist policies are analogous to the events that led to the fall of the Roman Empire. Transferring British troops to home shores only creates a delusion of defense since a "last ditch" strategy is not valid in a world of continuing Communist aggression and European disunity. As long as the Communists threaten the security of free nations, Britons cannot safely assume that "by keeping out of world affairs they will be able to remain at home in peace." Britain cannot defend itself alone, but if it does not maintain the capacity to aid weaker nations in time of crisis, it cannot expect outside aid for itself.

159

Hinterhoff, Eugene. **THE EROSION OF THE WESTERN DETERRENT: AN ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA'S GROWING POSITION OF STRENGTH.** NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, June/July 1968: 57-58, 60-61, 64-65. illus. UA646.F5, v. 13

Warns that the balance of power in Europe is shifting decisively in favor of the Soviet Union. Hinterhoff argues that Western reliance on the balance of terror and a passive policy of containment has paralyzed the will of Western statesmen and led them to the erroneous belief that the status quo in Europe can be maintained indefinitely. The Soviet Union, however, is not interested in supporting a status quo, and its armament efforts have brought about a slower erosion of the second-strike capability of the United States and thus undermined the credibility of the Western deterrents, nuclear and conventional. Hinterhoff traces the progress of this erosion in military doctrine, strategic hardware, naval forces, and troop strengths and then relates the resulting shift in the strategic balance to recent political and military events in NATO, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

160

Hinterhoff, Eugene. **EROSION OF WESTERN DETERRENT. PT. 2. THE AUTHOR BRINGS HIS STUDY OF OPPOSING CAPABILITIES TO A CONCLUSION.** Cosantóir, the Irish defence journal, v. 28, July 1968: 201-205. Ut.C8, v. 28

See also item no. 159 in this bibliography.

The erosion of America's strategic deterrent has been accelerated by Russia's ABM system and the "thinning out" of the NATO shield. The Soviet ABM has greatly disturbed West Europeans, who were already disillusioned by the withdrawal of the medium-range Thor and Jupiter missiles, by leaving them face to face with Russia's nuclear capability. This makes NATO's forces "look as efficient as a child's toy." Western Europe has become a Soviet nuclear hostage because NATO does not have an effective countermeasure to Russia's medium-range missiles. NATO's flexible response and forward defense strategies,

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which depend on superior conventional forces and tactical nuclear weapons, are in jeopardy because of France's withdrawal and proposed American troop reductions. In addition, Soviet political and military penetration into the Middle East has threatened both the U.S. 6th Fleet and NATO's southern flank. The Russians are quickly filling the vacuum left by Britain's withdrawal East of Suez and, in a time of political crisis, will be able to control the flow of oil from the Near East to Western Europe, strangling it into submission. The weakening of America's second-strike capability and NATO's defenses is paving the way for a Russian victory and the realization of long-range Soviet objectives.

161  
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IS BECOMING MORE ACTIVE] Die atlantische Allianz wird offensiv. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, July 15, 1968: 323-324. U3.W38, v. 12

The German Federal Republic's Foreign Minister Willy Brandt stressed at the Reykjavik meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council that new East German pressure on West Berlin was directed against not only West Germany but the entire NATO alliance as well. Brandt won the meeting's approval for the need to carry out the new Western defense policy with initiative, not just as a reaction to Soviet policy. The German Foreign Minister also made clear that the Federal Republic's new Eastern policy aims at the relaxation of East-West tensions in Europe.

162  
Ingles, David R. CONSERVATIVE JUDGMENTS AND MISSILE MADNESS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, May 1968: 6-11. TK145.A84, v. 24

Deployment of the ABM and the MIRV may mark the beginning of another upward spiral in the arms race, but this need not be the case. A second-strike capability is a fully adequate deterrent and does not require superiority, or even equality, in nuclear forces. The Soviet Union seems to be aware of this and is willing to settle for a substantial inferiority in nuclear weaponry. The United States, by contrast, is committed to a military policy based on "conservative judgments"--that is, on decisions taken relative to the "worst plausible case"--and this leads to the demand for offensive and defensive nuclear superiority. On this basis, no control over the arms race is possible. The decision to deploy a thin ABM system and the pressure that followed to expand it into a thick one illustrate the "mad momentum" that propels decisionmakers in America. The claim that the ABM is needed to defend against Chinese irrationality was only a blind for domestic political pressures. It is time that the United States begin to make a few conservative diplomatic judgments to correct the fallacies of the military ones. The most pressing dangers at the moment are nuclear proliferation and potential instability in the nuclear balance. If the United States had approached these matters on the basis of the "worst plausible case" in the diplomatic sense, it would never have decided to deploy the ABM. Since it is superior to the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons, the United States ought to take the first step to decelerate the arms race. But powerful forces--military and industrial--oppose this and perpetuate the tradition of conservative military judgments.

163  
Kampe, Helmut. [STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE WESTERN WORLD'S HYPOTHESES] Strategie im Atomzeitalter; eine Untersuchung der Lehrmeinungen in der westlichen Welt. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau: Zeitschrift für europäische Sicherheit, v. 18, May 1968: 283-290. U3.W485, v. 18

Reviews modern Western strategic concepts. Kampe discusses the principles, prerequisites, and kinds of deterrence; massive retaliation and flexible response strategies; and the doctrine of multipolar nuclear-arms sharing and the special interest by various countries in certain of its strategic aspects. The main Western strategic doctrines, although differing among themselves, concur that modern war has ceased to be Clausewitz's "continuation of politics by other means," that its strategy rests in the value of deterrence, and that the most important deterrent against Communist aggression is nuclear weapons. The future development of strategic doctrines depends on "political changes: the development of weapons technologies, especially ABC weapons; and the proliferation of nuclear weapons."

164  
Kaysen, Carl. THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. Survival, v. 10, Sept. 1968: 278-284. U162.S9, v. 10  
Reprinted from Foreign Affairs, July 1968. D410.F6

For nearly a decade the Soviet Union and the United States have been deterred from attacking each other by the knowledge that such a move would invite a devastating counterattack. However, recent and projected changes in Soviet and U.S. strategic forces could seriously undermine the stability of mutual deterrence. While the U.S. response to Russian increases in striking power and the Soviet ABM have so far been limited to upgrading the efficiency of existing systems, congressional and public pressures could eventually result in an extensive broadening of strategic forces. Since increases in the numerical strength of the adversary do not necessarily jeopardize the soundness of America's second-strike forces, an upward surge in weapons production and development would needlessly propel the superpowers into a dangerous new round of the arms race. Furthermore, rapid changes in force structures could seriously hinder and distort the interpretation of the military situation by political decisionmakers, thus endangering the stability of mutual deterrence. Rather than overreact to the Soviet weapons buildup, the United States should take advantage of the approaching parity between the superpowers' offensive forces to initiate a "freeze" on force levels. While such an agreement would be difficult to conclude, it is essential if the risks inherent in the uncertainties created by "the uncontrolled forward thrust of technical change in weaponry" are to be avoided.

165  
Kinnard, Harry W. O. THE FUTURE BEGINS TODAY. Ordnance, v. 53, Sept./Oct. 1968: 162-164. UFI.O67, v. 53

Explains the functions of the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command (CDC), emphasizing its concern with blueprinting future land combat systems and improving today's Army. The CDC helps bring Army doctrine for combat and combat support into line with the capabilities of the field army, helps keep the

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combat service support of the battle area updated, aids in advancing communications that can link the battlefield with the White House, and determines what material capability is needed to meet a specific threat. The helicopter provides a specific example of CDC's usefulness. The helicopter previously had limited use in wartime; today, dignified by doctrine provided by the CDC, it has become the symbol of combat mobility in Vietnam and has thrust the Army into a new dimension of combat.

166

Kirk, Donald. REPORT FROM THE THAILAND FRONT. New leader, v. 51, Sept. 23, 1968: 6-8. HX1.N37, v. 51

The recent guerrilla attack on Udorn, a provincial capital in Northeast Thailand, suggests that Communist terrorists may have shifted their attention from remote hamlets to important towns and bases. While the Thai struggle pales beside Vietnam, the United States, in cooperation with Thai authorities, is transforming the country into a permanent defensive line against Communist advances. Operating invisibly and successfully during this rapid American and allied military escalation, the Communists have emphasized the American occupation and the corruption in the Bangkok government. The Thai Government, supported by American money and advisers, has reacted with a policy ranging from village-level programs to military reprisals; while these programs have frustrated some of their plans, the Communists have not lost strength. Factors that favor the Communists are their ability to retreat to jungle strongholds, the Government's failure to raise the basic living standard, the dictatorial attitudes of Bangkok officials and the harshness of Army officers toward the peasantry, and the lack of rapport between the upcountry peasants and the pureblooded Thais from the central plains. Some believe that if a Vietnam settlement is reached the North Vietnamese will concentrate on solving problems in their own country rather than intensifying the war in Thailand. Others view Northeast Thailand as the next step in the Communist quest for total domination of Southeast Asia. The conflict will probably simmer for years, but if the Thais and the Americans broaden military and civilian aid programs they might still be able to solidify this front and prove that predictions of "another Vietnam" in North and Northeast Thailand are false.

167

Kulakov, V. THE ORIGIN AND ESSENCE OF A STRATEGY OF "FLEXIBLE RESPONSE." In U.S. Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet military translations, no. 431, Apr. 24, 1968. Washington. (Its JPRS 45,165) p. 12-23.

AS36.U57, no. 45,165  
Translated from *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, no. 3, 1968: 40-49. Slav Rm

Examines the theoretical bases and trends that led to the flexible response strategy. In the late 1950's, criticism of the massive retaliation strategy was intensified in the American press. The Council on Foreign Affairs tried to play down a massive-strike strategy in favor of a limited-war strategy, which would reject the use of nuclear weapons against the strategic rear and favor their use only on the battlefield. "However, attempts to find in a series of 'limited' wars the strategic equivalent of world thermonuclear war [were] fundamentally untenable" because they did not consider that in time of war a nation will use any available

means to attain complete victory. In 1959 the basic trend of U.S. military policy stressed preparation for total nuclear war. During the early 1960's American officials continued to search for an alternative to the bankrupt massive retaliation strategy and this was found in the concept of flexible response. The difference between flexible response and massive retaliation is the use of conventional warfare to achieve national objectives. The author concludes that flexible response is an aggressive military policy that seeks to establish the supremacy of American imperialism over the world.

168

Lehmann, Hans. [PERSPECTIVES] Perspektiven. Politische Studien, v. 19, Sept./Oct. 1968: 513-516. H35.P66, v. 19

Points out that the loosening of Czechoslovak ties with the Warsaw Pact Organization would have strategically undermined the bloc's southern flank, which explains the Soviet military leadership's desire to occupy the nation. But the decision to occupy Czechoslovakia was independent; it was made by Soviet political leadership--"a thin layer of Communist functionaries," who, although invoking the interest of world peace, are at a loss to really understand it.

169

McBride, James H. HOW THE STRATEGIC BALANCE IS SHIFTING--1961-1972. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Oct. 1968: 36-43, illus. UG633.A65, v. 51

If the United States wants to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, it must counter recent Soviet challenges to America's nuclear-weapons superiority. While in 1961 America led the Soviet Union in total strategic delivery vehicles by 1,866 to 1,350, unless current trends are reversed, by 1972 the Soviet Union is projected to be ahead of the United States by more than 2 to 1. In addition to producing submarine-launched missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles at a faster rate than the United States, Russia has also added an orbital weapon to its assured destruction forces. Moreover, through the deployment of an ABM system, the Soviet Union is working to surpass the United States in damage limitation capabilities. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued against reacting to the Soviet move with an American ABM on the basis that it would be ineffective and would precipitate a dangerous arms race. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that a viable U.S. ABM system is feasible and contend there is no substantive proof that the Soviet Union would or "could deploy offensive systems any more rapidly than they already are." The United States should follow the advice of the Joint Chiefs and expand the anti-Chinese Sentinel system and reorient it against the Russians; otherwise its influence and prestige may seriously decline. Furthermore, it should increase the mobility of its missile force and expand fixed-site missiles to locations outside the contiguous 48 states in order to protect its arsenal against the possible Soviet deployment of multiple independently-guided reentry vehicles. Since the entire world stands to benefit from America's retention of a "politically exploitable nuclear superiority," it is imperative that the United States "alter its currently programmed force levels" and maintain the position of strength needed to promote its progressive ideals.

170

Mackintosh, Malcolm. JUGGERNAUT: A HISTORY OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES. London, Secker & Warburg [1967] 320 p., illus.

UA770, M28 1967b

Bibliography: p. [313]-314.

Contents. --The foundation of the Soviet Army and the Russian civil war. --Revolution for export: the battle for Poland, 1920. --The army of workers and peasants: 1922-29. --Modernization and mechanization: 1930-36. --The Army purge and its aftermath: 1937-39. --The lessons of Finland: 1939-41. --Disaster in the west: June-October, 1941. --The battle for Moscow: October, 1941-March, 1942. --The year of Stalingrad: 1942-43. --The battle of the Kursk salient: 1943. --The pursuit of 1944. --The final victory: 1945. --Stalin's army: 1945-53. --Khrushchev's army and after: 1953-66.

History of the Soviet Army from its formal establishment on January 28, 1918, to the present. In the near future the Army will have to contend with three important questions: the development of an antimissile system, the role of the nonnuclear and nonstrategic forces, and the relationship between the high command and the post-Khrushchev political leadership.

171

McLin, Jon B. CANADA'S CHANGING DEFENSE POLICY, 1957-1963: THE PROBLEMS OF A MIDDLE POWER IN ALLIANCE. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1967] 251 p. UA600, M33

Partial contents. --Introduction. --Background: the early years of Canada's peacetime alliances. --The North American Air Defense Command. --Hardware for North American defense. --Canadian forces for NATO. --The problem of nuclear weapons. --Defense development and production sharing. --Return of the Liberals. --Summary and conclusions. --Appendixes. --Bibliography.

Begins as an effort to explain the contretemps that characterized Canadian-U.S. relations during the period of development of the Arrow aircraft and the Bomarc missile and evolves into a discussion of the military problems Canada faced from the formation of the North American Air Defense Command in 1957 to the 1963 decision of the Government to acquire nuclear weapons. McLin believes changes in Canada's defense policy should not obscure the fact that the fundamentals of that policy--such as alignment with the United States, are likely to remain constant for many years.

172

McNamara, Robert S. UNDER THE SHADOW OF THE BOMB. Look, v. 32, Sept. 3, 1968: 13-15. AP2, L79, v. 32

An excerpt from Robert McNamara's forthcoming book *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office*.

The essence of the deterrence concept is a nation's assured destruction capability. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States possesses a first-strike capability--the ability to eliminate the attacked nation's retaliatory forces--but both possess a credible second-strike capability--the ability to retaliate if attacked. The significance of U.S. nuclear superiority over Russia is limited because the Soviet Union could still destroy the Nation after an American first strike. Thus the fear

of destruction renders the nuclear force inadequate to deter lesser forms of aggression; therefore substantial conventional forces are required. Although the United States recognizes the futility of the arms race and would prefer to reach an agreement to ultimately reduce offensive and defensive nuclear forces, it must prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining a first-strike capability, even at the price of an arms race. An attempt to achieve a first-strike capability would be futile because it could not be acquired secretly; spiraling of the arms race would ensue with no ultimate change in the security balance. An example is the recent Soviet deployment of an ABM system. Thus far the United States has taken steps to ensure that its offensive weapons can penetrate future Soviet defenses. If the Soviet Union expands its ABM deployment, the U.S. response must be realistic. A massive ABM deployment would be ineffective and cause the Russians to build up their offensive capability, canceling any U.S. gains. Instead the United States must expand its offensive forces to preserve its assured-destruction capability. This is the more reasonable course for "the root of man's security does not lie in his weaponry; it lies in his mind." The world does not need "a new race toward armament, but a new race toward reasonableness."

173

Magnuson, Warren G. THE NEW SOVIET THREAT AT SEA. Eagle, v. 56, Oct. 1968: 10-11, 25. illus. HSI510, E23E3, v. 56

The Soviet Union is challenging the United States for maritime supremacy. From 1960 to 1965 the Soviet merchant fleet doubled in tonnage, and by 1970 it is scheduled to expand by another 50 percent. The Soviet Union has come from a relatively obscure position to sixth place among the world maritime powers and now leads all competitors with an average of 2.5 million deadweight tons. Russia seeks maritime power to increase its arms shipments and its national prestige. The United States cannot ignore this thrust and must act immediately because "the U.S.S.R. may dominate world shipping within a decade or two." A first step is the legislation now pending in Congress that would revitalize the U.S. merchant marine by providing funds for 30 to 35 new ships a year and research and development money to explore new maritime techniques.

174

Marriott, John. THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE 70'S. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, June/July 1968: 28-33. illus. UA646, F5, v. 13

Outlines British naval plans for the next decade. Marriott recalls the major reasons for Britain's decision to withdraw into Europe, discusses the political and military factors shaping current British naval strategy, and enumerates the types and numbers of fleet units programmed by the Labor government for the 1970's.

175

Martin, Laurence. CANADA, TRUDEAU LOOKS TO HIS DEFENCES. Spectator, v. 221, Sept. 20, 1968: 384-385. AP4, S7, v. 221

Prime Minister Trudeau has ordered a thorough review of Canada's defense policy in light of the modern strategic balance and the criticism of Canada's role in the Atlantic alliance. Canadians are disenchanted with

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

their NATO forces because they lack the unity characteristic of a national defense establishment and are incorporated into other national forces. Canada's NATO Navy and Air Force play a nuclear role in the alliance that is distasteful to most Canadians. In addition, Canadians criticize the North American Air Defense Command because it binds Canada to America as a junior partner and because the bomber threat no longer exists. Canadians also condemn America for its decision to deploy an ABM system even though they would like a share of the protection if the system works. However, so long as America can deter Russia and the threat to Western Europe diminishes, Canada would reject any attempt by the United States to construct missile sites on its territory. Although few Canadians believe America would seize Canadian territory in peacetime, many fear "powerful political and economic reprisals and a general deterioration in the good relations upon which Canada relies so heavily for its welfare." Canada would prefer to play a peacekeeping role in the international community because of its unsatisfactory role in the Atlantic alliance, but because of the recent dismissal of the U.N. Emergency Force support for such a strategy is rapidly waning.

176

Mazrui, Ali A. ANTI-MILITARISM AND POLITICAL MILITANCY IN TANZANIA. *Journal of conflict resolution*, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 269-284.

JX190LJ6, v. 12

References: p. 284.

Two dialectical tendencies in military affairs have characterized the ethos of Tanzania under Julius Nyerere. One is a marked distrust of professional men under arms at home and in inter-African affairs. The other is a faith in military or quasi-military solutions to some of the remaining colonial problems in Africa. Changes in Nyerere's original positions on these matters are described and related to certain events such as the Tanganyika army mutiny of January 1964. The commitment to the idea of necessary military solutions for colonial problems has emerged partly out of Tanzania's leadership in the Pan-African Freedom Movement and partly out of the subsequent choice of Dar es-Salaam as the headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee. This militancy has interacted with Tanzania's conceptions of her own role in the development process. The notion that more than one party might lead to a civil war and the notion that development is an exercise in an economic form of battle have been major aspects of Tanzania's political ethos. The soldier, the state, and the socialist have had to devise a new interrelationship in the political personality of the nation. (Abstract supplied)

177

THE MISSILE BALANCE. *Economist*, v. 228, July 6, 1968: 30.

HCH.F2, v. 228

Even though no nuclear power can legitimately be termed "inferior" as long as it maintains a sound second-strike capability, most strategists have not forsaken the ideas of nuclear superiority and nuclear parity and still measure deterrence even in terms of tonnage, numbers of missile launchers, and numbers of warheads. Russia has produced larger warheads than the Americans, but the United States claims at least a 3-to-1 numerical advantage. The United States is slightly ahead in land-based long-range missile launchers and far ahead in submarine-borne missiles. However, Russia is fast increasing its land- and

sea-based ICBM launchers and expects to catch up to the United States by 1975. By then both countries will probably also possess missiles equipped with multiple independently-guided warheads. Moreover, each country has also begun deployment of a limited ABM system. The American Sentinel system is much more sophisticated than the Russian system, although neither will be able to adequately limit damage from a Russian or U.S. attack.

178

Montfort, Colonel-divisionnaire. [WHAT'S NEW AT NATO?] A l'OTAN, quoi de nouveau? *Revue militaire suisse*, v. 113, July 1968: 317-324.

U2.R5, v. 113

The gravest consequence of France's withdrawal from NATO is the alliance's loss of French airspace and territory, which has reduced the available space for auxiliary installations and deployment of allied forces. This loss has ruptured NATO's communications and logistics systems, and the withdrawal of French troops from the organization has depleted an already inadequate conventional force level that is a result of the West's commitment to a flexible response strategy -- "a euphemism destined to reassure the bourgeoisie." This strategy does not protect Western Europe from Communist aggression; the implementation of it during war would mark the beginning of a nuclear war. In fact if the Soviet Union attacks Western Europe, NATO would either have to capitulate or launch total warfare. An increase in NATO's conventional forces, at least to the level of those in the Warsaw Pact, would eliminate having to make one of these decisions. However, the source of such an increase will not be France because "the supreme commander of NATO's forces cannot count on French forces, any more than he can on those of Switzerland."

179

Niu, Sien-chong. CHINA AND SEAPOWERS. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, June/July 1968: 24-27, illus.

UA646.F5, v. 13

Calls attention to China's potential as a seapower. Niu believes that China's maritime forces are a more serious long-term threat to the free world than Chinese nuclear weapons. China has a long naval tradition and is really a coastal, not a heartland, power. The free world is essentially a maritime alliance, and that part of it that lies in South and Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific is highly vulnerable to hostile penetration from the sea. Unlike Japan, China possesses an adequate base of manpower and resources and gives sufficient naval forces may yet succeed in doing what the Japanese failed to do -- establish a "co-prosperity sphere" for Asia.

180

Norris, John G. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND PENTAGON DECISION-MAKING PROCESS BLAMED FOR LONG DELAYS IN WEAPONS PROGRAMS. *Naval*, v. 11,

Aug. 1968: 12-17, illus.

VA49.N28, v. 11

Summarizes Navy and congressional criticism of the use of systems analysis in major decisions on naval ship design and construction. According to Admiral Rickover's testimony before Congress, systems analysis -- originally introduced into the Department of Defense as an analytical tool useful in staff work -- has become "severely" in the Pentagon, overriding the professional advice of the Service Secretaries and the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Rickover believes Defense Department analysts are technically illiterate and cause major errors to be made in planning U.S. naval requirements.

181

Nuechterlein, Donald E. PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Asian survey, v. 8, Sept. 1968: 806-816. DSI A492, v. 8

The significance of Britain's withdrawal of forces East of Suez is that the burden of maintaining peace and security in Southeast Asia will fall to the United States. Americans will not accept such a role, however, without the active support of other powers, including those of Southeast Asia. A promising development in Southeast Asian security that would give that area's nations "an opportunity to join in a purely Asian endeavor without the participation, and thereby the direction, of non-Asian powers" is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Although differences on regional security questions exist within ASEAN, it is a viable economic and social organization and may eventually provide the impetus for a regional security system for Southeast Asia. However, the area's defense must for some time continue to be guaranteed by the Great Powers, particularly the United States. In fact, Southeast Asia's future security would be strengthened by Russo-American cooperation, which would greatly diminish the Chinese nuclear threat. Without such cooperation "the defense of Southeast Asia in the future will be a much more difficult task."

182

Ostrowska, N. von. [EFFECTS OF THE ATOM AND HYDROGEN BOMB TESTS ON CHINA'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT] Die Auswirkungen der Atom- und Wasserstoffbombenteste auf das strategische Konzept Chinas. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Aug. 1968: 404-408. U3.W396, v. 17

Mao Tse-tung's strategic concepts draw from the classical Chinese military doctrines of the 6th, 5th, and 4th centuries B.C., from the dialectic methodology of Marxism-Leninism, and from Clausewitz' theories, through Lenin. In Mao's view each stage of mankind's course toward the ultimate goals of communism has specific political goals that determine its strategy. World peace can be achieved only through a war that results in China dominating the world. But Mao believes the confrontation of regular troops by warring states has little influence on the war's outcome. He also rejects the idea of the strategic decisiveness of "technical weapons," without minimizing their otherwise strategic or tactical effectiveness. Peiping is determined to match the technical sophistication of American and Soviet nuclear weaponry to add credence to its ambitious political goals, but it also places a high premium on conventional weapons, the incitement of "people's wars," and the potential strategic uses of its paramilitary masses. Peiping claims that after the most devastating nuclear confrontation it still would command enough human resources to decide the war's outcome. China counts on time as a factor in wearing out the enemy, one which technological superiority cannot counteract. The West has not yet found a satisfactory answer to this aspect of China's strategy.

183

Paolucci, Dominic A. POSEIDON AND MINUTEMAN: EITHER, OR, NEITHER, NOR? In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 94, Aug. 1968: 46-58. illus. VI. U8, v. 94

If Russia's ballistic missile forces become more effective, the United States will have to decide which strategic delivery systems it will need to maintain its assured destruction and damage limitation capabilities, and what the criteria will be to measure the efficacy of these systems. The most important criteria for selecting U.S. missiles to counter various feasible Russian strategies are cost, weapons reliability, and survivability. The Poseidon missile will best ensure U.S. strategic deterrent capabilities. It will cost less and have a greater survivability rate than a ground-based missile system. It will double the payload-on-target capability of sea-based systems without necessitating a larger investment in submarines. Furthermore a mobile sea-based system would be more reliable in the face of enemy multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV's), which in turn may make obsolete the fixed, undefended ground-based system. Above all, a sea-based MIRV can reduce the leverage of a potential arms race by playing down the number of launchers and silos within the framework of strategic deterrence.

184

Payne, Don H. WHAT HAPPENS AFTER VIETNAM? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Sept. 1968: 42-48. Z6723.U35, v. 48

Although a few spokesmen argue that the United States does not have vital interests in Asia, most top policymakers of the past century have been convinced that the security of the United States is very closely linked to the Orient. This belief was dramatically demonstrated during World War II and is currently being reaffirmed in Vietnam. Contrary to the opinion of a small minority, Communist China constitutes a real threat to U.S. interests since it not only has the nationalistic and ideological aspirations for territorial expansion but is gradually acquiring the capability to carry out such aspirations. While the United States has little reason to fear a direct attack by the Chinese, it must be prepared to prevent China from taking over its Asian neighbors and thus creating an unfavorable shift in the world balance of power. Preemptive war against China would effectively eradicate the danger but would be unlikely to garner broad public support. Thus the United States is left essentially with the strategy of containment and must decide the best military arrangements for implementing it. Withdrawal of American troops to Hawaii or to some intermediate position such as Australia appeals to the isolationist mentality. However, neither action would provide a convincing deterrent, and both presuppose the existence of strong national forces on the Asian mainland. While withdrawal to a line just off the coast of Asia would assure the protection of U.S. interests in the West Pacific, only the tightest line of containment running along the existing boundaries of U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence would form a distinct barrier against Chinese aggression on the mainland. The United States cannot allow the formation of a coalition government in Vietnam but must strive for a Vietnam Government that is democratic and closely allied with the United States. It must attempt to strengthen all states in the path of Chinese expansionism and back them up with the necessary military support until such time as the Chinese cease to be a threat to Asia and to U.S. security.

185

Polisky, Anthony. READY POWER FOR PEACE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 61, July 4, 1969: 23-28. illus. HC411.F18, v. 61  
Second article in a section on "America in Asia."

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The American military presence in Asia is overwhelming, but the full extent of troop deployment is difficult to ascertain. Top U.S. Government officials who have access to this information are unwilling to discuss the issue. The United States must eventually account for this tremendous overseas extension of its power and wealth. If an international conference on Southeast Asia is convened, it is hoped the United States will state clearly and succinctly "what its military forces in Asia are designed to do." A convincing argument must be made not only for the sake of the Asians but also for the average American, who has begun to worry about the extent of the U.S. overseas commitment.

186

Popov, O. **BLACKMAIL STRATEGY**. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 14, Aug. 30, 1968: pt. 1, [item] 4, 1-2.

Slav Rm

Translated from Izvestia, Aug. 29, 1968.

Slav Rm

The Western imperialist powers are using the events in Czechoslovakia to create a new wave of war hysteria. On the one hand, West Germany is advocating a hard-line military strategy for NATO and more Bundeswehr troops, while, on the other, the United States is using the "communist threat" to put "pressure on its allies, in order to harness them still tighter to the American war chariot." Australia, which is actively supporting Washington's criminal policies in Vietnam, is being transformed "into a bridgehead of American imperialism in Asia." Despite public opposition to the Vietnam War the Australian Government will continue to press for greater military appropriations. However, the progressive forces in Australia will not be intimidated or deceived by the imperialists, who seek to strangle the freedom and independence of other countries.

187

Powell, Ralph L. **MAOIST MILITARY DOCTRINES**. Asian survey, v. 8, Apr. 1968: 239-262.

DSL A492, v. 8

Maoist military doctrine begins with the assertion that men and politics are superior in warfare to weapons and technology. Defensive doctrine assumes (unrealistically) that the United States will follow up a nuclear strike with an invasion of mainland China, and the Maoists say that this invasion can be defeated by a people's war waged in depth by aroused and politically motivated masses. Offensive doctrine outlines the use of closely coordinated political, economic, and military means to promote revolutionary seizures of power in underdeveloped regions in order to surround the capitalist world city in Europe and North America. These Maoist theories have come under fire from Chinese military professionals who resent the intrusion of politics into the armed forces and have serious doubts about the supremacy of man over machine on the battlefield. These critics would like to see China's Armed Forces equipped with the new sophisticated weaponry, and, for military reasons, they desire a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Mao's military doctrines are rooted in the past and stifle progressive military thought. Nevertheless, his stress on the importance of men in warfare and his constant reiteration of the invincibility of the Chinese masses have helped sustain the morale of the Chinese people. Furthermore, in China's present circumstances, it is difficult to see what other strategy it could adopt. The defensive doctrine is obviously inadequate to cope with

the threat posed by the United States, but the offensive plan for revolutionary warfare could, as the Vietnam war is proving, be a very effective Chinese "weapons system."

188

**REPORTS FROM THE AIR FORCE COMMANDS AND SEPARATE OPERATING AGENCIES**. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Sept. 1968: 83-92, 94-101, 103-104, 109-114, 117-121, 124-128, 130-137, 139-140, 145-149, 151-156, 158-159, 162-172, 174-175, 177-179. illus. UG633.A65, v. 51

Reports the activities of the Air Force's commands, its operating agencies, and its civilian auxiliary, the Civil Air Patrol. The principal missions, major accomplishments, and organizational structure are presented for each unit.

189

**ROLES AND MISSIONS OF U.S. AIR FORCES IN EUROPE**. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, June/July 1968: 34-38, 41, 43. illus. UA646.F5, v. 13

An interview with General Maurice A. Preston, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe. Preston answers questions on the organizational structure of his command, its role in NATO strategy, and its present state of readiness. He discusses the strategy of flexible response, the recent withdrawal of four U.S. Air Force squadrons from Europe, and some of the problems of civil-military relations in Europe.

190

**ROYAL NAVY: WHAT FOR?** Economist, v. 227, June 15, 1968: 22, 25. HG11.E2, v. 227

Britain's Navy will soon be confined to an almost exclusively European role. By the early 1970's the Navy will have lost 6,500 men and will be equipped with four Polaris submarines, four assault ships, three cruisers, eight missile-carrying destroyers, four nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines, about 55 frigates, 40 minesweepers, 30 conventionally powered patrol submarines, and various support vessels. The fleet's primary mission will be to enforce the doctrine of graduated, flexible response, which means it must be prepared to react to threats ranging from local harassment of merchant shipping to the blockading of maritime access to Western Europe. In order to realize its objectives the Navy should avoid delays in its rebuilding program, maintain an effective amphibious element, deploy more than the planned number of hunter-killer submarines, and bolster NATO forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

191

Schmidt, Helmut. **MAKING BETTER USE OF NATO**. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Oct. 1968: 309-310. DB200.7.S74, v. 16

In a televised interview Helmut Schmidt, Deputy Chairman of the German Social Democratic Party and SPD Faction Chairman in the Bundestag, discusses the changes in the European scene and the question of the Federal Republic's security. Although consciously guarded in his remarks in order not to give the Soviets occasion or pretext to misinterpret the West German policy, his concern with regard to future developments in Europe was unmistakable. Queried as to the tasks of NATO, Schmidt said that it was necessary to make

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better use of that political organization than has been done heretofore and to keep it functional. He feels sure that it would be a serious mistake indeed if, after the lessons of this summer, the Americans were to effect a withdrawal of troops from Europe. (Supplied summary, modified).

192

**SENTINEL AND BEYOND.** Space/aeronautics, v. 50, Sept. 1968: 42-51. illus.

TL50L A786, v. 50

Projects possible trends in strategic defense emanating from the deployment of the thin Sentinel ABM system. With the establishment of near-nuclear parity between the superpowers and the approaching unity of the cost-exchange ratio between an ICBM and an ABM, a strategy based solely on deterrence may prove obsolete. If the Sentinel becomes an integral part of America's strategic posture there will probably be efforts to integrate it more closely with other surveillance systems and develop closer coordination between offense and defense through the establishment of a force management command and control system. Furthermore, other defensive systems may be deployed to supplement the Sentinel's work, including the Navy's seaborne antiballistic missile intercept system, the Air Force's airborne antiballistic missile intercept system, and the forward area ballistic missile intercept system, among others. Improvements in surveillance, warning, prediction, and display capabilities should greatly boost the effectiveness of the interceptors.

193

**SOVIET MARITIME POWER.** NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, June/July 1968: 12-16. illus.

UA646. F5, v. 13

Describes the recent growth of Soviet maritime power. The article reviews Soviet progress in shipbuilding and repair, overseas base acquisition, merchant shipping, fishing, and oceanography. It puts particular stress on the implications of the Soviet effort to develop specialized amphibious forces. The Soviet Union became convinced of the crucial importance of seapower through direct and frequently painful confrontations with Western naval might during and after World War II. It has come to recognize though that, while the sea is NATO's greatest source of strength, it is also the point at which the alliance is most vulnerable.

194

**Stikker, Dirk U. NATIONALISM THREATENS ATLANTIC COOPERATION.** Atlantic community quarterly, v. 6, summer 1968: 228-230.

D839. A85, v. 6

Much attention has been given recently to the estrangement between the United States and Europe, and with good reason. Some discontent is normal to any alliance, but there is danger that transatlantic discord within NATO will get out of hand. The major disagreement is over the meaning of détente. Many Europeans argue that détente has eliminated the danger of war in Europe and therefore European military forces can be greatly reduced. The United States disagrees but finds its capacity to deal with European problems restricted by its commitments in Vietnam. Consequently, some European states are showing a marked propensity for seeking national solutions to their security problems: France works to dismantle NATO,

some Germans--fearing a Franco-Soviet deal--explore the possibility of a united but neutralized Germany, and Britain becomes increasingly bitter against the Common Market. Faced with this rebirth of nationalism in Europe, the United States is seriously considering bilateral collaboration with the Soviet Union in attacking the world's major security problems. This disintegration can be stopped if the West will recognize "that a real détente does not exist." The Communist world and its relations with the West are undergoing profound changes, but the Soviet Union has not renounced its global aims, and the public should be made aware that European integration and Atlantic cooperation are as essential as before to Western security and world peace.

195

**Stillman, Richard J. TRAINING OF DEFENSE LEADERS. PT. 2. THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, Apr./May 1968: 18-22, 24, 26-31. illus.**

UA646. F5, v. 13

Pt. 1 was annotated as item 1567 in v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography. For pt. 3, see next item.

A comparative study of the NATO Defense College and the U.S. National War College. Part 2 relates the history of the National War College and evaluates its student body, faculty, and curriculum. Stillman points out that the growing complexity of war prompted establishment of the War College to produce officers with interservice training and familiarity with the political and economic aspects of security policy. The school is a center for "foster the fusionist ideals of the combined civil-military approach," but service loyalties and military values both run counter to this concept and have restricted the school's educational effectiveness and general influence.

196

**Stillman, Richard J. TRAINING OF DEFENSE LEADERS. PT. 3. THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND THE NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE (A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS). NATO's fifteen nations, v. 13, June/July 1968: 66-73. illus.**

UA646. F5, v. 13

For pt. 1, see item no. 1567, v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography; for pt. 2, see preceding item.

A comparative study of the NATO Defense College and the U.S. National War College. Part 3 compares the teaching method, student body, faculty, and organization of the two colleges. The NATO Defense College has the one great advantage of being a genuine experience in internationalism for its students, but otherwise it has grave institutional and political weaknesses as well as inadequate standards of scholarship. The U.S. War College has no serious institutional or political problems, but because of its narrow national and military focus its student body is insufficiently exposed to cosmopolitan experiences and the hard academic disciplines. Stillman recommends curriculum and faculty changes at the War College to bring about a better balance of instruction between broad international issues and technical subjects and suggests structural changes at the NATO college to give it a more independent and influential role in alliance affairs.

197

**Stockwin, Harvey. SUSPICIOUSLY LIKE NOTHING.** Far Eastern economic review, v. 61, July 11, 1968: 116-119.

HC411. F18, v. 61

Reports on the first Five Power Commonwealth Defence Conference, in Kuala Lumpur. The conference



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was more concerned with examining future defensive capability than with future commitments and contingencies in the face of British withdrawal. While the five nations--Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia--noticeably disagreed, certain accords were reached. The basis was laid for joint air defense through, and possibly after, 1971, and Britain left the other four powers with the feeling that it would have a "continuing interest" even after withdrawal was complete.

198

Stradling, Alfred H. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1968-1978. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, summer 1968: 103-106. UG635.G7A1252, v. 8

Reviews the challenges to be met by the Royal Air Force as set forth in "The Defence Estimates 1968." While Air Force officials regret the substantial personnel and aircraft reductions proposed in the policy paper, their morale remains high, and they are approaching the problem of covering a wide variety of tasks with a relatively small force level in the same spirit that won them the Battle of Britain. The aircraft that survived the Government's economy drive are not quite up to the standard of those that were cut, but through adequate planning they can be utilized to give "the fighting power and deployment capability required for foreseen circumstances."

199

STRENGTHENING THE COMBAT READINESS IS OUR CHIEF TASK. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 20, Sept. 4, 1968: 5.

D839.C87, v. 20

Translated excerpts of an editorial in *Krasnaya zvezda*, Aug. 13, 1968.

Slav Rm

The 1968 command staff exercises conducted by the Warsaw Pact countries' armed forces in Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, and the Soviet Union; the North command staff exercises in which the staffs and ships of Poland, East Germany, and Russia participated; and the Sky Shield exercises of the anti-aircraft defense troops marked a new stage in the combat readiness of the armies and a high level of development of all classes of troops, types of weapons, and staffs. They demonstrated the increased skills of the commanders as well as the field training of the units and subunits and the firm fighting morale and preparedness to perform the most complex and diverse combat tasks. The political consciousness and vigilance, the willingness to fulfill their duty in defending the great cause of socialism, and the high level of their ideological convictions are the most important components of the troops' combat readiness. The present situation requires unrelenting efforts to raise the defense capability of every Socialist state and the whole Socialist commonwealth and to strengthen the political and military cooperation of the members of the Warsaw Pact Organization, who are facing the aggressive activities of the United States and West Germany. The Warsaw Pact armies must be an insurmountable barrier against any aggression.

200

Subrahmanyam, K. DEFENSE PREPARATIONS IN INDIA AND CHINA. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, May 1968: 28-33. TK145.A84, v. 24

For every level of industrial development there is a corresponding level of sophistication in defense technology.

A nation can move to a more sophisticated level of weaponry before it has the appropriate industrial base only if it is willing to make enormous economic sacrifices. China, committed to world revolution and fearing the United States, has tried with Soviet aid to make a great leap forward into advanced military technology. India, which is plagued with financial difficulties but faces no major threat to its security, has proceeded more slowly and economically. The Indians have developed a conventional arms production capability and for economic, not military, reasons have made considerable progress in electronics and nuclear energy. But the growing threat from China is forcing a reevaluation of Indian security policy. What course India will take depends on whether the Chinese can make their nuclear threat credible, and this in turn depends in part on the success or failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy effective ABM systems. Difficult decisions will have to be made, should India be forced to procure a high-cost defense technology of its own. It might seek outside assistance, but the only states capable of giving it are the promoters of the nonproliferation treaty, and they are unlikely to honor any such request. On the other hand, it would be prohibitively costly for India to develop advanced weapons systems with its own resources. This--the dilemma raised by India's confrontation with China--is the most debated issue in India today.

201

Swenson, Mark E. THE VIETNAM MANIPULATORS. Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Oct. 1968: 12, 14-15. UG633.A65, v. 51

The middle-of-the-roads, not the hawks or the doves, are responsible for the failure of U.S. policies in Vietnam. The administration's strategy of gradualism has led to heavy losses of American soldiers and materiel without weakening the political influence of the enemy in the south. By deciding to step down from top policymaking positions, President Johnson and Robert McNamara have shown that some key officials already recognize and admit their mistakes in Southeast Asia. Whether or not another strategy would have succeeded is now irrelevant; what is important is that the lessons of Vietnam be heeded in the future. Henceforth wars involving U.S. forces should be understood and accepted by the American people and should be fought in support of a representative government. Strategy and tactics should be in line with an overall policy formulated by the President and his advisers, but field commanders should be given more flexibility than in Vietnam.

202

[USSR: POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROBLEMS] U.R.S.S.: problèmes politique et militaire [by] J. G. Perspectives, v. 24, July 27, 1968: [item 1]: 1-3. HC10.P4, v. 24

Reviews Russo-Czechoslovak relations and the effect the democratization in Prague will have on East-West relations and the world balance of power. The Russians believe that Czechoslovakia is, geopolitically, the key to the East-West military balance on the Continent. An independent Czechoslovakia would leave the Russian frontier open to invasion and, in the eyes of the Soviets, would spread the "contagious disease" of liberalization and freedom throughout the East European bloc. If the liberal Czechoslovak Government wishes to remain in power, it will have to agree to tougher censorship, absolute fidelity to the Warsaw Pact, and the establishment of a cordon sanitaire between West Germany and Russia.

203

USSR WARNS ON BONN LAWS. Democratic German report, v. 17, June 12, 1968: 89-90.  
DD261, D3, v. 17

Excerpts from the May 28, 1968, "warning" by the Soviet Union "that the West German Emergency Laws could have a serious effect on European security." The new laws, if adopted, would enable the West German Government to raise at almost any time a paramilitary force of several hundred thousand to transform the peacetime economy into a wartime one and to militarize the entire country. "The Soviet Union is ready, together with the other peace-loving states, to take all necessary measures to ensure that these forces shall never again disturb the peace of the peoples of Europe."

204

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: JACKSON SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS AND FINDINGS. Edited by Henry M. Jackson. New York, Praeger [1967] 309 p. UAG46, 3, U445

Portions of the hearings were noted in v. 3, no. 1, item 235, and the chapter entitled "Basic Issues" was noted in v. 2, no. 4, item 1746, of this bibliography.

Partial contents. --pt. 1. Findings: Initial. Basic issues. The Atlantic alliance: unfinished business. --pt. 2. Hearings: The practice of alliance politics, by Richard E. Neustadt. The past and the future, by Dean Acheson. Toward Atlantic unity? by Christian A. Herter. Collective defense in NATO, by Lauris Norstad. Central Europe--the challenge, by Thomas C. Schelling, with a comment by Malcolm W. Hoag. Experience as a teacher, by John J. McCloy. A critical test, by Dean Rusk. The alliance agenda, by Robert S. McNamara. --pt. 3. Documents: The North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949. Text of letter from President Eisenhower to General de Gaulle, October 20, 1958. Exchange of letters between President de Gaulle and President Johnson, March, 1966. Joint declaration agreed upon by the fourteen member nations, March 18, 1966. Communiqué issued at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, June 7-8, 1966. Communiqué issued at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Paris, December 15-16, 1966.

Staff reports and testimony presented before the subcommittee during its general review of the Atlantic alliance. Troubled by recent signs of lessening solidarity among NATO members, the subcommittee examined the key problems confronting the alliance. The papers emphasize NATO's importance to the vital interests of the United States and recommend measures for strengthening the alliance.

205

U.S. EYES ITS OUTPOSTS ABROAD. Business week, no. 2036, Sept. 7, 1968: 134-136, map.  
HC431, B87, 1968

In response to political and economic pressure to reduce U.S. foreign military bases, the administration has established a study group headed by Robert McClintock, a senior career ambassador, and retired General Robert Wood to evaluate America's overseas bases network. Although the study group may indicate a need for additional bases to fill the voids caused by Britain's withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and the Far

East, it is expected to recommend an overall reduction in America's overseas bases, including U.S. NATO forces, if the détente with Russia can be reestablished in the wake of the Czech occupation. Improvements in weaponry, equipment, and mobility; increasing resentment by foreign nations over the presence of American troops, the outflow of some \$2.3 billion annually, demands for the closure of U.S. bases by countries that have shifted toward the Communist camp; and military developments in hostile countries adjacent to U.S. bases are among the many considerations that will influence the study group's conclusions.

206

USAREUR'S VAST VISTAS, OR FROM KANSAS TO GERMANY. Army, v. 18, Sept. 1968: 22-25, illus.  
Ul. A893, v. 18

Reports on the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and examines the reorganization and relocation of U.S. troops that resulted both from DeGaulle's ultimatum for allied withdrawal from French territory and from efforts to rectify the unfavorable balance of payments. Except for occasional anti-Vietnam demonstration, relations between USAREUR and the native populace remain excellent; programs to increase understanding, both between USAREUR and the allied troops; and between USAREUR and the civilian community, are underway constantly. There is no evidence of any significant resentment against American troops.

207

Vukadinović, Radovan. NORDIC ATTITUDES ON FURTHER COOPERATION IN NATO. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Aug. 5, 1968: 8-10.  
D839, R4, v. 19

The three Nordic countries, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland, have often been described and recently appraised in all forecasts of NATO's further development as the weakest points of the Atlantic organization. However, as the time for NATO's renewal approaches their attitudes have crystallized, and there is little doubt that they will remain in NATO. Traditionally oriented toward Western Europe and unable to organize a Nordic defense alliance, they feel that NATO still offers military, political, and economic advantages. Besides, they want to preserve the so-called Nordic balance of power. As Finland is bound by a treaty with the Soviet Union and Sweden is neutral, Norway and Denmark must remain in NATO to provide equilibrium. In the present situation they doubt that NATO can be disbanded, but they want it to become a mechanism for bilateral negotiations to ease the international tension. Today the extrabloc countries are more important and have a larger scope of action than the bloc countries. A neutral Nordic area could be instrumental in intensifying international cooperation and promoting intra-European ties.

208

Walsh, J. NATIONAL SECURITY. In Royal United Service Institution, London, Journal, v. 113, Aug. 1968: 251-253.  
Ul. R8, v. 113

What role should military power play in national security? Traditionally, states have increased their military power to guarantee their security, but today this policy produces a "security dilemma": military power may be increased with no increase in relative security. In fact, gains in military strength may

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

engender an arms race that may "be broken only by the war against which the increases in strength were intended to insure." National security in the nuclear age depends on not only a nation's defense posture but whether it is psychologically secure and acts it. Despite the introduction of quantitative analysis into strategic decisionmaking, security policy continues to be influenced by human judgment; this is good because broad issues cannot be decided upon an objective basis alone. Security is a long-term objective as are peace, freedom, power, and survival. Although the order of priority of these goals is difficult to determine because of their interdependency, security can be classified as an end in itself "owing to the way in which [it] has always been sought by states."

209

Wettern, Desmond. *THE FADING NAVY*. Spectator, v. 221, Sept. 13, 1963: 352-353.  
AP4.S7, v. 221

Against the background of Russia's naval expansion to support its overseas interests, the British Navy is being reduced. Specific causes for alarm are ship shortages in Britain's Western and Far East Fleets, a slump in naval recruiting, a slack in the warship building program, and a shortage of weapons. In the context of today's world power politics, these deficiencies may be viewed in two ways: either the British Armed Forces as a whole are no longer significant and should be dismantled, or the Navy is vital to the maintenance of peace and should be strengthened. Great Britain's defense policy should reflect the realization that the nation is completely dependent upon shipping and upon raw materials from foreign markets, and that H-bombs or Polaris missiles are not substitutes for the forces formerly deployed. In sea operations, air control over a fleet is vital, but Britain plans to uphold its global responsibilities without aircraft outside the Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

210

Wettern, Desmond. *ROYAL NAVY AVIATORS MAINTAIN STIFF UPPER LIP*. Navy, v. 11, June 1968: 15-19.  
VA49.N28, v. 11

Forecasts British naval policy. Wettern notes British plans to strengthen amphibious and antisubmarine forces in the Mediterranean and cites evidence to suggest that the withdrawal from East of Suez may not be total. He argues that if Britain decides to maintain a military presence in the Far East or the Indian Ocean its naval forces will have to be configured much like the U.S. 6th Fleet, which is built around a nucleus of attack carriers and missile cruisers with their own seaborne logistic support.

211

Wiener, Friedrich. [ARMIES OF THE EASTERN-BLOC NATIONS, ORGANIZATION, TACTICS, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT] Die Armeen der Ostblockstaaten; Organisation, Taktik, Waffen und Gerät. [München] J. F. Lehmanns Verlag [1967] 224 p. illus., maps. [Truppendienst-Taschenbücher, Bd. 2]  
UA646.W47 1967

Partial contents. --The Warsaw Pact. --Organization of armed forces. --Concept of war; command and combat principles. --Weapons and equipment.

Second edition of the West German military manual (first edition, 1965, entitled *Die Armeen der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten*) shows changes made in

organization, weaponry, and military tactics of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. The book contains over 200 illustrations of weapons.

## D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

### 1. Biological

212

Alland, Alexander. *WAR AND DISEASE. AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE*. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, June 1968: 28-31.  
TK945.A84, v. 24

Offers an ecological model of the highly complex behavioral and biological links between warfare and disease. Alland suggests that the health patterns of a given society depend on an ecological relationship between its members, disease organisms, vectors, and reservoir populations. Men are able to reduce the incidence of disease by making genetic and behavioral adjustments appropriate to the given ecology, but if the latter is disturbed an increased disease rate and lowered viability may result. He cites the plague epidemics of European history to illustrate the theory and then applies it to present-day events in Vietnam. In that country, defoliation, the interruption of public health services, population movement, overcrowding, physical and psychological stress, and other disturbances have greatly increased the possibility of serious epidemics and of long-term damage to the population.

213

Amir, S. M. *BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: A NEW THREAT TO LIFE ON EARTH*. Science Chronicle, v. 6, Apr./June 1968: 507.  
Q1.S368, v. 6

Biological weapons could potentially pose a greater threat to mankind than thermonuclear or chemical weapons. As little as one milligram of a deadly virus would have the destructive equivalent of a hydrogen bomb or 100,000 kilograms of nerve gas. Since biological weapons are designed to resist immunization and treatment and to break down the body's natural defenses, their mortality and crippling rate is extremely high. In addition to creating disease and suffering, the use of microbes in war could have very serious ecological effects--possibly the end of the human race. Despite their destructive potential, however, biological weapons will not become viable until researchers have devised adequate means for their delivery and control. A group of scientists from 13 countries, known as the Pugwash study group, is currently endeavoring to create public awareness of the grave consequences of the continued development of bacteriological weapons and hopes to marshal public opinion into demanding a ban on further research.

214

Davis, George E. *RADIATION AND LIFE*. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State University Press [1967] 344 p. illus.  
QC778.D3

Partial contents. --Radioactivity: death of an atom. --Nuclear radiations. --Atomic fission: an atom splits in two. --Power from the atom. --The atomic fission bomb. --Energy from atomic fusion. --Biological effects of nuclear radiations.

Describes important physical and biological structures, activities, relationships, principles, and applications that form the basis of the scientific age, attempting "to interpret recent advancements in terms of human values." Included are brief descriptions of atomic reactors and bombs and a consideration of vital atomic age problems: the reaction of living things to radiation injury, the genetic effects of atomic-bomb radiation on present and future generations, and recent discoveries concerning DNA.

215

Denbasky, G. [THE TESTING OF FOOD-SUPPLIES AND POTABLE WATER FOR RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES FROM THE STANDPOINT OF MILITARY MEDICINE] Die Untersuchung von Lebensmitteln und Trinkwasser auf radioaktive Stoffe unter sanitätsdienstlichen Aspekten. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 12, no. 3, 1968: 352-355. P&GP RR

The methods which are commonly used during peacetime for the determination of radioactive substances in food supplies and in potable water can largely be adapted to the conditions of a chemical field laboratory. However, they are frequently too tedious for use during crises. This is particularly valid for the determination of such radioactive substances which cannot be determined by  $\gamma$ -spectrometry. This includes  $\beta$ -rays without  $\gamma$ -components or without  $\gamma$ -emitting daughter-radioactive substances. Their number is small, if one only takes into consideration the radioactive substances released by the explosion of nuclear weapons; however, this group includes radioactive strontium which is known to be particularly dangerous and, on account of this, the chemical separation process cannot be foregone. The radioactive-chemical separation process may, to a certain extent, be accelerated by knowingly accepting the losses of the sought radioactive substances, after the addition of a known amount of inactive carrier substance, and by determining the percentage of the carrier value at the end of the analysis. The radioactive-chemical result is identical to the chemical result. If, in urgent cases involving food supplies, the determination in the picocurie-range is foregone, then considerably smaller samples will be adequate and the time required for drying and incineration, as well as the measurement times, will be correspondingly shorter than is the case if one is working at the low present activity range. The distribution of the test material in a thin layer on V2A-sheet metal permits shortening the time to the availability of the raw ash to 60 minutes with a few food materials. For the evaluation of this method, the tracer-technique observation of every analytical step by direct  $\gamma$ -determination is of considerable value. For radioactive strontium, the  $\gamma$ -ray-emitter  $^{85}\text{Sr}$  was found useful as a radioactivity indicator. (Abstract supplied, modified)

216

Galston, Arthur W. CHANGING THE ENVIRONMENT: HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM. Yale scientific magazine, v. 42, Apr. 1968: 4-7, 29. Q1.Y16, v. 42

Criticizes the use of herbicides for defoliation and crop destruction in Vietnam. Galston describes the various types of chemical compounds used, the methods by which they are applied, and the extent of application. He discusses the chemical and biological mechanisms involved in defoliation to the extent that they are known but stresses that this knowledge is based almost exclusively on laboratory experiments or

field applications in areas with plant and animal ecologies very different from Southeast Asia. Scientific ignorance of the biological environment in Vietnam means that the United States cannot foresee the overall and long-term effects of the large-scale application of herbicides. Possibly direct harm to the human population will result, as well as serious and lasting damage to the soil and agriculture of the country.

217

Johnson, Kenneth G., Katsuhiko Yano, and Hiroo Kato. CORONARY HEART DISEASE IN HIROSHIMA, JAPAN: A REPORT OF A SIX-YEAR PERIOD OF SURVEILLANCE, 1958-1964. American journal of public health and the Nation's health, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1355-1367. RA421.A41, v. 58

Updates the results of a continuing epidemiologic study of coronary heart disease (CHD) in Hiroshima. Since 1958 a sample of 20,000 A-bomb survivors and others has been subjected to intensive clinical and mortality study at the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, providing an opportunity to observe the natural history of disease in the Japanese and its modification by ionizing radiation. No relationship was found between radiation exposure and the incidence and prevalence of CHD.

218

Linnemann, Roger E. COMMAND RADIATION GUIDANCE. Military medicine, v. 133, Sept. 1968: 711-716. RDLA7, v. 133

Discusses the chief difficulties encountered in predicting the impact of radiation exposure on the effectiveness of military units in combat. The nonavailability of data from real combat experiences in nuclear war makes predictions of this kind very uncertain both for units as a whole and for the individual soldier. Furthermore, what constitutes "combat effectiveness" is largely a matter for command decision and thus is contingent on the exigencies of battle.

219

Messerschmidt, Alfred. [RADIATION PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION DURING A NUCLEAR DISASTER] Strahlenschutz der Bevölkerung bei einer Nuklearkatastrophe. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 395-396. P&GP RR

Reports on the symposium of Fachverband für Strahlenschutz, the Swiss branch of the International Radiation Association, held May 27 through June 1, 1968, at Interlaken, Switzerland. Messerschmidt outlines the papers on radiation effects delivered by American and British experts, among others. Despite some protestations that discussion of defense against nuclear attack would be inopportune, the meeting dealt with such matters at the urging of Swiss participants and the Swiss Government in particular, which is still concerned with the nuclear war danger and adequate defense measures to preserve the Swiss national heritage. Among the participants were experts from East European countries.

## 2 Economic

220

Adams, Walter. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE. American economic review, v. 58, May 1968: 652-665. HBL E26, v. 58

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Industrial concentration is not, as Professor Galbraith believes, an unavoidable consequence of unmanageable economic and technological forces. Rather it is the outgrowth of discriminatory and privilege-creating economic policies. American firms have invoked Government protection to avoid the danger of what Schumpeter has described as the "perennial gale of creative destruction." The petroleum industry is a good case in point, but the military-industrial complex is a better example. The complex is not a conspiracy but a natural coalition of interest groups. It was brought into being, and is now sustained, by defense and space contracting, research and development funding, patent grants, stockpiling, alienation of the public domain, and international trade restrictions. Recently the complex has grown so powerful that the Government, its creator, has ceased to be its master and become instead its instrument. But precisely because it is a creature of policy and not of economic necessity the complex can be controlled and its influence reduced. The Government should cease interfering in competitive markets and renounce its role as a mercantilist state that enforces private privilege. When intervention is unavoidable, the Government should adopt policies that encourage the decentralization of power; where monopoly is inevitable, it should apply management techniques that will ensure its control over contractor performance.

221

Eisner, Robert. **WAR AND TAXES: THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMIST IN POLITICS.** Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, June 1968: 13-18.  
TK9145.A84, v. 24

Attacks the Johnson administration's 10 percent tax surcharge decision. Eisner argues that President Johnson's only real motive for the tax surcharge was "his needs for manipulating American public opinion in favor of himself, his party, and his policies." This kind of self-serving is characteristic of American leadership as a whole. U.S. foreign policy, for example, is not directed at external targets but at the American people themselves in order that the leadership can keep itself in power. Social scientists must cease answering technical questions from the political leaders of the moment and instead begin to concern themselves with the ends of policy. Otherwise, they will become involved in a game being played with the American people that serves the interests of the leadership alone.

222

Harlow, Christopher J. E. **THE EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS BASE: A SURVEY.** London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 2 v. ([London, Institute for Strategic Studies] Defence, technology and the Western Alliance, no. 2)  
UA646.H3

Bibliographical footnotes.

Surveys the economic aspects of defense procurement in Europe and attempts to demonstrate its place in the wider context of general economic activity. The countries examined--Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Holland, and Belgium--were chosen because of their proportionately large share of the total West European defense-procurement expenditure and because most of Europe's defense-related industrial activity takes place within their boundaries. The main questions considered are: What have these countries bought in the years 1955-64? How much have they spent on different categories of equipment? Did they buy this

equipment at home or abroad? What resources for the design, development, and production of defense equipment do they possess, and how are they organized? The survey reveals an increase in European defense-procurement expenditures and an expansion of defense-production resources during the 10-year period. Volume 2 reviews the defense procurement procedures of the seven countries. The general defense policy for each is summarized briefly, followed by an explanation of its military procurement policies and a description of its defense industry.

223

Hennig, Eike. **[ARMAMENT SOCIETY AND ITS COSTS. PT. 2] Die Rüstungsgesellschaft und ihre Kosten (III).** Atomzeitalter, June/July 1968: 374-380.  
P&GP RR

Pt. 2 appeared as item no. 722 in v. 4, no. 2, of this bibliography.

Compilation of statistics that support Hennig's theses expressed in his earlier articles that "war is an essential structural characteristic of world policy" and that American bourgeois-capitalistic society increasingly depends on the military establishment. The world's military expenditures are so heavily concentrated in the United States and the Soviet Union that the arms race is almost completely bipolar. China would need an eightfold, and France a sevenfold, increase of its military expenditures to achieve, respectively, the Soviet and the American armament level.

224

Lapp, Ralph E. **CUTTING THE DEFENSE BUDGET: CAN THE NEXT PRESIDENT DO IT?** New republic, v. 159, Sept. 28, 1968: 26-28.  
AP2.N624, v. 159

Congress and the President will encounter many difficulties if and when they attempt to reduce defense spending in the post-Vietnam period. The Federal Government currently accounts for three-fourths of the nearly \$30 billion earned annually by the aerospace companies, and company workers and officials will make every effort to maintain and even increase this spending level. Aerospace industry representatives are already campaigning for new strategic delivery systems even though the development of multiple independently-guided reentry vehicles should adequately maintain America's assured destruction capability without the addition of costly new aircraft and missiles. Congress appears to be more responsive to the aerospace demands than to the repeated assurances of Defense Department officials that the U.S. deterrent is not endangered now or in the foreseeable future. Only two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee voted against deployment of a light ABM system after listening to Pentagon testimony about the present soundness of the U.S. deterrent. Continued pressure by industry and union officials after the Vietnam War will make it exceedingly difficult for the President to slice from the budget funds formerly expended on the Southeast Asian conflict. It appears that Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex was prophetic: "it may have become a machine like a nuclear chain reactor with jammed controls, so that it defies a power reduction."

225

Maretzki, Hans. **VIETNAM AND THE CRISIS OF US-MILITARIZED ECONOMIC POLICY.** German foreign policy, v. 7, no. 4, 1968: 291-301.  
DD261.4.D353, v. 7

# ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Details the adverse effects on the American national economy of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Maretzki considers the escalation of the war by the United States responsible for the "rapid acceleration of the crisis tendencies" in the U.S. economy. The main cause of these tendencies is the high degree of militarization of the U.S. monopoly capital. The Vietnamese movement of national liberation has brought U.S. global strategy into this critical situation, and only through that movement can peace be reached.

226

Richards, J. T. G. ECONOMICS AND DEFENCE MANAGEMENT. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, summer 1968: 115-118.

UG635. G7A1252, v. 8

Great Britain would be wise to draw on U.S. experience in the use of economic analysis for improving the efficiency of its armed forces. Operating in an organization that is not highly motivated toward efficiency, military managers would be greatly aided by the adoption of cost-effectiveness techniques; i.e., methods for seeking either the cheapest way to attain a desired objective or to achieve the maximum effectiveness from an established budget. In addition, economists could work closely with military experts in improving budgeting and accounting techniques, solving problems of procurement and logistics, and formulating equitable contracting procedures for the acquisition of advanced weapon systems.

227

Weidenbaum, Murray L. ARMS AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A DOMESTIC CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS. American economic review, v. 58, May 1968: 428-437. HBI.E26, v. 58

The close, long-term relationship between the Department of Defense and its major civilian contractors has led to a convergence of the two in a new relationship where the distinction between private and public sectors of the economy has disappeared. Private suppliers have taken on the characteristics of Government arsenals, with the Defense Department making the decisions and assuming the risks once reserved for business management. As a result, the ability and willingness of defense-oriented firms to compete in the open market has drastically declined. These developments do not imply a conspiratorial military-industrial complex, nor do they support Professor Galbraith's thesis that all firms are becoming part of the governmental administrative apparatus. Evidence of significant structural differences between defense-oriented and market-oriented firms suggests the contrary of Galbraith's hypothesis. Expectations of large defense cutbacks have provoked demands that alternative uses be found for defense firm resources, but would it be wise to expand a branch of industry possessed of the "mentality of a government arsenal"? One benefit of disarmament might be the opportunity to reduce if not eliminate this 'seminationalized' branch of the American economy."

## 3. Ethical and Social

228

Fisé, Toyomasa. RELIGION, WAR AND THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1968:

196-210.

AS9.J6, 1968

Notes: p. 207-209.

Religion, especially in its institutionalized church form, has always prescribed universal love and brotherhood and proscribed against killing and violence. Yet the institutionalized church has always rationalized and come around to the support of the war and institutionally organized killing by its national community. This disparity between religious norms and practice has historically disturbed idealists and intrigued students of religion. This paper is concerned with how a universalistic religion confronts and resolves the dilemma of war vis-a-vis a particularistic socio-political system. It discusses (1) the theoretical bases for the non-pacifist attitudes and behavior of the institutional churches within the framework of the sociological 'Church-Sect' concept, and (2) the available data to lend support to the major hypothesis, that the church as a social institution (as opposed to the sect) is both reflective and supportive of society's values and practices and that the church, therefore, functions primarily as an agent of conservation rather than as an agent of social change. These postulates are strongly supported by four sets of data and empirical evidence. The first fully supports the implication that outright opposition to war—conscientious objection—would be more evident in the sects than the churches. The second study supports the thesis that the church, through the chaplaincy system, resolves the value conflict in favor of society in a manner to support the values and objectives of the sociopolitical system in war. The third study supports the postulate that the church is accommodative in that its stand on social issues depends largely upon the mood and sentiment of its parishioners rather than standing upon its own religious values. The last set of evidence sheds light on the thesis that the church remains essentially a conservative force by compartmentalizing its radicalism within the campus ministry—i.e., the church is a conservative rather than change-inducing agent vis-a-vis society. (Abstract supplied, modified)

229

Kaufman, Arnold S. SELECTIVE OBJECTION TO WAR. Dissent, July/Aug. 1968: 306-313. HX1.D58, 1968

All conscientious objectors should be exempted from military service—selective as well as absolute. The four arguments against legally exempting selective conscientious objectors presented by the majority of the National Advisory Commission on Selective Service "failed to make even the beginning of a case for differential treatment of absolute and selective conscientious objectors." Furthermore, there is no basis for this legal distinction, assuming that one places a high priority on the right to life and that conscientious thought and conduct are central values of civilized society. "Forcing conscientious objectors to fight and kill may be justified" under some circumstances, and there is no reason to treat absolute pacifists differently in such situations, except possibly practical considerations.

230

Sorokin, Pitirim A. MAN AND SOCIETY IN CALAMITY: THE EFFECTS OF WAR, REVOLUTION, FAMINE, PESTILENCE UPON HUMAN MIND, BEHAVIOR, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND CULTURAL LIFE. New York, Greenwood Press, 1968 [c1942] 352 p. HM299.S6 1968

## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Partial contents. --How calamities influence our affective and emotional life. --How famine influences our behavior. --How calamities influence the vital processes. --The influence of calamities upon political, economic, and social organization. --How calamities affect the religious and ethical life of society. --Sinners and saints in calamity. --Dynamics of ideologies in calamity. --The way out of calamity. --A glance into the future. --Notes.

Describes the typical effects of famine, war, pestilence, and other calamities on the human mind and sociocultural life. Sorokin concludes that as long as any of these calamities continue society will experience an increase of various mental disturbances, psychic diseases, and emotional and affective instabilities.

231

Walsh, John. DEFENSE RESEARCH: QUESTIONS FOR VIETNAM DISSENTERS. *Science*, v. 161, Sept. 20, 1968: 1225-1226. Q1.S35, v. 161

Recent actions by the Army Research Office (ARO) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) indicate that the Defense Department is beginning to question the renewal of contracts of its researchers who openly critical of the Vietnam War. The ARO and the ONR notified mathematicians on their research projects who signed a published statement condemning the war that, in view of the "unfortunate circumstances," their contracts would not be renewed. Because of its tradition of utilizing the "best people," the Defense Department wants to avoid alienating the academic community and disavows that these actions point to a new policy toward Vietnam dissenters. However, strong congressional pressure to cut off the funds of Government-backed researchers who publicly protest the war, plus the conviction of some Pentagon officials that the Defense Department is justified in raising the "question of conscience," may turn an isolated incident into a general trend.

#### 4. Other

232

Cohen, Carl. THE CASE FOR SELECTIVE PACIFISM. *Nation*, v. 207, July 8, 1968: 11-15. AP2.N2, v. 207

The reasons for opposing conscientious objection to particular wars prove insufficient upon examination. Some contend that during war the nation is involved in a life or death struggle and permitting individual citizens the right to object on the basis of personal convictions would constitute too great a danger. However, eliminating from the armed services those who morally object to a particular war actually increases the safety factor. Others claim that allowing the individual to object to specific wars is unreasonable and cannot be tolerated in a law-governed community. Nevertheless the United States may at times act immorally, and individual citizens must pass judgment upon their government's actions. Some assert that granting each citizen the privilege of "opting out" in crisis situations is an invitation to chaos. But obtaining the status of conscientious objector is not a matter of simple option; it entails careful documentation and examination. Others maintain that it would be difficult to determine the legitimacy of applications for this status and fakery would be encouraged. These predictions are probably false, but if some did escape

military service by deception, that would be the "price that can be paid by a society whose first concern is the humanity and justice of its laws." Legislation allowing conscientious objection to a specific war would establish a safety device for the nation. The refusal by individuals to participate could act as a restraint upon political leaders and could help prevent grave international crimes by "honorably motivated but narrow-minded or irrational leaders."

233

Cottrell, Alvin J., and Stanley L. Harrison. ALLIANCES: THE TIES THAT BIND. In *United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings*, v. 94, Sept. 1968: 26-35. VI.U8, v. 94

Although the United States cannot conveniently withdraw from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), it could probably pursue its policy goals more effectively in the Middle East and Asia if it were free to operate on a bilateral basis. Unlike NATO, SEATO and CENTO are not soundly based upon a community of interests. Most non-European countries allied themselves with the United States primarily because of expectations of aid rather than concern over the Communist threat. Many have become disillusioned because their membership did not garner them special consideration in regional disputes. However, despite the fact that the alliances are not the best answers to problems in diverse areas and involve the United States in "intramural squabbles," they do provide political leverage in negotiations with the Russians. SEATO and CENTO can never become as effective as NATO in the implementation of U.S. policy. Modern alliances are not just fighting alliances and must provide the framework for economic and political cooperation as well as mutual security. NATO best fits the concept of the contemporary alliance and could eventually lead to a partnership that could project Western power, political and economic--and if necessary, military--to all corners of the globe.

234

Dobkin, James A., and Harry M. Saragovitz. PATENTS, TECHNICAL DATA AND INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE AGREEMENTS. *Villanova law review*, v. 13, spring 1968: 457-486. LL

Reviews the functions, purposes, and provisions of international patents and technical data. These agreements facilitate the transfer of technical information and patent rights between governments but are too broad to cover "specific cooperative defense programs involving research, development, and production." In such cases an executive agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding, is negotiated to protect private proprietary rights. But until lawyers pay more attention to the entire field of intellectual property, intergovernmental relations will continue to "force the law to be more a question of diplomacy than of precedent."

235

Domes, Jürgen. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE ARMY. *Asian survey*, v. 8, May 1968: 349-363. DS1.A492, v. 8

The protracted power struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i has brought about the overthrow of the longstanding Maoist principle that "the party must control the gun." Centralized party government in China has been replaced almost everywhere by an as

# ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

yet indeterminate form of military rule. This transformation of the Chinese political structure came about during the course of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and is perhaps its most significant result. In the early phases of the Cultural Revolution the People's Liberation Forces (PLF) gave evidence that it would be an efficient and subservient instrument of Maoist rule. However, the PLF was not able to take part in the factional struggle with Liu without itself becoming a prey to factionalism, and for this reason regional military commanders began to adopt an increasingly neutral attitude toward the political antagonists. In practical terms, this meant a policy of maintaining local order with military force irrespective of the faction that claimed political control. By July 1967 the party had disintegrated and Mao's political offensive had collapsed. The PLF--though itself still troubled by regional and factional divisions--was the only instrument of state power still intact. Consequently local authority passed completely into the hands of the military, who also strengthened their influence over a greatly weakened central government and party. This is the situation at present. What the future will bring--increasingly centralized military rule or a revival of warlordism--is uncertain.

236

Emerson, Thomas I. **FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN WARTIME.** University of Pennsylvania law review, v. 116, Apr. 1968: 975-1011.  
LL

Examines the law of treason and the problems of general criticism of the war effort, more specific forms of expression that could possibly lead to insubordination in the armed forces, obstruction of recruitment or resistance to conscription, and protection of wartime dissent against illegitimate harassment. Theoretically the first amendment affords a substantial measure of protection, but if freedom of expression is to withstand the pressures of wartime, the "rule of full protection for expression, as distinct from action" must be applied, making it necessary to define and refine concepts of expression and action.

237

Friedell, Morris F. **A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT IN RETALIATION.** Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 357-373. JX1901J6, v. 12  
References: p. 373.

The paper summarizes an investigation of the effects of psychological and situation variables in a study of retaliation which was designed to simulate aspects of accidental nuclear war. An experimental game with options to attack and to retaliate was presented to 196 college students. The factorial design explored the effects of accidental attack, expected iteration, social influence, and timing conditions upon the incidence of retaliation. Measures of authoritarianism, orientation to military-political strategy, and attitudes relating to nuclear war were obtained. Statistically significant findings were that expected iteration and social influence inhibited retaliation while authoritarianism fostered it. The other four variables did not have significant effects. The most important finding was that the possibility of accidental attack did not appreciably inhibit retaliation. (Abstract supplied)

238

Gilbert, Marc. **[H BOMB: LIKE THE GREAT POWERS]** Bomb H: comme des grands. Nouvel observateur, no. 199, Sept. 8, 1968: 26.  
AP20, O2, 1968

Comments by Roger Galley, Minister of Scientific Research, and Pierre Messmer, Minister of the French Armed Forces, on the scientific and military repercussions of the French H-bomb explosion. The bomb caused little radioactive fallout because it was detonated under perfect weather conditions and at a high altitude, but "it will not have any beneficial effects on civil industry." Messmer believes as long as France has the H-bomb no country will attack it. France can now look forward to beefing up its force de frappe with a nuclear submarine fleet and multiple independent reentry missiles. These weapons systems will greatly strengthen not only the military but also the political power of France's striking force.

239

Hübner, Werner. **[NATIONAL DEFENSE CONCERNS EVERY CITIZEN]** Landesverteidigung geht jeden Bürger an. Pressespiegel der Sowjetzone, June 4, 1968: 3.  
P&GP RR  
Reprinted from Neues Deutschland, Apr. 20, 1968.

According to the new Socialist concept all citizens of the German Democratic Republic are responsible for the defense of their country, a duty which has priority over personal and social interests. Today socialism is protected by a union of Socialist states and their military coalition, of which the Soviet Union is a leading force. This unity is based on the conviction that East Germany is worth defending, that the citizens must be educated to patriotism, Socialist internationalism, and deep brotherhood in arms with the Soviet Army and the armies of other Socialist states. The defense of their countries and of socialism is the citizens' international duty, which they must fulfill in a potential war imposed by the imperialist aggressors and for the final victory of peace. The children of the citizens should begin their military training in schools, and parents, teachers, and youth organizations must all be responsible for their education.

240

Inglis, David R. **THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE: A DANGEROUS FOLLY.** Saturday review, v. 51, Sept. 7, 1968: 26-27, 55-56. Z1219.S25, v. 51

The Senate should not approve funds for the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system. By intensifying the arms race it will increase the likelihood of nuclear war. The ABM's effectiveness remains uncertain because advance testing under actual conditions is impossible, and since the ABM cannot stop more than a fraction of incoming missiles the enemy can reduce its effectiveness by attacking with more missiles. It will endanger the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the proposed U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks on limiting offensive and defensive weapons, and the 1963 test-ban treaty. Finally, considering the pressing social and economic problems of the Nation and the world, proposed expenditures for the ABM represent fiscal irresponsibility. Many maintain that the system is needed against China, but it would not "be so mad as to make an utterly suicidal attack against our vastly superior nuclear might." Some also contend that the ABM would increase the difficulty for newcomers in mounting a nuclear threat, but challenging the giants is hopeless anyway. Although a year's interruption in deploying the system would increase the cost of completing it, the delay would foster negotiations that might make completion unnecessary.



## II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

241

Klineberg, Otto. FEARS OF A PSYCHOLOGIST. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 206-214. U164.C155 1968

The existence of modern weapons of mass destruction prompts numerous fears about the future of mankind. The new weapons tend to dehumanize warfare, thereby lessening regard for the degree of suffering they inflict and lowering traditional barriers to the use of "inhuman weapons." In the absence of effective controls, there is always the danger that these terrifying weapons might become available to pathological national leaders. The prospect of a Hitler armed with nuclear weapons is frightening, but even "normal" leaders could be motivated by nationalism to attempt to annihilate the "enemy." Unfortunately, because of widespread personal insecurity nationalism is on the increase at a time when it "should be considered anachronistic and lethal." In this atmosphere there is a great danger that the very existence of weapons could constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy--they are there, why not use them? Because of the horrifying implications of modern weapons, every possible effort must be made to avoid or overcome potential dangers. "Even if the world is not yet ready to take the logical step of relinquishing some of its treasured national sovereignty in the interests of peace, it may still be prepared to take thought about ways and means of reducing the threat of destruction."

242

Lorince, Gabriel. RIFT IN THE KREMLIN? New statesman, v. 76, July 12, 1968: 36.

AP4.N64, v. 76

The U.S. Senate vote authorizing work to begin on America's ABM system helped the Krenlin doves (who advocate a dialog with the United States on the limitation of offensive and defensive weapons) win their dispute with the military-industrial faction. Seventy-two hours after the vote, Russia offered to hold substantive disarmament talks to scale down the missile race. The doves also were helped by the conclusion of the nonproliferation treaty, the growing Chinese nuclear threat, and Richard Nixon's presidential nomination. Furthermore the high cost of the missile race in Russia has strengthened the economists' lobby, which has induced most members of the Politburo to prefer butter to guns.

243

Miksche, Ferdinand O. [VIETNAM 1968] Vietnam 1968. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 12, July 15, 1968: 325-327. map. U3.W3, v. 12

The escalation of the Vietnam War has had adverse consequences for the United States politically, economically, and militarily. The basic failure of McNamara's strategy of graded warfare is its public renunciation of a strategy to end the war. It has thus contributed to the escalation, along with the U.S. underestimation of its adversary and overestimation of its own means to bring him to the conference table.

244

Miles, Jack L. THE FUSION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THREAT OR CHALLENGE TO THE MILITARY. Marine Corps Gazette, v. 52, Aug. 1968: 22-29, Sept.: 45-52.

VE7.M4, v. 52

Traces American civil-military relations and examines both the fusion of military and political considerations and its effect on the military establishment. The military's minor role in national affairs expanded during and after World War II, and military leaders became increasingly involved in many phases of national policy and planning. A new concept of military-civilian cooperation seems to be emerging, but tradition presents a barrier and may delay its acceptance, making future coordination of military-civilian roles a major administrative problem. Miles cites Walter Millis' conclusion that "the civilian and military elements in our society have become so deeply intermeshed that neither the uniformed officers nor the administrative bureaucracy nor the representative legislature speak from any firm, independent position of principle or policy." This is the real problem in civil-military relations, as opposed to the "ascendancy of the civilian Secretary of Defense or the military directorate of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Today national objectives require "an optimum blend of both political and military ingredients"; no longer can political and military components be considered independently. The impact of this fusion has both threatened and challenged the military establishment. An aggressive Secretary of Defense with new management techniques has presented a threat to the old system of service preeminence and to static military concepts. His emphasis on centralization of decisionmaking authority has resulted in increased civilian command and control. This situation challenges military officers to accept the procedures and decisionmaking framework within the Defense Department, adjust to the new environment, and develop a joint military doctrine ensuring that the civilian leadership gets sound military advice. In the development of weapons and strategy, military expertise in technological matters is vital. Thus if military professionals have scientific or engineering backgrounds or practical technical experience, they will be better equipped to provide newer weapons and ways to employ them. If the military continues to play an increasing role in formulating national security policy, its professionals must be knowledgeable not only in military but also in economic and political affairs.

245

Mori, Kvôzô. JUDGMENTS OF PARIS. Japan quarterly, v. 15, July-Sept. 1968: 298-300.

DS8C.J274, v. 15

America's continued escalation of the Vietnam War has caused Japanese respect and friendship for the United States to reach a low ebb. While the Japanese Government has consistently followed a pro-American policy in Vietnam and cooperation between the two governments has increased since November 1967, the gap between the Sato government and the Japanese people has widened. The "many and varied legalistic and strategic arguments produced by America in an attempt to justify the bombing" have failed to convince the Japanese. They believe the South Vietnamese people must be allowed to determine their own fate, even if this may mean handing the country over to the Vietnamese. They also hope that America will give serious consideration to the proposals of De Gaulle and U Thant for a return to the 1954 Geneva resolutions calling for neutralization of the whole Indo-China peninsula.

246

Nieburg, H. L. SOCIAL CONTROL OF INNOVATION. American economic review, v. 58, May 1968: 666-677.

HB3.F26, v. 58

Growing concern over the unforeseen consequences of technological innovation--part of a more general anxiety about the growth of impersonal and arbitrary power in a planned social order--points to a troubled decade ahead for research and development (R&D) programs. The central problem with R&D has been the merging of Government bureaucracy with private contractors into a whole to which the old ethical standards and accounting practices are no longer applicable. The challenge is to find a new system of values and institutions to protect political freedom and pluralism as individual initiative and private property once did. The problem is not so much to control technology as it is to control the interest groups that make public policy; and the solution is not to eliminate these groups but to increase and diversify them by insuring that no group with interests at stake in an R&D decision is excluded from the decisionmaking process. In short, R&D must be politicized; the experts must be stripped of their mystery and overrated authority and made to submit to politics. In conjunction with this essential step, a balanced set of national priorities must be drawn up; Government-civilian contract relationships must be formalized to guarantee the interests of both parties; performance yardsticks in the form of "in-house" capabilities must be maintained, at least where they do not exist in the civilian economy; and new methods of R&D funding, e.g., foundations, must be tried experimentally. But the pivot is still politics, troublesome, unavoidable, and good for the nation."

247

Rabb, Charles. **MILITARY 'SOFTWARE.'** Nation, v. 207, July 22, 1968: 46-48.  
AP2, N2, v. 207

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has revealed that the Pentagon's nonmilitary research program is characterized by lavish spending for many projects of dubious quality that frequently have little relevance to defense needs and are potentially embarrassing for the United States. Focusing upon the many non-military studies in the social and behavioral sciences and "think-tank" research, the committee has challenged the policy underlying multibillion-dollar defense programs in an attempt to trim the spiraling defense budget. In allocating responsibility for this research program, the committee indicts the Defense Department most heavily but does not exempt Congress, which votes defense funds uncritically, or the social, political, and behavioral scientists, who benefit from the Pentagon's largess. The Defense Department's research role is being criticized by a growing number of Senators, who are disturbed by the "size and sweep" of its research; members of the academic community, who fear the conversion of social science into a Pentagon service industry; and members of the military, who contend that emphasis upon social science research detracts from the military's efficiency.

248

**REACHING A LONG ARM TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF.** Business week, no. 2035, Aug. 31, 1968: 48-50, illus.  
HC431, B87, 1968

Sketches the Navy's plans for testing its newest vehicle for underwater study, the Sealab III. Scheduled to begin in mid-October, 55 miles southwest of Long Beach, California, the test will involve 54 aquanauts working at depths of 620 feet. The aquanauts will be equipped to stay as long as 4 hours in the open ocean

and will be divided into five teams, each of which will spend 12 days on the ocean floor. Although the main purposes of the \$10 million experiment--which will include studies of human physiology, deep water salvage, underwater construction, oceanography, search and rescue procedures, and Continental Shelf geology--are scientific and commercial, the Navy is also interested in its long-range military applications. Techniques learned from Sealab III may eventually be applied to the construction of undersea submarine bases, monitoring stations, navigational devices, and weather stations.

249

Schwartz, David C. **TOWARD A NEW KNOWLEDGE BASE FOR MILITARY DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS DURING INSURGENCIES.** Orbis, v. 12, spring 1968: 3-86.  
D639, O68, v. 12

The problems of conducting military development operations during insurgencies and of improving the contributions of the social sciences to politico-military policymaking have been acknowledged. The global scope and the intensity of U.S. military development efforts in other nation's internal wars and nation building coincide with the increasing ability of the social sciences to contribute to the identification, planning, conduct, and evaluation of military missions in civic-action programs. The ability to identify nations and subnational regions likely to be involved in future insurgencies would constitute a breakthrough in the lead time for development planning and mission identification. Although political and military assessments of potential insurgency theaters exist, social science can improve the data base on which these assessments rest and thereby facilitate theater identifications. Theoretical formulas that identify potential insurgency theaters and provide military development guidelines to help insure that development itself does not reinforce revolutionary conditions are not enough. A processual theory of revolutionary behavior is necessary in order to plan military development operations for the various stages of a revolution. Once a revolution is identified as corresponding to one of six stages, which range from initial political alienation to the outbreak of a revolution, specific development efforts aimed at behaviors at this stage can be initiated and the conditions for moving to [another stage] can, in theory, be prevented from occurring. When properly identified and well planned, development operations can significantly strengthen a nation even during insurgencies.

250

**TOO MUCH FOR THE RUSSIANS?** Economist, v. 228, Aug. 17, 1968: 53-54.  
J611, F2, v. 228

The alleged slowdown in the construction of the Soviet limited ABM system, if true, would confirm the growing suspicion of the ABM's uselessness. The system would consume roughly one percent of the annual Soviet national income. With luck, it would substantially reduce the death rate from nuclear attack. In contrast to other weapons, however, the ABM must be totally effective. If it fails the first time, there will be no second chance. The technological difficulties of assuring such reliability are formidable and the costs would be prohibitive. In addition, radioactive contamination of space by antimissiles would create a long-term fallout menace to whoever survives the war itself. Plagued by similar shortcomings, the American and Chinese ABM will at least give the United States its

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more it's worth in a nationwide radar and computer network on which a more effective missile defense chain can be built "when that ever becomes possible."

251

Van Gelder, M. M. AN INTRODUCTION TO OPERATIONS RESEARCH. Australian Army Journal, no. 230, July 1968: 39-55. U1.A92, 1968

Outlines the military applications and management tools of operations research (OR). Van Gelder defines some of the analytical tools of OR--dynamic programming, game theory, symbolic logic, and search theory--and notes that definitions help to isolate the terms and prevent confusion in their use. These tools can be applied to such military problems as equipment replacement, transportation and logistics, simulation, and network analysis. The author concludes that OR should be widely used in the Australian Services because of its almost universal acceptance in business "as an invaluable aid in the solution of research and industrial problems."

252

Wagner, Eugene. ROADBLOCKS TO CIVIL DEFENCE. International civil defence, v. 15, July/Aug. 1968: 1-2. UA926.I488, v. 15  
Transcript of Eugene Wagner's article in *Survive*, May 1968. P&GP RR

Enumerates the principal reasons why there is no popular demand for civil defense. First, the anti-civil defense establishment is very powerful; second, a nuclear holocaust is unpleasant to think about; third, people do not believe such a disaster could happen. Wagner concludes that "nothing but illusory comfort can be gained by closing our eyes to these dangers."

253

Young, Olan R. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACTIVE DEFENSE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Feb. 1968: 16-20.

TK9145.A84, v. 24

Deployment of ABM systems by the two superpowers could be strategically stabilizing if these systems are so constructed as not to threaten the second-strike capability of the opposing superpowers, while remaining completely effective against all third powers. This raises the problem for both superpowers of convincing the other side that a given system really is ineffective against it although demonstrably effective against third states. It also establishes the need to resist all pressures to escalate from a light to a heavy ABM system. The momentum toward expansion of a light system is powerful, but it can be resisted. The possibility that active defense will make superpower guarantees to non-nuclear powers more realistic and thus reduce the attractiveness of possessing nuclear weapons should not be overlooked because of preoccupation with the bipolar strategic balance. ABM deployment also has implications for the international power structure as a whole since it is likely to reverse the trend toward diffusion of power that began in the early 1960's. The impact of ABM deployment on alliances cannot be predicted. Certainly some states will be tempted to range themselves closer to the superpowers but, since this will involve a loss of independence, many may turn to nonalignment or a Gaullist solution to their security problems. For the immediate future, however, the third states will probably attempt to avoid painful decisions by opposing all ABM deployment by the superpowers. To the extent that this restrains the superpowers from deploying heavier ABM systems the effect will be salutary.

### III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

#### A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

254

Coplin, William D. THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD. Chicago, Rand McNally [1966] 294 p. (Rand McNally political science series)

JX3110, C57F8

Partial contents. --International law as law. --The allocation of legal competences among states. --The limitation of violence in international conflict. --The development of international social and economic welfare legislation. --A climate of opinion on international relations: the development of an international political culture. --Bibliography.

An introduction to international law and legal organization. Coplin's major concern is to construct a theoretical framework that will "come to grips with the operational role of international law in the contemporary world." His explanation of the way law functions to limit international violence stresses the central theoretical value of conceptualizing force in terms taken from the bargaining process, while his assessment of its contribution to the more general goal of a rational international order rests on the proposition that law is instrumental in creating "an international political culture through the socialization of a consensus on the nature of the state system."

255

Freeman, Alwyn V. SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW [editorial] American journal of international law, v. 62, July 1968: 710-722. LL

The basic Soviet philosophy concerning the substantive nature of the law of nations is the doctrine of peaceful coexistence between "Socialist and non-Socialist states." While extremely positivist in its articulation, the doctrine in certain respects resembles some conceptions of early natural-law schools, although it does not share their classical rationalization. Based on Marxist-Leninist dialectic, it is intensely political, merely dressed in legal trappings, and totally unconcerned with a code of principles applicable to all nation-states. Its goal is to influence non-Soviet disarmament and pave the way for Soviet world domination. In its ultra-positivist rejection of certain long-established basic principles of international law, the Soviet Union finds allies in the newly emerging nations of Asia and Africa, which argue that they have not participated in the formulation of those principles. Soviet positivism serves to protect the Socialist state's interests against legal principles to which the Socialist state has not expressly agreed. The Soviet concept of natural law, on the other hand, offers "a technique to warrant any and all departures from previously accepted restrictions, justifying the legal means by the end pursued." This fits well into the Soviet doctrine on wars of

national liberation and its parent doctrine of "just war" which legitimates gross violation of the fundamental right of every state to be free from outside interference and makes defense against such an unlawful act an international illegality if the violation serves Soviet or Socialist interests. The same reasoning applies to the legality of belligerent action during hostilities. Unless the Soviet Union discards its doctrine of world revolution "the prospects for an evolving set of international norms serving the generalized interests of all nation-states of the world must remain as elusive as they have been since World War II."

256

Hazard, John N. WHY TRY AGAIN TO DEFINE AGGRESSION? [editorial] American journal of international law, v. 62, July 1968: 701-710. LL

Discusses abortive attempts by the United Nations to define aggression. Hazard contends that unless such attempts are limited to discussion instead of polemics there is little chance a viable official definition will ever be found.

257

Lazar, Joseph. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STATUS OF GUANTANAMO BAY. American journal of international law, v. 62, July 1968: 730-740. LL

Explains that the current occupation rights of the United States over Guantanamo "were not founded upon and did not arise from or grow out of" any treaty or agreement between Cuba and the United States but were established before Cuba became a subject of international law. Consecutive American-Cuban agreements used the term "lease" in reference to Guantanamo strictly within the framework of the municipal legal system and not within that of the law of nations. Since Cuba never acquired ultimate sovereignty over Guantanamo, neither the *rebus sic stantibus* doctrine nor the principle "*pacta sunt servanda*" [treaties are to be kept] can have any legal effect on Cuban-American relations in regard to occupation rights.

258

O'Brien, William V. SELECTIVE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Georgetown law journal, v. 56, June 1968: 1080-1131. LL

Analyzes principles regulating modern warfare--the Nuremberg precedent and conventional international law--to determine if they provide a legal basis for selective conscientious objection. O'Brien discovers that many of the traditional laws of war and the Nuremberg principles are no longer relevant to the type of conflict underway in Southeast Asia. He concludes that the most justifiable position for an individual is general conscientious objection.

### III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

259

SEIZURE OF USS PUEBLO; LEGAL ISSUES IN PUEBLO INCIDENT. American journal of international law, v. 62, July 1968: 756-757.

LL

Text is quoted "with the addition of words omitted from telegram."

Text of the February 8, 1968, telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to all diplomatic posts, which stresses the illegality of North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo because it was on the high seas and never violated the North Korean territorial sea. As a commissioned vessel of the United States Navy the Pueblo was entitled to "absolute immunity from any jurisdiction other than that of the flag state"--the traditional rule of international law. "The seizure of foreign war ships or other attacks upon them are much too dangerous and provocative acts to be permitted by international law."

260

Stein, Eric, and Dominique Carreau. LAW AND PEACEFUL CHANGE IN A SUBSYSTEM: "WITHDRAWAL" OF FRANCE FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. American journal of international law, v. 62, July 1968: 577-640.

LL

Explores the implications of the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated command "for the international system and for the international legal order." The authors consider at length the French case against NATO, which comprises, among other things, the risks of entanglement in "unwanted" war, the reduced credibility of the American nuclear deterrent on which the NATO defense concept rests, and the "illegal" change of NATO strategy. The French invocation, although not by name, of the *rebus sic stantibus* doctrine was unjustified, since NATO has evolved beyond a traditional military alliance of questionable stability into the embodiment of institutionalized Atlantic collaboration and thus a subsystem of the existing world order. In the case of France, NATO review and termination rules should have taken precedence over recourse to the *rebus sic stantibus* doctrine. "The concept of a 'partial' withdrawal from an international organization is hardly compatible with rational development of international organizations." However, in this case all parties concerned have accepted France's unilateral action as a lesser evil than its possible withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty.

261

Wünsche, Kurt. THE NEW SOCIALIST PENAL CODE IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. German foreign policy, v. 7, no. 4, 1968: 251-259. DD261.4.D353, v. 7

Stresses that "offences against international law, crimes against peace, humanity and human rights as first laid down in the London Four-Power Agreement of August 8th 1945 and later generally acknowledged as international law"--e.g., the convention of December 9, 1948, against genocide--are expressly included in the German Democratic Republic's new penal code. Wünsche, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice of the Republic, points out that such crimes do not fall under the statute of limitations.

262

Young, Richard. THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE DEEP-SEA FLOOR. American journal of international law, v. 62, July 1968: 641-653.

LL

Points out that "unlike outer space, ocean space is not a *tabula rasa*, and its legal history cannot be ignored" in any international convention on use of the deep-sea floor. Modern technological developments have opened up enormous possibilities for exploitation, including military, of the floor. Young discusses the Continental Shelf Convention and doctrines that may be of consequence for legal control of the floor and considers exploratory efforts by the United Nations and the United States that may help future international legislation.

### B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

263

Cousins, Norman. U THANT AND THE U.S. [editorial] Saturday review, v. 51, Oct. 12, 1968: 30-31. Z1219.S25, v. 51

The U.S. Government attitude toward the United Nations is ambivalent. The United States first criticized U Thant's public appeal for a bombing halt as meddling in U.S. Far Eastern affairs and then, when an American naval intelligence ship was seized in the Far East, demanded appropriate action by the U.N. Security Council. This ambivalence has undercut U.S. basic interests because America now has no effective voice for objections to violations of world peace. The United Nations needs an identity that transcends the foreign policies of its members; insistence on national sovereignty at the expense of world government has increased world insecurity. The United States should be definitely committed to the principle of world law; this could represent a new beginning for American influence in world affairs.

264

Gordenker, Leon. THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE. New York, Columbia University Press, 1967. 80 p. (Columbia University studies in international organization, no. 1) JKL377.8.34C6

Partial contents. --Models for San Francisco. --Concepts of the office. --Internal administration. --The Secretary-General and his "special right." --Investigation and observation. --Peace-keeping--politics and policies of forces. --Peace-keeping--operations and adaptations. --Peace-keeping--civil ramifications. --Influence--expansion and limitation. --Appendixes. --Notes. --Index.

Examines the role of the Secretary General and his influence on the process involved in issues relating to the maintenance of peace and security. The Secretary General can alter the course of international politics but never at a constant level; the results of his actions are modified by the configuration of international politics as well as by his character, energy, style, and intelligence. He cannot act as if only his organization determined the maintenance of peace. He must discover favorable conditions for action and then act within the framework of world politics that involves his organization. Gordenker notes that the Secretary General's capacity to create favorable conditions for his actions is minimal so long as governments guard their sovereignty and attempt to act independently of outside agencies and organizations. The author concludes that these limitations will hardly vanish in the coming years and that it is improbable, in the light of recent events, that the Secretary General will be able to stimulate and direct peacekeeping operations under broad mandates.

265

Green, Lucile W. THE CALL FOR A WORLD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. Humanist, v. 28, July/Aug. 1968: 12-13. BL2700.H78, v. 28

Only minor advances have been made toward world government because nations will not transfer their sovereignty. Because the people want and need peace, while their governments wage war, the primary impetus for world government must come from the private sector. The first working sessions of a world constitutional convention representing the peoples of the world will be held August 27 through September 10, 1968, in Interlaken, Switzerland. This convention could issue a Magna Carta for mankind and implement it in some continuing agency "established as a 'watchdog' for the principle of human sovereignty." This convention could begin drafting blueprints for a world government together with plans for implementation and ratification. Efforts to obtain government representatives have been unproductive, but with or without them the convention will take place. The problems are so urgent the convention cannot wait.

266

Sohn, Lewis. STEPS TOWARD WORLD LAW/WORLD PEACE. Humanist, v. 28, July/Aug. 1968: 6-8. BL2700.H78, v. 28

"A condensation of a lecture delivered at Stanford University as a part of the Stanford Union's Century 21 Project."

An effectively functioning world order based on the rule of law is composed of international institutions empowered to enact, interpret, and enforce rules and decisions. Suggestions for attaining this world order include drawing all major powers into the world community's main institutions, with membership an obligation rather than a privilege; improving the rulemaking and decisionmaking capacity of U.N. organs, conferring power on the General Assembly to adopt basic rules of international behavior; strengthening the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction and giving it the right to interpret the U.N. rules; enforcing decisions of international tribunals by improving peacekeeping forces; and hastening disarmament by halting unnecessary arms trade and placing both arms trade and the restriction of arms under U.N. control.

### C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

267

Wilson, A. J. PEACEKEEPING: A U.N. COMMANDER'S VIEW. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 113, May 1966: 113-122. U1.R8, v. 113

"A lecture given at the R.U.S.I. on 29th November 1967." Discussion included.

Outlines the problems of peacekeeping as Wilson experienced them as U.N. Chief of Staff in Cyprus. He notes the importance of carefully selecting senior officers, maintaining good relations between national contingents, preliminary briefing for all ranks of a U.N. force, establishing a collocated politico-military headquarters, ensuring that senior officers understand how the diplomatic machine works, quick and accurate reporting to U.N. headquarters in New York, and careful drafting and interpretation of U.N. mandates. The U.N. Force Headquarters should be built up on an international basis, and the force commander must

think supranationally and give careful consideration to those powers to employ force that he wishes to possess. Political training for senior officers should be required, and contingency planning for future theaters of operations is needed.

### D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

268

THE ARMS CONTROL AGENCY: IT'S SMALL, SHORT OF CASH, BUT GROWING IN INFLUENCE. Space/aeronautics, v. 50, Sept. 1968: 26, 28, 30-34, 36. TL501.A786, v. 50

Despite its small staff of about 230 people and an annual budget that has never exceeded \$10 million, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has steadily increased its influence in policymaking since its establishment in 1961. The Director is the principal adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control affairs. ACDA is in many ways closely integrated with the State Department and maintains strong ties in the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission, although it does not always get its own way in policy disputes with these agencies. Most Congressmen support ACDA's efforts since, as one spokesman pointed out, "no one really wants to be caught being opposed to peace." As America's principal "thinker" for arms control and disarmament matters, the Agency is responsible for initiating and implementing arms control policies, conducting international negotiations in disarmament matters, and sponsoring research on the technical, economic, social, political, and diplomatic aspects of arms control. ACDA is the focal point in the U.S. Government for arms control matters, but proposals for action can originate anywhere and are often submitted for analysis to task groups composed of representatives from both the Government and private sectors. Significant policies are always coordinated with ACDA's senior policymaking body, the Committee of Principals, which is composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the Central Intelligence Agency, AEC, NASA, and USIA, and the special assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Science and Technology. While eventually the Agency may be forced to assume responsibility for managing major systems for arms control, it has to date preferred to let other agencies direct the development of scientific monitoring devices and for the foreseeable future will probably remain a "sparkplug rather than an engine" in arms control affairs.

269

Brandstätter, Leopold. [THE WAY OUT: EUROPE'S LAST CHANCE AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND] Der Ausweg: Europas letzte Chance und die Zukunft der Menschheit [by] Leopold. Linz, Spirale-Verlag [1967] 155 p. illus. (Welt-Spirale-Bücher, 2) JN15.B66

On cover: Pannationale Welt-Union.

Contents. --Preface. --The rise or the downfall of mankind? --Cosmic magnetism most extensively determines general development on the earth. --The rise or the downfall of the West. (Has Europe still a chance?). --Dante Alighieri's fable of the loss of world domination. --The UNO--a failure. Vietnam--a senseless war. --Dissolution of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact as well as of the Soviet Union's bilateral satellite treaties

### III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

(as a principal prerequisite of Europe's unification and rise). --Principal factors of the present European policy. --Contemporary Europe (the hitherto achieved European mergers). --Practical realization of the "PWU" (Pannational World Union) and of its preliminary stage, the "PU" (Pannational Union).

Advocates establishment of a pannational world union as a means of saving mankind from approaching Armageddon. Brandstätter sees in man's political, economic, social, and technological developments the effects of "cosmic magnetism," a part of the "universal force field" defined by Agni Yoga, among others.

270

Eckhardt, William. PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND PEACE. Journal of human relations, v. 16, no. 2, 1968: 230-249. HJ155, v. 16

An investigation into the psychological roots of war. Using evidence obtained from content analyses of political speeches and writings and from questionnaire studies of public opinion, Eckhardt claims to have established a correlation between militarism and an "authoritarian faith" on the one hand, and pacifism and a "democratic faith" on the other. He argues that authoritarian faith originates in traumatic childhood experiences of aggression and guilt, and on this basis suggests methods by which authoritarians can be won over to democratic and peaceful principles. To apply these methods on a sufficient scale, "all we need is a world constitution, world parliament, world police, and world court."

271

Feld, Bernard T. TOWARD A NEW AMERICAN PROGRAM FOR PEACE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, May 1968: 4-5. TK9145, A84, v. 24

Despite the expenditure of billions of dollars since World War II, the United States has failed to establish world peace or to bring stability and prosperity to the newly developing nations. It has done no better on the homefront in dealing with the problems of race and poverty and is faced with a domestic crisis possibly more threatening than the foreign ones. Ideas and programs to deal with these problems abound, but resources do not. Where will the country get the funds it needs to stave off disaster? An end to the Vietnam War, or even a significant reduction in the scale of fighting, would provide more than enough money to finance domestic reconstruction. Consequently it behooves the United States to call a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, to adopt some form of the enclave strategy, and to press vigorously for a negotiated settlement. But funds are needed now, not at some indefinite time in the future, and to get them the United States cannot let "trivial arguments of cost-accounting" stand in its way. The project to land a man on the moon, the supersonic transport, and Project Plowshare must all be postponed. U.S. commitments to Europe must be reduced, and the deployment of additional missiles, offensive and defensive, must be delayed. Most of the funds released by these measures should go into domestic programs, but a significant fraction should be reserved for foreign aid. The American people must make the necessary sacrifices; only in this way can optimism about America's future be restored.

272

Gardner, Richard N. SPACE COMMUNICATIONS: A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR WORLD ORDER. War/peace report, v. 8, Oct. 1968: 14-17. JX1901, W38, v. 8

Operating in a framework of international cooperation, communication satellites could contribute enormously to world development and understanding. New satellites will soon be available that will bypass the necessity for the expensive ground relay stations used by present satellites, thus offering an inexpensive and effective way of reaching large areas of the population. However, the tremendous potential of these new broadcast satellites may never be realized unless a comprehensive international space communications program can be started. Such a program should promote the development of a network of broadcast satellites and encourage studies by international organizations of the benefits of space broadcasting. Pilot projects should be organized to demonstrate the potential contribution of space communications to national economic and political development, and national and international lending agencies should be persuaded to help finance space broadcasting systems in less-developed countries. Although the United States should retain the option of communicating with hostile nations during a serious international crisis, it should assure foreign governments that under all other circumstances they will not receive political or commercial messages against their will. U.N. endorsement of international cooperation in space broadcasting should be sought and the International Telecommunication Union convinced that it should begin assigning radio frequencies for space broadcasting operations. Finally, the space communications program should promote the use of satellites for publicizing U.N. activities and proceedings. Greater knowledge of U.N. objectives could substantially increase the chances of their realization. Furthermore, worldwide broadcasts of opposing national viewpoints could help clarify international misunderstandings and lay the groundwork for a peaceful international community.

273

Panagides, Stahis S. COMMUNAL CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS: THE CASE OF CYPRUS. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1968: 133-145. AS9, J6, 1968

Notes: p. 144-145.

Attempts to demonstrate the contribution which better economic integration can make to the peaceful coexistence of the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus. It is asserted that interdependence in the economic sphere brings interaction and eventual dependence of one community on the other for their continued existence. The analysis demonstrates that economic interdependence with free flow of resources between the communities contributes to minimizing income inequality, which in turn is seen as a condition conducive to social stability. Estimates made of income distribution between the Greek and Turkish communities demonstrate that the Greek Cypriots with 77.1 percent of the population have 80.2 percent of the income, while the Turkish Cypriots with 18.2 percent of the population have a low 12.6 percent of the income. In turn data from the manufacturing sector are used to demonstrate that allocation of capital and labor within this sector on the basis of economic considerations (not ethnic) will favorably serve the economic welfare of both communities, with particularly beneficial effects for the minority. (Abstract supplied, modified)

274

Pillsau, Marc. THE UNIVERSITY CONTRIBUTION TO RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS. American Journal of orthopsychiatry, v. 38, Apr. 1968: 493-502. RA790.H1A5, v. 38

Peace researchers are devoted and energetic men, but so far they have failed to find a solution to the problem of war. Studies in psychology, conflict beliefs, strategy, history, game theory, economics, and law have contributed significantly to man's understanding of war and peace, and out of this work have come valuable suggestions for the construction of a more peaceful world. But one factor has been consistently overlooked: the absence of any market for these suggestions. Proposals are not enough, for "the social force necessary to try the plan" is also required. In American politics, this force is stifled by institutions with an interest in preparations for war and a will to survive and expand their influence. Such are the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, the defense corporations, and even the universities. There has been no takeover by a military elite. The problem is rather that the distinction between the civilian and the military man has disappeared. The result can be seen in U.S. foreign policy, where it is evident that it is the United States that stands in the way of peace. This is the missing link in the work of the peace researchers. Their recommendations will be of little value until they have understood the distribution of decisionmaking power in the United States and then discovered the means to change it.

275

PUGWASH IN GOOD SHAPE. Nature (London) v. 219, Sept. 21, 1968: 1205-1206. Q1.N2, v. 219

Reports on the 1968 Pugwash Conference. Czechoslovakia overshadowed all other issues and a compromise report declaring that the Czechoslovak people should be allowed "to run their own affairs" was agreed to only after lengthy and emotional debate. Other reports called for general and complete disarmament, talks on ABM deployment, a comprehensive test ban treaty, conventional arms limitations, and regional arms control arrangements. The nuclear powers were asked to declare formally that they would not attack the nonnuclear powers. The conference has managed to free itself from its financial woes but still suffers from the pretense "that when scientists act as diplomats and politicians they do it scientifically and therefore better."

276

Rich, Alexander, and V. A. Engelhardt. A PROPOSAL FROM A U.S. AND A SOVIET SCIENTIST: OCEANIC RESOURCES AND DEVELOPING NATIONS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Feb. 1968: 2-3. TK9.A5.A84, v. 24

The growing disparity between living standards in the developed and the developing nations of the world is a source of international tensions and substantially increases the danger of war. How to reverse this trend is one of the gravest problems facing mankind today. The vast mineral resources beneath the ocean floor offer some hope of a solution, but only recently has man become fully aware of the great potential of these resources and begun to devise the technical means of exploiting them. It is likely that the legal status of these oceanic minerals will soon be decided by international convention. These resources should

be reserved by that convention to all the peoples of the world. A considerable share of them should be designated for use in economic assistance to the developing countries. The benefits would be twofold: the means would be at hand to lift the developing states out of poverty, and the concern of the developed states to find a solution to the problems of underdevelopment would be demonstrated.

277

SAKHAROV: SOVIET PHYSICIST APPEALS FOR BOLD INITIATIVES. Science, v. 161, Aug. 9, 1968: 556-558. Q1.S35, v. 161

In an essay circulated within Soviet scientific circles, Russian physicist Andrei Sakharov made an unprecedented plea for rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union. He urged the two powers to abandon extremist ideologies and advocated utilizing the scientific techniques of open discussion and intense analysis of facts to seek a route to cooperation and disarmament. Although deeply committed to classic Marxism, Sakharov recommended changes in both Soviet and U.S. domestic and foreign policies to accelerate the "inevitable convergence" between socialism and capitalism. He suggested that the United States make the minimal economic sacrifices needed to increase its support of the poorer countries and discussed the need for greater intellectual freedom in the Soviet Union. Top U.S. scientists, including Paul Doty of Harvard, Jerome Wiesner of M.I.T., and Polykarp Kusch of Columbia, welcomed the Sakharov essay and felt it reflected a liberalizing trend among Soviet professionals. Sakharov's views on the perils of thermonuclear war are shared by many Americans, and his convictions regarding the impossibility of constructing an effective missile defense system echo the opinions of physicists Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin published in the March 1968 Scientific American. However, many other scientists in both countries still concentrate on short-range or tactical problems and do not share Sakharov's world view.

278

Senghaas, Dieter. [PEACE RESEARCH IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Friedensforschung in der Bundesrepublik. Atomzeiter, June/July 1968. 380-381. P&GP RR

Outlines the peace research activities of West German societies, foundations, and institutes: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik, Bonn; Forschungsstelle der Vereinigung Deutscher Wissenschaftler, Hamburg; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Forschungsinstitut für internationale Politik und Sicherheit, Ebenhausen/Isar; Studiengesellschaft für Friedensforschung, Munich; Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft, Heidelberg; Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer, Bonn; Gesellschaft zur Förderung von Zukunfts- und Friedensforschung, Hannover; and some university institutes.

279

Ulbricht, Walter. NEW INITIATIVES OF THE GDR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. GDR review, v. 13, no. 9, 1968: suppl., [1-8] DD261.G2, v. 13

Address presented to the People's Chamber by the Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, on Aug. 9, 1968.

Declares East German dedication to promoting peace and security in Europe and proposes several measures



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that could ease tensions on the Continent. The West German Government is criticized for its revanchist policies and its suppression of democracy at home. Ulbricht emphasizes that until the Federal Republic recognizes existing frontiers in Europe, there can be no solution to the European security problem. Once Bonn is willing to accept realities in Europe, further steps can be taken to safeguard European security, including the admission of both German states to the United Nations, acceptance of the nonproliferation treaty, conclusion of a treaty between the two Germanies renouncing the use of force, recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe, and the normalization of relations between the two Germanies.

280

Waskow, Arthur I. TOWARD A PEACEMAKERS ACADEMY: A PROPOSAL FOR A FIRST STEP TOWARD A UNITED NATIONS TRANSNATIONAL PEACEMAKING FORCE. [Rev. ed.] The Hague, W. Junk, 1967. 44 p. JX1981.P7W33 1967

Contents. --A note on origins. --Introduction and summary. --The political need: The recent experience. Private action toward a new vocation. --The curriculum: Morale. Languages. Policeman-conciliator. Teacher-community organizer. Technical skills. --The institution: The academy in operation. The planning stage. The site. The alumni. --Conclusion.

Proposes a peacemakers academy to teach men and women languages, technical skills, and peacekeeping methods. Its opening enrollment of 275 would ultimately grow to between 10,000 and 20,000. Graduates would serve 3- or 4-year tours of duty in development projects or local conflict areas, where they would be

available for emergency service for the U.N. Waskow believes if such an institution had existed a decade ago Arab-Israeli tensions might have been partly reduced. He concludes that 10 years from now the world will wish such an academy had been founded in 1967.

281

Werkheiser, Don. INVISIBLE TYRANNY. PT. 2. TOWARD THE ALTERNATIVE OF MUTUAL CONVENIENCE. Journal of human relations, v. 16, no. 2, 1968: 149-166. HJ.J55, v. 16

Pt. 1 was abstracted as item 1659 in v. 4, no. 4, of this bibliography.

Western man is caught up in an antiquated symbol system that stifles thought and communication about social evils. To escape from the invisible tyranny and killer culture of the Western war machine, he needs a new language to expose the truth about the human condition. Human relationships are based on either single or mutual convenience. A game simulation of these two types of relationships has proved that, while the former is the cause of all man's social afflictions, the latter offers the one hope of escape to a better world. Guided by the distinction between these relationships, a semantic analysis of current symbol systems reveals the hypocrisy and confusion of modern political and social jargon but also points the way to the construction of a new language more adequate to man's real needs. The freedom movement everywhere has begun to turn to violence, but this is futile. Men must learn to see the truth of their present situation and then cooperatively take their freedom into their own hands. This is the only road to freedom and an end to war, strife, and annihilation.

## IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

### A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

282

Bohlen, Charles E. EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. In U.S. Dept. of State. News letter, no. 88, Aug. 1968: 6-9.

JX1. U542, 1968

"Address delivered before the World Affairs Council, San Diego, Calif., June 24, 1968.

Traces America's increasing involvement in European affairs, especially since World War II. The two basic tenets of America's postwar European policy have been to assure the peace and security of the North Atlantic community and encourage the creation of a European community. Earlier policy toward Eastern Europe stressed containment, whereas present policy emphasizes peaceful engagement. For a quarter of a century war has not erupted on the European Continent, bearing testimony to the success of U.S. policies and the abilities of the European peoples to peaceably resolve their differences.

283

THE CHINESE WORLD ORDER: TRADITIONAL CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966. 416 p.

DS740. 4. C35455

Partial contents. --A preliminary framework, by John K. Fairbank. Aims and means: the diversity of practice in China's foreign relations. --Historical notes on the Chinese world order, by Lien-sheng Yang. The sinocentric world order. Myth and reality. --Early Ming relations with Southeast Asia: a background essay, by Wang Gungwu. The myth of superiority: its origin. --Intervention versus tribute in Sino-Vietnamese relations, 1788-1790, by Truong Buu Lam. --The Chinese perception of world order, past and present, by Benjamin I. Schwartz. --Notes and bibliographies.

Surveys China's relations with non-Chinese states, mainly during the Ch'ing dynasty (1644-1912), and contends that they have some indeterminate relevance to the problem of China in today's world. If a Chinese perception of the world order existed in the past, it was undermined in the 20th century; the West should be skeptical of explaining present or future Chinese policies in terms of this traditional image. China has adjusted to the world's multistate framework, has accepted the whole machinery of international diplomacy, and appeals to international law whenever it is advantageous.

284

THE COLD WAR AND BEYOND. International journal, v. 23, summer 1968: 335-455.

D839. I5, v. 23

Contents. --A multitude of cold wars, by Louis J. Halle. --The cold war revised, by Wilfrid Knapp. --International organization and the cold war, by Leon

Gordenker. --The Marshall plan and the cold war, by Charles P. Kindleberger. --Berlin, the blockade, and the cold war, by Robert Spencer. --The Austrian State Treaty and neutrality in Eastern Europe, by Ghita Ionescu. --The cold war--second phase: China, by John F. Melby. --Soviet policies in Southeast Asia, by Peter Howard.

Essays on the history of the cold war and aspects of East-West relations today. Halle discusses some of the historiographic problems encountered in attempting to interpret a historical movement as vast as that of the cold war and concludes that since every historian will see the struggle in his own terms there will always be not one but "a multitude of Cold Wars." Knapp reviews and criticizes recent historical writing on the cold war, particularly that of the younger "revisionist" historians. Gordenker relates the way in which the Soviet-American conflict has "necessarily conditioned the functioning and development of the new structure of international institutions intended to maintain and foster the post-World War II peace." Kindleberger describes the genesis of the Marshall plan on the basis of personal reminiscences as a participant in that event. Spencer examines the role played by Berlin in the cold war, emphasizing the long-term diplomatic repercussions of the blockade of 1948-49. Ionescu considers the implications of the Austrian State Treaty and suggests that it was the harbinger of a trend toward neutrality in Eastern Europe. Melby identifies and discusses a "second phase" of the cold war, which is manifested "in the deadly impasse of relations between Washington and Peking" and colors the nature of every major problem in Asia. Howard describes the aims and methods of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia, finding them "above all pragmatic and opportunist."

285

Eppstein, John. NATIONALISM. British survey, Aug. 1968: 1-19.

D410. B7, 1968

Relates the history of nationalism from its origin in 18th-century Europe to the present and attempts to find "the place which the nation and devotion to the nation hold in a reasonable framework of international life." Violence is a perennial adjunct of the nation-state system, and the hope that it can be eliminated completely and permanently is unrealistic. The task of statesmen and peoples today is to prevent, delay, and limit violence to the greatest extent possible. The most significant step in this direction would be the recognition by all that the moral and positive laws are binding on the behavior of states.

286

Richter, Rolf. [THE DISARMAMENT IDEA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE AND GERMAN POLICY, 1920-1929] Der Abrüstungsgedanke in Theorie und Praxis und die deutsche Politik (1920-1929). Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 18, Aug. 1968: 442-496.

U3. W485, v. 18

#### IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

Points out that, despite the patent failure by the League of Nations to disarm Germany from 1920 to 1929, Germany's own efforts during that period represented the greatest disarmament achievement in the history of mankind.

287

Soulié, Jean Louis. [FOREIGN CONFRONTATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. PT. I] Confrontations étrangères au Proche-Orient, pt. I. Revue de défense nationale, v. 24, June/July 1968: 1001-1010. illus. D410.R45, v. 24

Traces Russia's political and military penetration into the Middle East since the end of World War I. The British and French mandate systems established in the Near East at the end of the war incited youth movements to seek an "alliance" with Moscow to check this new form of colonialism. The Moslem community was favorably impressed by Russia's liberal treatment of ethnic minority groups and by its creation of federated Moslem republics within the Soviet Union. During this period Lenin was carrying out a propaganda campaign calling for an end to colonialism and imperialism throughout the world. The Arab people, most of whom lived in abject poverty and suffered at the hands of brutal feudal systems, were receptive to programs advocating revolutions and classless societies. After the Second World War, Russia continued to advocate the overthrow of the established regimes in the Near East, and, as a Great Power, sought to influence the Arab States through diplomatic channels. Between 1956 and 1965 the Russians concluded 28 accords with various underdeveloped countries, five of which were Middle East states. However, despite the Soviet Union's influence in the Near East, the great majority of progressive Arabs remain allergic to communism. Russia will nevertheless continue to compete for hegemony in the Middle East and thus reduce the chances for true peace in the troubled Holy Land.

288

Sabbarao, M. V. A COURSE TOWARDS DISARMAMENT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. United Asia, v. 20, Mar./Apr. 1968: 96-104.

DSL U55 v. 20

Traces the various disarmament commissions established by the United Nations, from the Atomic Energy Commission to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The latter was created to deal with such questions as a freeze on offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the reduction of the danger of accidental war. Subbarao believes the nonproliferation treaty, a product of the 18-Nation Committee, will perpetuate the present nuclear-weapons monopoly of the Great Powers. The author concludes that India favors the treaty so long as it does not discriminate against nonnuclear-weapon states or impede the growth of peaceful nuclear science and technology.

289

Trevor-Roper, H. R. THE DILEMMA OF MUNICH IS STILL WITH US. New York Times magazine, Sept. 15, 1968: 34-35, 72, 76, 79, 82. illus. AP2.N6575, 1968

"Munich" has become the symbol for any disastrous surrender to a threat of force and a rallying cry for those who fear the consequences of "appeasing" an enemy. Yet the great debate provoked by the Munich

settlement and its aftermath has never been satisfactorily resolved. What is the real lesson of that tragic moment in history? The Munich Conference, like every other historical event, can be understood only within its own historical context--the European crisis that began with Hitler's assumption of power in 1933. Hitler was determined to overturn the Versailles settlement, and the destruction of Czechoslovakia was one part of this program. The democracies were committed to the defense of the status quo but were willing to settle for a rational and honorable compromise with the Germans. Neither the objectives of the Western Allies, nor the diplomatic machinery they invoked to serve those objectives, were at fault. The real cause of the tragedy lay in the unwillingness of Western statesmen to face up to the truth concerning Hitler's intentions. Chamberlain simply refused to face the facts. The critical question was whether Hitler was seeking only local adjustments of the European status quo or the overthrow of the existing European framework. Even in the 1930's, the answer should have been obvious. The lesson of Munich is clear. Policy must be based "on the evidence of the present" determined "by examining the facts fairly within their own context." Applied to Vietnam, this rule would require an unbiased investigation of all the relevant factors present in that situation. A rational consideration of these matters might lead to a policy of retreat. But if retreat is based not on the facts, but on virtuous illusions, then it "can only lead, like Munich, to moral collapse and political defeat."

290

Williams, Geoffrey, and Joseph Frankel. A POLITICAL SCIENTIST'S LOOK AT THE COLD WAR AS HISTORY. Political studies, v. 16, June 1968: 285-292. JAL P63, v. 16

Reviews the books *The Hard and Soft Power* by G. F. Hudson, *The Age of Containment* by David Rees, *World Politics in an Age of Revolution* by John W. Spanier, *The Debateable Alliance* by Coral Bell, *Political Power: U.S.A./U.S.S.R.* by Z. Brzezinski, *The Cold War as History* by Louis J. Halle, *The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet and American Gamesmanship* by Joseph Nozce and John W. Spanier, *The Strategy of Interdependence* by V. P. Rock, *Beyond the Cold War* by M. D. Shulman, and *The End of Alliance* by Ronald Steel. The article points out "problems of interpretation which are of particular political interest" for predicting international relations in the post-cold war era.

#### B. GENERAL ANALYSES

291

Bennett, Roy. NUCLEAR POWERS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 19, Aug. 5, 1968: 16-17. D839.R4, v. 19

While most of the U.N. members who abstained from voting on the nonproliferation treaty were sub-Saharan African states, and their reasons for doing so were chiefly nonnuclear and regional, the abstention of Japan, West Germany, and India poses a serious problem that pertains to the intentions of the superpowers, on which there are two contrasting views. Some hold that the United States and Russia want to establish a dual hegemony and divide the world between themselves. But this seems improbable because the two superpowers possess over 90 percent of the world's

nuclear capacity and the restrictions of the treaty seem to militate against their condominium. Others maintain that after the settlement of the Vietnam War a much stronger détente can be expected. They argue that the superpowers realize that the focus of the cold war now lies in the Third World and a conflict there would be in neither's interest. Against this background the nonproliferation treaty may be important because it points to Communist China as tomorrow's major conflict area. After the Vietnam War and the Near East crisis are settled, the superpowers might well agree to do nothing in regard to China that would affect the vital interests of the other and not to permit a third party to upset the balance. If such a détente materializes and the superpowers together assume the responsibility for international peace and security, the United Nations may then be able to turn its attention to the urgent problems in the Third World.

292

Božinović, M. THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND FURTHER PROSPECTS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Aug. 5, 1968: 14-16.

D839.R4, v. 19

Although the great effort to clarify the attitudes and intentions of the U.N. member states toward the nonproliferation treaty was generally successful, some countries still remain doubtful. The treaty has definite positive aspects. If it is accepted and applied it will end the further spread of nuclear arms, commit the nuclear powers to embark on the road of disarmament, lessen the fears of nuclear war, and enable the nonnuclear countries to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes under most favorable conditions. But it does not solve the problem of guaranteeing the security of the nonnuclear countries, and no steps have been taken by the nuclear powers toward their own disarmament. However the emphasis by both the United States and the Soviet Union on the readiness to resort to more nuclear disarmament measures in the future and the fact that the time limits mentioned are not so vague as they used to be seem encouraging. Under these conditions the responsibility and role of the small countries is growing, and the Conference of Nonnuclear Countries to be held in Geneva in September 1968, might facilitate the settlement of many problems. But, rather than indulging in general declarations of positions or concentrating on problems of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the conference must discuss not only the main problem but also partial disarmament measures not directly connected with nuclear proliferation. The United States, Russia, and Great Britain have promised to participate, and they may expect to be confronted with more tangible proposals and demands from the nonnuclear countries and offered support for more determined efforts toward disarmament. Yugoslavia is ready to help in the search for a more adequate solution of the nonnuclear countries' security problems and in the initiation of the process of disarmament.

293

Feld, Bernard T. AFTER THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY--WHAT NEXT? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Sept. 1968: 2-3.

TK9145.A84, v. 24

The nonproliferation treaty may be a significant turning point in the quest for disarmament. At a minimum, it has proved once again that despite ideological and political differences the nuclear powers

can reach agreement on important security matters of mutual concern. But more important than the treaty itself was the accompanying announcement that the superpowers were ready to negotiate limitations on their own nuclear armaments. With the deployment of ABM's and multiple warhead missiles, the nuclear arms competition is taking another upward turn, which must be stopped before it gets out of control. The Soviet Union, in its memorandum of July 1, 1968, offered arms control proposals in nine areas of concern, and it is possible to see opportunities for progress in each of them. Certainly a "no first use" pledge and a moratorium on the manufacture of fissionable materials for weapons are within reach, as are a suspension of the deployment of new weapons systems and negotiation of a ban on underground nuclear tests. It would be worthwhile to see what more the Russians have to say about limiting the movements of submarines and aircraft and about arms reductions in Europe. Other regional arms control arrangements, as well as measures to secure the peaceful use of the seabed, ought to be discussed. The matter of chemical and biological weapons can be disposed of with unilateral pledges by all the major powers not to develop or use them.

294

Geyer, Alan. TOWARD JUSTICE AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Christian century, v. 85, Aug. 21, 1968: 1049-1053.

BRI.C45, v. 85

Examines the report "Toward Justice and Peace in International Affairs" of section 4 at the World Council of Churches' Fourth Assembly in Uppsala, Sweden. The report urges nuclear abstinence for smaller nations and phased disarmament for nuclear powers, calls for a Soviet-U.S. moratorium on antiballistic missile systems and extension of the test ban to underground testing, as well as reliance on multilateral peacekeeping and international law. China's foreign relations, the Vietnam War, the Nigerian conflict, and the Middle East situation are also discussed in the document, which notes that revolution and violence will increase if the relative growth rate in developing countries is not raised substantially.

295

Kahn, Herman, and Anthony J. Wiener. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE VERY LONG RUN. In their: The year 2000: a framework for speculation on the next thirty-three years. New York, Macmillan [1967] p. 359-385. illus.

CB160.K3 1967

Reflections on the long-term prospects for the international political system. The authors recall a common assumption of the 1950's that the arms race, innate human aggression, economic inequities, and international anarchy together doom the armed nation-state system to rapid extinction. They challenge this theory to the extent that it has assumed the aspects of a dogmatic truth and argue that the present state system is equally compatible with a future of evolutionary stability or of widespread international violence. However, they do not deny the possibility of great structural changes to the system, and a series of these possibilities are explored, including bloc systems, condominiums, concerts of powers, perfection of the United Nations, world federal government, world empire, community sanctions, and the decline of civilization. Finally, the various possible methods--peaceful and

#### IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

violent--whereby the current system might be transformed into a new one are commented upon.

296

Leary, Frank. **ARMS CONTROL--HOW REAL?** Space/aeronautics, v. 50, Sept. 1968: 52-65. illus.  
TL501.A786, v. 50

Although the outlook for general and complete disarmament in the foreseeable future is bleak, the current prospects for the conclusion of limited arms control measures are very good. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is currently seeking "insights which may permit the U.S. to step off the open spiral down to hell, and hopefully take the rest of the world along." Even though most nations are not willing to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, the majority are eager to limit the destruction resulting from international conflict and to divert the resources devoted to making war materials to more constructive purposes. Since nations are generally reluctant to accept restraints on arms production on faith alone, ACDA officials have focused a good deal of attention on verification procedures that would assure the compliance of all participants with the terms of any arms control agreements that may be reached. Because governments often resist the intrusion by foreign nationals into their defense and scientific establishments, verification systems are needed that are minimally intrusive and can operate with or without the cooperation of all governments involved in the agreement. Among the possibilities under consideration are unmanned on-site systems utilizing automatic sensors, recording devices, and data transmission techniques; satellite reconnaissance; high-altitude surveillance; and offshore reconnaissance. Satellites appear to be the most promising of all proposed monitoring devices since they are very unobtrusive and offer "the potential of seeing anything larger than two feet in diameter on the surface from 100 mi up." As long as diplomats must contend with ambition, suspicion, and jealousy, they will be unable to negotiate arms control agreements on the basis of trust alone, but this does not prevent the enactment of limited arms control measures for which sound verification procedures can be worked out. Thus, "granted only a minimal measure of good will and sanity," nations may soon be persuaded to noticeably curtail arms competition.

297

Noel-Baker, Philip. **WE HAVE BEEN HERE BEFORE.** In: Calder, Nigel, ed. *Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons.* New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 215-230.  
D104.C155 1968

Modern weapons technology makes it more urgent than ever that all nations cooperate to curb the arms race. Except for a 10-year period following World War I, all serious efforts to achieve disarmament during the past hundred years have been blocked by the militarists. They include the professional military staffs, armaments manufacturers and salesmen, members of patriotic societies, and national intelligence services. Despite the antiwar passions aroused by the Franco-Prussian War and the two World Wars, national leaders have been unable to resist the pressures for arms expansion. Although the United Nations is in many ways a stronger organization than the League of Nations, its main achievements in the field of disarmament are limited to the

test ban treaty and the treaty prohibiting military uses of outer space, neither of which have had universal adherence. Despite its bleak history, however, disarmament should not be considered impossible. The principal impediments, China's apparent intransigence and the difficulty of instituting effective safeguards to guarantee compliance with disarmament measures, can eventually be overcome. The variety of successful international institutions already in existence that serve the mutual interests of the international community give an indication of the feasibility of worldwide cooperation. The elimination of national rivalries, the perfection of international institutions, and disarmament are all goals that should be pursued simultaneously; "success or failure in any one direction will affect progress toward the others. None is out of reach."

298

**THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF PEACE.** Impact of science on society, v. 18, Apr./June 1968: 7-133.  
Q1.14, v. 18

Contents. --The editor comments. --Peace research, the science of survival, by Bert V. A. Röling. --Why is man aggressive? A synthetic round table. --A data-collecting network for the sociosphere, by Kenneth E. Boulding. --Polemology and the solution of conflicts, by Gaston Bouthoul. --The application of game theory to peace research, by Anatol Rapoport. --Ethnocentrism, source and aggravating factor of conflicts, by Ignacy Sachs. --Notes on contributors.

Introductory essays on peace research. Röling describes the emergence of this discipline as a separate field of inquiry, identifies the major subdivisions of the field, discusses briefly its most pressing methodological problems, and concludes with an institutional survey and call for greater international cooperation. The roundtable participants exchange thoughts on the biological and psychocultural roots of human aggression, with most of the discussion directed to answering the question of whether aggressive behavior is in some sense instinctual or innate to man. Boulding complains of the lack of hard information on the factors affecting war and peace and calls for creation of a "worldwide system of social data-collecting stations, like a meteorological network, which would be able to convert raw facts into 'a form something like weather maps' for the guidance of statesmen. Bouthoul outlines the major concerns of polemology, or the science of conflicts. He recommends a scientific study of the rhythms and cycles of war and peace in order to "arrive at a functional pacifism instead of, as hitherto, a purely emotional one." Rapoport discusses game theory as the science of "rational decision in conflict situations." Game theory, according to Rapoport, by proving that modern war is unrealistic, forces the conclusion that the states of the world must learn to substitute collective for individual rationality. Sachs analyzes the phenomena of "ethnocentrism--the belief that what is one's own or 'ours' is always best. He illustrates how ethnocentrism distorts perceptions by tracing the changing attitudes of Europeans toward the Negro.

299

Senghaas, Dieter. **[AGGRESSIVENESS AND VIOLENCE. ABOUT THE ANATOMY OF DETERRENCE POLICY]** Aggressivität und Gewalt. Zf. Anatomie der Abschreckungspolitik. Atomblätter, June/July 1968. 319-327.  
P&GP NR

## ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

Expounds that no viable peace can be built on deterrence strategy; true peace planning cannot be undertaken until the dismantling of deterrence systems begins.

300

Benghaas, Dieter. [PEACE RESEARCH UNDER THE SPELL OF DETERRENCE] *Friedenstforschung im Banne von Abschreckung. Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, v. 8, Sept. 1963: 460-477.  
JAI4. P63, v. 8

Appraises trends in contemporary peace research. Benghaas points out that ignorance of power politics by peace researchers may deprive their work of the "public resonance" necessary under the present conditions of an organized negation of peace. On the other hand, their preoccupation with deterrence might make their research irrelevant. A seven-page bibliography is appended.

301

Shulman, Marshall D. *BEYOND THE COLD WAR*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966. Ill p.  
D844.947 1966a

Contents. -- Preface. -- Retrospect. -- The changing terrain of international politics. -- Transformations in the Soviet system. -- The evolution of Soviet foreign policy and the cold war. -- A shift of emphasis in policy.

Contents that the cold war is no longer the dominating fact of international relations and describes the changes over the past decade within the Soviet Union and between the East and West that have altered the rationale and the weapons of the cold war. Shulman notes that as a consequence of mutual deterrence "the conflict relationship between the Soviet Union and the West has passed from a stark postwar confrontation to a more ambiguous stage in which the balance of conflicting and parallel interests is less clearly defined." The author recommends a shift of emphasis in Western policies that would recognize that the cold war does not provide an adequate framework for dealing with relevant international problems.

302

Slomich, Sidney J. *ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: THE GREAT EVASION*. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, June 1968: 18-22.  
TK9145.A84, v. 24

Accuses U.S. policymakers of preoccupying themselves with technocratic fantasies and peripheral issues in order to avoid the crucial political problems of arms control and disarmament. Slomich cites the proliferation of conventional arms in Latin America, the decision to deploy an ABM, and the war in Vietnam as evidence that the United States has become obsessed with technology; he points to the outer space treaty and the nonproliferation treaty as proof that peripheral matters are being used to avoid the one real problem, nuclear disarmament. Since those Government agencies responsible for U.S. arms control policy seem designed to perpetuate a strategy of avoiding the important issues, a greater and more active concern with arms control is required outside the bureaucracy, and, in particular, a public constituency for an effective disarmament program must be created. The aim, of course, is to devise a new and imaginative arms control policy that will put ideas and politics in their proper place before things and possessions.

303

*SOVIET MEMORANDUM OF JULY 1, 1968*. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, S 1968: 30-31.  
TK9145.A84, v. 24

Sets forth nine arms control and disarmament proposals, all of which are "urgent measures" requiring implementation "in the near future." The memorandum calls for a ban on the use or manufacture of nuclear weapons, reduction of present stockpiles of nuclear weapons, limitations on the movements of strategic aircraft and submarines, a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear tests, a ban on the use of chemical or biological weapons, liquidation of foreign military bases, regional disarmament measures, and a treaty insuring that the seabed and ocean floor will be used only for peaceful purposes.

304

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1967*. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1968] 820 p. (Its Publication 46)  
JX1974.A1U542, no. 46

A compilation, in chronological order, of the "basic documents on efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other aspects of disarmament and arms control." The full text of the seventh annual report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 30, 1968, concludes the volume.

305

Vernant, Jacques. [ONE STEP TOWARD DISARMAMENT?] *Un pas vers le désarmement? Revue de défense nationale*, v. 24, Aug./Sept. 1968: 1306-1312.  
D410.F45, v. 24

Assesses the chances for a successful arms reduction agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Three reasons why the superpowers agreed to discuss the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons are that arms control discussions would facilitate the election of Hubert Humphrey, speed up the ratification of the nonproliferation treaty, and pave the way for an honorable solution to the Vietnam War. Vernant believes that an arms control agreement between the superpowers would be ineffective without the signatures of France and China. Although persuading China to agree to any arms limitation will be difficult, it will have to bear the responsibility of being a nuclear power before the world can become a safe place in which to live.

306

Weinberg, Alvin M. *LET US PREPARE FOR PEACE*. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, Sept. 1968: 17-20.  
TK9145.A84, v. 24  
"Presented at the Seventh Atoms for Peace Award Ceremony, Rockefeller University." N.Y., Nov. 14, 1967.

New technologies offer the hope of eliminating a major cause of war--the inequitable distribution of the earth's scarce resources. The potential benefits of nuclear technology alone would seem to be sufficient to sustain this optimistic forecast. Yet material scarcity is not the only cause of war. Optimists are mistaken in believing that the nuclear confrontation of the superpowers will simply dissolve with the advent of their technological Utopia. Paradoxically the recent failure to negotiate a freeze on the construction

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of ABM systems may prove to have been a major arms control breakthrough. To the degree that active defenses are effective, the capacity of the world to destroy its people has been reduced and a kind of arms limitation already achieved. Why not concentrate U.S. diplomatic efforts on negotiating a limitation on offensive weapons while at the same time encouraging the expansion of defensive systems? Admittedly this approach faces a number of formidable difficulties, but the balance of terror is imperfect too, as well as much more destructive if it fails. Furthermore, the two superpowers already have decided to deploy ABM systems, and an adequate defense is in fact a prerequisite to effective arms control. The energy-rich world of tomorrow will be a world of material plenty, but it will also be a world of nation-states carrying into the future their habits of violence. A world in which nations occupy themselves with defensive rather than offensive preparations would be a safer place in which to live than one held together by the fragile balance of terror.

#### C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

307

QUESTION OF GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE EFFECTS OF THE POSSIBLE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ON THE SECURITY AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR STATES OF THE ACQUISITION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THESE WEAPONS. Peace and the sciences, Apr./June 1968: 1-34. JX1901. P25, 1968

Describes the probable effects of nuclear weapons under various conditions of strategic and tactical warfare, estimates the cost of producing these weapons at different levels of economic development, and discusses their impact on international politics and the security of nations. The panel recommends approval of the nonproliferation treaty, negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty, an agreement to reduce existing nuclear stockpiles, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones and effective security guarantees for the nonnuclear powers. But the panel goes on to suggest that only through general and complete disarmament can the nations of the globe achieve genuine and lasting security.

308

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM ON CERTAIN URGENT MEASURES FOR ENDING THE ARMS RACE AND ON DISARMAMENT. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 7, July 26, 1968: 31-37.

P&GP RR

Translated from Pravda, July 2, 1968.  
Slav Rm

Enumerates Soviet measures for ending the arms race and implementing a plan of general and complete disarmament. The plan calls for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, reduction of their means of delivery, liquidation of foreign military bases, regional disarmament, and a ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet Government calls upon all peace-loving states to do everything in their power to agree to these measures and end the arms race. It will, in cooperation with these states, work to curb the forces of aggression and remove the threat of international nuclear war.

## V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

### A. NEGOTIATION

309

**BONN'S EFFORT TO HAVE MOSCOW RENOUNCE THE USE OF FORCE.** In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949- ) *Presse- und Informationsamt Bulletin*, a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 16, July 16, 1968: 185-187. DD259, A35, v. 16

Notes the Bonn government's publication of documents pertaining to German-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of a mutual agreement renouncing the use of force and briefly summarizes their contents. In releasing the documents Foreign Minister Willy Brandt stated that they reveal the persistent efforts of the Federal Government to promote understanding with the Soviet Union regardless of the uncompromising attitudes of the latter. For nearly 2 years Bonn has attempted to persuade Moscow to agree to a mutual renunciation of force, but the Russians persist in maintaining that the Soviet Union "as a World War II victor in Germany retains the ultimate right to use force in Germany" and attach unconditional demands to their acceptance, including the recognition by Bonn of East Germany.

310

**Bourguiba, Habib, Pres. Tunisia. BOURGUIBA OUTLINES SOLUTION AT U.N.; PRAISES VITALITY OF PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.** Arab world, v. 14, May/June 1968: 3-4. DS36, A74, v. 14

Address delivered to the U.N. General Assembly on May 20, 1968.

Praises the substantial progress in eliminating the cold war, liquidating the colonial phenomenon, and improving international economic and social cooperation but laments the continued existence of the Palestinian problem. Bourguiba offers a three-phase peace plan--the withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces and the assignment of U.N. forces to Arab occupied territory, negotiations between the concerned parties, and a Special Representative of the Security Council to guarantee the application and terms of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and a Security Council decision declaring that the resolution had received adequate application and ordering a U.N. troop withdrawal to return control of territories to the respective countries involved. Bourguiba states that implementation of the Security Council resolution would not solve the problems raised by the creation of Israel but would free the substantive problem from the marginal problems that have complicated and distorted it.

311

**Durbrow, Elbridge. NEGOTIATING WITH THE COMMUNISTS: FIRMNESS IS THE KEY.** Air Force and space digest, v. 51, Sept. 1968: 48-52. UG633, A65, v. 51

While every attempt should be made to pursue meaningful avenues to peace in Vietnam, past experiences have shown that "negotiations for negotiation's

sake" are pointless and totally unrealistic in dealing with the Communists. Behind the facade of peaceful coexistence the Communists are still working toward the goal of world domination. They are not interested in peace and stability and only favor treaties in their own basic interests. On a number of occasions during the past two decades they have swiftly moved into political vacuums and encouraged insurgent activities. Efforts to "bank good will" with the Russians and Chinese have consistently failed; France and Great Britain have gained little by recognizing Communist China, and temporary bombing halts in Vietnam have not brought about reciprocal gestures of good will. Furthermore, the Communists have demonstrated many times their lack of compunction in breaking their word and have shown themselves masters of shifting to others the blame for their misdeeds. The Communists can be brought into productive negotiations only when they feel they have already attained their objectives or when they are confronted by overwhelming force on the part of their adversaries. Therefore, the President must approach the peace table with caution and not be politically pressured into accepting "an unrealistic face-saving compromise agreement in Southeast Asia."

312

**Foster, William C. CROSSROADS IN ARMS CONTROL.** In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, October 7, 1968: 366-368. JX232, A33, v. 59

"Address made before the Federal Bar Association at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 13, 1968.

Discusses the impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on the outlook for progress in arms control and disarmament. Foster admits that the invasion has been a setback in important respects. It has caused some states to delay in signing the nonproliferation treaty and complicated the preparations for U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, technology already has determined "that there really is no acceptable alternative to arms control and disarmament progress." The United States must continue to give its full support to the nonproliferation treaty, not only for the more obvious reasons, but also in order that the encouraging "political dynamic" generated by a new arms control agreement will not be lost.

313

**Gregory, Gene. FIRST ROUND TO HANOI.** Far Eastern economic review, v. 60, June 20, 1968: 611-612, 615. HC411, F18, v. 60

The Paris negotiations have provided Hanoi with a political victory by contrasting North Vietnam's independence with the dependence of South Vietnam on the United States. Even greater gains for Hanoi are expected as negotiations continue, because the United States cannot return to a policy advocating escalation. Most proponents of a negotiated settlement prefer a coalition government, even if it might mean National



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Liberation Front (NLF) control of the country, because it provides "an honourable way out for the United States." The most concrete proposals favor reconciliation with the NLF, abrogation of the present constitution, and formation of a provisional civilian government. This government, together with the NLF, could establish a coalition government to send representatives to Paris or Geneva to negotiate with Hanoi. A coalition with the NLF excluding the army would create a power vacuum in the non-Communist camp; however, this is for the Americans to decide, and not the South Vietnamese.

314

Grossman, Otto. [PROBLEMS UNDERLYING THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN GERMANY] Zur Problematik des Aufenthaltes ausländischer Streitkräfte in Deutschland. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Aug. 1968: 399-401. U3.W396, v. 17

France's withdrawal, in July 1966, from the NATO military organization prompted Bonn to declare that France's right to station its troops in the German Federal Republic was inseparable from subordinating the troops to that organization. Paris, in rebuttal, called the German treaty of 1954 and the 1954 Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany a still-satisfactory basis for the stationing of Western troops in the Federal Republic. In the French view only practical provisos needed to be negotiated for the continued stay of French troops in the republic. The matter was finally settled in December 1966 by an administrative agreement between the two governments stating that the existing rights, based on the German treaty, to station French troops in the Federal Republic could be exercised only with the consent of the German Government. Except for an ill-defined consent clause this agreement is in accord with the actual legal situation in regard to the presence of French, or American and British, forces in the German Federal Republic. The overriding legal basis for the presence of foreign troops is the "1945 occurrences," including the Potsdam agreement, whereby the Four Powers gained occupation rights in all Germany. The continuing right of the Three Powers to station their troops in the German Democratic Republic is indirectly recognized even by the Moscow agreement of 1955, which defines the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops in that republic. Thus, among the Four Powers, and in regard to Germany as a whole, the wartime occupation of Germany is still in force as long as the German question remains unsolved. It follows that consent by the Government of the Federal Republic--of which the German treaty and the Convention speak--is not mandatory in order for the Three Powers to exercise their rights in the Federal Republic. The same is true for the Soviet Union, exercising its rights in the German Democratic Republic, although the Moscow agreement has a similar consent clause. All this pertains to the Three Powers' and the Soviet Union's "outward relation" to Germany, which is a relation to that nation as a whole. To their "inward relation" to Germany, which actually is a relation to a portion of the country, the Federal Republic enjoys equal, fully sovereign status. The presence of Western forces for the West's and the Federal Republic's defense purposes requires the German Federal Government's consent.

315

Hadawi, Sami. THE ARAB STATES: WHY WON'T THEY NEGOTIATE? Arab world, v. 14, May/June 1968: 10-11, 23. DS36.A74, v. 14

Flames Israel's expansionist designs for the Arab refusal to negotiate and cites specific examples of previous Israeli breaches of peace agreements. If the Israelis want peace they must withdraw immediately to the 1949 armistice demarcation lines, complying with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and begin negotiations within the framework of the 1947 Partition Plan.

316

Heilbrunn, Otto. WHEN COMMUNIST INSURGENTS NEGOTIATE. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 113, May 1968: 132-135. U1.R8, v. 113

When checked against the historical record, the contention that a people's revolutionary war cannot be halted in midcourse by a ceasefire and a negotiated settlement reached is questionable. Insurgents may be willing to negotiate to save their political underground organization, obtain legal recognition for their party or for their guerrilla force as part of the country's armed forces, enter into a government coalition, or consolidate their position in part of the country with the intention of resuming the fight at a more opportune moment. They may also aim to become the de facto or de jure government of part of the country and gain the rest later by force or plebiscite, or they may seek recognition as the country's government to achieve independence by a plebiscite or force. But the insurgency must be contained in its initial stages. If not, considering the insurgents' limited willingness to negotiate, the government may be forced to continue the war.

317

Hermann, Margaret G., and Nathan Kogan. NEGOTIATION IN LEADER AND DELEGATE GROUPS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 332-344. JX1901.J6, v. 12

References: p. 343-344.

Negotiations among leaders were compared with negotiations among delegates in order to investigate the effect of role in the reference group on intergroup bargaining behavior. The negotiations of ten groups of leaders and ten groups of delegates matched on initial positions were examined. Because of their greater flexibility and authority, leaders were expected to spend less time negotiating and have fewer deadlocks than delegates. Neither of these hypotheses was supported. Leaders and delegates, however, were found to resolve their conflicts in different ways. While delegates more often reached agreement through compromise, leaders were more likely to choose one party's position. Thus, delegates tended to converge upon the average of their initial positions while leaders showed a significant change in the risky direction. Leaders' and delegates' reactions to their negotiations were also analyzed. In general, the results suggested that leaders can be influenced more by other leaders than delegates can by other delegates. (Abstract supplied)

318

HOW THE WAR IN VIETNAM MIGHT END. Time, v. 92, Aug. 9, 1968: 22-23. AP2.T37, v. 92

How the Vietnam War ends is important for America's future image both at home and abroad. Suggestions for decreasing the level of hostilities have varied: Hubert Humphrey suggests an immediate cease-fire; Arthur M. Cox urges a cease-fire, but only after procedures for deescalation have been formulated; Nelson

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Rockefeller advocates creating a temporary "security buffer" between the two opposing forces, followed by the gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops, and Herman Kahn suggests further partitioning of Vietnam or the creation of a buffer state. Suggestions for determining "who will rule and how" once the war ends have also varied. One set of plans directed toward the higher echelons of government concentrates on formulating a conciliatory central government in Saigon; another set aims at integration on a lower level, legitimizing the NLF as a political party and permitting its members to run for National Assembly; and academic and think-tank plans advocate reconciliation at the lowest level--of hamlet, village, and province. William Pfaff contends that future peace and a durable settlement will depend on neutralizing not only Vietnam, but also Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and perhaps eventually Malaysia.

319

Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S. THE DISARMAMENT AGENDA OF MANKIND. In U.S. Dept. of State, Department of State bulletin, v. 59, Aug. 5, 1968: 137-138. JX232.A33, v. 59

Message to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, read at its opening session on July 16, 1968.

Identifies the arms control issues the United States believes require the immediate attention of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Johnson commends the Committee for its work in drafting the non-proliferation treaty but goes on to stress the urgency of negotiating an end to the nuclear arms race and an effective nuclear disarmament agreement. He also calls for arms limitations on the seabed and for regional limitations on both nuclear and conventional weapons.

320

Morkhandikar, R. S. THE WEST ASIAN CRISIS--A STUDY IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION. United Asia, v. 20, Mar./Apr. 1968: 91-95. DSI.U55, v. 20

A Middle East settlement can be realized only if the Arabs and Israelis modify their respective positions on the problems of Jerusalem, the refugees, and Arab-Israeli security. Whether threats of punishment or promises of rewards can induce them to change depends on their vulnerability to political and economic sanctions. Israel relies heavily on the United States for aid and development programs; in 1957 it was forced to evacuate Egyptian territory because of U.S. economic sanctions. Although Jordan receives aid from Great Britain, West Germany, and the United States, it has a greater maneuverability than Israel. Unlike Israel, Jordan can turn to the Soviet Union for military aid, and most of its losses resulting from strained relations with Western countries are offset by its richer Arab neighbors. By comparison Egypt is the least vulnerable because it trades with the Communist bloc and its losses from the closing of the Suez are made good by Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait. Furthermore, the territory it lost during the war is mostly desert and inhabited by Arab refugees. As matters now stand, unless outside pressure is applied to modify the belligerents' positions in the negotiations, there will be another war.

321

Muney, Barbara F., and Morton Deutsch. THE EFFECTS OF ROLE-REVERSAL DURING THE DIS-

CUSSION OF OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 12, Sept. 1968: 345-356. JX1901.J6, v. 12

References: p. 355-356.

This study examined the effects of two different discussion methods, role-reversal and direct presentation of one's own viewpoint, upon the ease of reaching agreement and upon attitudinal change. Pairs of subjects, who had been selected for their extreme and opposed attitudes on a controversial issue, were instructed to attempt to reach a joint solution on the issue after an initial period of either role-reversal or self-presentation. Role-reversal proved no more effective on certain indices of conflict resolution. Both methods produced considerable understanding of the other's views and attitude change toward them. The pair's skill in role-reversal was related to attitude change toward one another. A hypothesis is offered explaining why role-reversal appeared more effective with one issue, while self-presentation was superior with the other. (Abstract supplied)

322

TWO AT THE TOP. Economist, v. 227, June 22, 1968: 16, 19. HG11.E2, v. 227

Despite its cooperation with the United States in the conclusion of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Russia has reacted far from enthusiastically to President Johnson's appeals for arms reduction agreements between the superpowers. President Johnson emphasized that many states will be reluctant to forgo nuclear weapons development unless the United States and Russia begin scaling down their own nuclear arsenals. Russia's cool response may be attributed partly to its sensitivity to China's charges of collusion with the United States and its fear of close association with the United States while the Vietnam War continues, but it is also heavily influenced by internal military pressures and concern over liberalizing trends in Eastern Europe. If the Russians continue to drag their heels on arms reduction efforts, they may seriously jeopardize the successful conclusion of the nonproliferation treaty. However, eventually Moscow may come around because "Mr. Kosygin knows that if he wants a tolerably stable world, as distinct from the wildly dangerous turmoil that some of the fundamentalists in Moscow still hanker after, he will have to work for it by agreements with the United States."

323

Wolpert, Stanley. SECOND YEAR OF THE JUNE WAR. Nation, v. 206, June 3, 1968: 726-729. AP2.N2, v. 206

The combination of Russian arms and terrorist action makes the recurrence of war in the Middle East highly probable, but the continuance of international negotiations offers encouragement. If Nasser should retire from public life, Hussein could take the initiative in achieving rapprochement with Israel. Such a settlement could result in the return of captured portions of the West Bank--excluding Jerusalem and several strategic outposts--recognition of Israel, a cooperative program between Jordan and Israel for economic development, a demilitarized Gaza, international control of Sinai and the Golan Heights, and international guarantee of free passage through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba. The U.S. promise of military support for Hussein should be contingent on peaceful negotiations and official Jordanian action to

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end terrorism by El-Fatah. Also, the United States should initiate a Soviet-U.S. summit conference to discuss "pacification" of the Middle East.

### B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

#### 1. Escalation

#### 2. Conventional Arms Transfers

324

Baker, Ross K. SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TROPICAL AFRICA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military Review, v. 48, July 1968: 76-81. illus.  
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Surveys the record of Soviet military assistance to Somalia, Mali, Tanzania, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, and Nigeria. Baker reports that, prior to the civil war in Nigeria, Soviet aid to tropical Africa was small and about equal to that of the United States to the same region. This was so primarily because tropical African states, even with outside assistance, are unable to muster the funds and technical competence to acquire and maintain modern weapons. Other reasons for the low level of aid were the reliance of most of these states on their former colonial rulers for assistance and the generally low political priority of the region for both superpowers. Domestic political pressures are likely to further reduce U.S. military assistance to this area, but Soviet aid, in competition with that of the British, French, and Chinese, is almost certain to expand considerably.

325

Gebhardt, Hermann P. [COMPLEX ARMAMENTS PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA] Komplexe Rüstungsprobleme in Lateinamerika. Aussenpolitik, v. 19, Apr. 1968: 220-229. D839.A885, v. 19

Identifies the forces contributing to the Latin American arms race. Gebhardt considers the international, especially French-American, competition in arms sales to individual Latin American countries and describes abortive Brazilian-French efforts to turn Brasilia into "Latin America's nuclear capital." The prudent U.S. policy in regard to supplying nuclear fuel to foreign countries accounts for the failure of these efforts, which were partly responsible for Brazil's opposition to the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

326

Hoagland, John H. ARMS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD. Orbis, v. 12, spring 1968: 167-184.  
D839.O68, v. 12

"Based on a paper prepared for the Ninth Annual Conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies, on The Implications of Military Technology in the 1970's, held at Elsinore, Denmark, in September 1967."

Quantifies the distribution of major items of military equipment--small arms, combat aircraft, and guided missiles--by the industrial nations to developing countries. The international arms market "provides a tacit but clear major-power endorsement of military conflict . . . in the developing world" and produces social, political, and economic effects in underdeveloped areas that no one really understands. Hoagland notes that the same major powers that made a conflict possible usually join in common appeals for a cease-

fire. This has occurred not only in the Near East but in the Horn of Africa, where both superpowers were involved in competitive buildups in the Somali Republic and Ethiopia. The author believes a greater international effort must be made to measure the scope of arms traffic and calculate its present and future effects on international security. Until then it will be difficult to confirm or deny the suspicion shared by political observers that the international arms market represents a net loss in international stability.

327

Kreker, Hans-Justus. [NIGERIA'S CIVIL WAR--AN AFRICAN TRAGEDY] Nigerias Bürgerkrieg--eine afrikanische Tragödie. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Aug. 1968: 412-414. map. U3.W396, v. 17

Discusses Soviet, British, French, and Portuguese involvement in the Nigerian civil war by supplying arms to the warring parties. Kreker stresses Soviet military support and propaganda for the Nigerian Government's operations against Biafra.

328

Leapman, Michael. THE WAR IN NIGERIA. Socialist commentary, Aug. 1968: 22-23.  
HX3.S74, 1968

If the Biafrans are defeated they will resort to guerrilla warfare, thus frustrating British aims of restoring stability. "One Nigeria" is unattainable, but a compromise solution giving Biafrans a large measure of autonomy, while maintaining close economic and other ties with the rest of Nigeria, might be negotiated. But the Biafrans will not accept Britain as a "disinterested mediator" until the British Government ceases its shipment of arms to the Nigerian Federal Government.

329

Milsche, Ferdinand O. THE ARMS RACE IN THE THIRD WORLD. Orbis, v. 12, spring 1968: 161-166.  
D839.O68, v. 12

The uncontrolled arms race in the Third World seriously threatens the peace of the world. Military assistance to underdeveloped countries is wasteful and provokes political tensions that hinder economic and social progress. Russian arms shipments to strategically located Third World countries that are in no way threatened by the Western powers "have a clearly offensive character because their volume goes beyond the needs of a defensive posture." U.S. arms policy seeks only to counterbalance this military aid and maintain the balance of power between hostile neighbors. Only an agreement between the superpowers can put an end to the worldwide arms race and begin to relax the international tensions resulting from it.

330

Schaar, Stuart H. THE ARMS RACE AND DEFENSE STRATEGY IN NORTH AFRICA. New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1967. 25 p. (American Universities Field Staff. Reports service; North Africa series, v. 13, no. 9) DT181.A7, v. 13

Reports the Tunisian and Moroccan reactions to the Algerian arms buildup. With the \$200 million in Soviet military aid it received during the past 5 years, Algeria has built up a military force that completely outclasses Tunisia's and gives it at least a 6-to-1 lead over Morocco. Although Algeria is now capable of mobilizing only a small percentage of its arsenal for

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warfare, defense strategists in Tunisia and Morocco fear it may become a real threat within 3 or 4 years. Tunisia has responded to the Algerian military program by attempting to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the two countries through diplomatic negotiations and by embarking on a military modernization program and encouraging increased civilian involvement in the nation's defense. King Hassan of Morocco is attempting to narrow the quantitative armaments lead that the Algerians enjoy and is organizing a mass mobilization program similar to the Tunisian plan.

### 3. Nuclear Proliferation

331

AUSTRALIAN DOUBTS ON THE TREATY [by] X. Quadrant, v. 12, May/June 1968: 30-34.

AP7.Q8, v. 12

The purposes of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) are admirable but unrealistic. Furthermore, the treaty is an attempt to negate history by depriving the nonnuclear powers of their rights to share fully in the growing benefits of the atomic age. The term "manufacture" in articles 1 and 2 is not defined, leaving open the possibility that every activity relating to nuclear technology--no matter how tenuous the relation or pacific the purposes--will be drawn into the treaty's net. Article 3, which grants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) responsibility for applying the safeguards, offers even greater opportunity for widespread intervention in Australian domestic affairs. Reliance on the IAEA converts the treaty into a blank check for international control over the Australian economy and defense establishment. The treaty does permit withdrawal by a state when "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized (its) supreme interests," but this is certain to be an awkward undertaking. Then again, although three of the current nuclear powers have given security assurances within the U.N. framework to the nonnuclear-weapon states, in the last analysis these are no more to be relied upon than any other U.N. assurance or guarantee. Nor would ratification of the treaty bring Australia great benefits from the use of nuclear explosives for civil engineering projects, since these are largely precluded by the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. If the NPT were capable of achieving the purposes of its promoters it would be of inestimable value to the world. But since it is doomed to be ineffective, while at the same time it threatens the nonnuclear weapon powers with "economic, technological, and military bondage," it is not in Australia's interest to become a party to the treaty in its present form.

332

Bull, Hedley. IN SUPPORT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. Quadrant, v. 12, May/June 1968: 25-29.

AP7.Q8, v. 12

Australia is in a dilemma: if it rejects the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) it will become a pariah of international society and this would disrupt its relations with Great Britain and the United States; but if it signs the NPT it might forfeit its security in its relations with such potential nuclear powers as Japan, India, and Indonesia. Australia recognizes that nuclear proliferation is dangerous and that the NPT does help to deal with the problem: the NPT furnishes a framework by which pairs or groups of rival states can provide one another with assurances about their politico-military intentions and helps keep these countries in a nonnu-

clear frame of mind and it creates a legal inhibition against going nuclear. However, the NPT does not prevent the construction of plutonium-producing nuclear reactors and, rather than restrict nations' nuclear capabilities, works on their wills "to keep them in the frame of mind where they won't want to take up the options that increasingly they will have." Despite the NPT's shortcomings, Australia must support the treaty not only to maximize the security of the international community but to ensure the regional security of Asia and the Pacific. Although Australia should not sign a treaty that "is likely from the start to be a dead duck," it should demonstrate a positive interest to help the NPT become effective and get underway.

333

Bull, Hedley. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA. Australian Outlook, v. 22, Aug. 1968: 162-175.

DU80.A947, v. 22

Examines the arguments for and against Australian adherence to the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Bull concludes that Australia "should adopt a generally favourable attitude towards the Treaty." Australia's interest in halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons and in supporting U.S.-Soviet political and diplomatic cooperation outweighs the slight military and economic disadvantages imposed by the treaty. On the other hand, in making its final decision Australia must consider whether the treaty is likely to acquire enough signatures to enter into force and whether it will get the signatures of those states whose adherence Australia considers to be a condition for its own adherence.

334

Cockcroft, Sir John D. THE PERILS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. In: Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 30-42.

U104.C155 1968

Since a number of nonnuclear-weapon states may soon be capable of launching a nuclear weapons program, steps should be taken immediately to curtail nuclear-weapons proliferation. Atomic bombs can be made from plutonium, and by 1971 seven nations that do not now possess nuclear weapons will be producing a sizable amount of plutonium as a natural byproduct of nuclear reactors operated for peaceful purposes. Moreover, some of these countries will have the financial resources to invest in the costly facilities needed for the development, production, and delivery of atomic weapons systems. An increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear arsenals is dangerous for it would substantially enlarge the risk of global nuclear war. Smaller countries armed with nuclear weapons might not develop the sophisticated command and control systems needed to minimize the danger of accidental war and might be tempted to use them irresponsibly. Because of the high costs and risks of nuclear-weapons proliferation, both the nuclear and nonnuclear powers must cooperate in the conclusion of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Nonnuclear-weapon states must be convinced that a treaty would not hinder their development of civilian power programs nor jeopardize commercial secrets. The five nuclear powers should encourage other countries to reject nuclear weapons by reducing their own nuclear arsenals.

# V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

335

Cousins, Norman. HOW NOT TO PUT OUT A FIRE [editorial] Saturday review, v. 51, Sept. 28, 1968: 28. Z1219, S25, v. 51

Proposals urging rejection of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in retaliation for Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia show little understanding of the need for arms control. The treaty might forestall a nuclear flareup in the Middle East, and it sets the stage for further attempts to reduce nuclear stockpiles and focuses on the problem of achieving safety at a time when the security of nations depends on controlling or eliminating force. The treaty does have severe limitations--nations possessing nuclear weapons are not required to relinquish them or to limit their further manufacture--and further discussions are needed to abolish nuclear weapons completely. However the major powers' unwillingness to relinquish national sovereignty presents an obstacle. Nations must realize that preoccupations with national power are antiquated; what one gives up may contribute more to security than what one stockpiles.

336

Diesel, Jürgen. [NEGOTIATIONS ON A TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE FALL 1966] Die Verhandlungen über den Kernwaffen-Sperrvertrag seit Herbst 1966. Europa-Archiv, v. 23, Apr. 25, 1968: 295-302. D839, E66, v. 23

Describes the positions taken by various delegations at the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the proposed provisions of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

337

Dorn, Armin. [INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR OPTION] Indien und die nukleare Option. Wehrkunde, v. 17, Aug. 1968: 401-404. U3, W396, v. 17

Points out India's autarkic plutonium policy, aimed at enabling the nation to produce up to 100 atom bombs per year. Even as a nuclear-weapon state India would not be able to counterbalance Red China strategically and would therefore have to give up its present no-alliance policy.

338

DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TO THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, MARCH 11, 1968. American journal of international law, v. 62, July 1968: 817-822. LL  
"Annex I of Report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, March 11, 1968 (Doc. 7072)."

Text of the draft treaty, which would prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons and explosives by nuclear-weapon parties to nonnuclear-weapon states. It would bar nonnuclear-weapon parties from receiving such weapons and materials and would subject the peaceful use of fissile materials by nonnuclear-weapon parties to international control and safeguards, to prevent such materials from being diverted for nuclear weapons. The treaty would also set forth the "inalienable right" of all parties for peaceful nuclear activities.

339

Einhorn, Cläre. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. German foreign policy, v. 7, no. 4, 1968: 275-282. DD261.4, D353, v. 7

States that "the development of the relation of power between socialism and imperialism" now makes possible East-West disarmament agreements and a treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Einhorn describes West German obstructionism in regard to the proposed nonproliferation treaty, outlines the history of relevant negotiations by the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament, emphasizes the German Democratic Republic's contributions to the Committee's work, and considers major provisions of the draft treaty.

340

Farrell, N. V. NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In New Zealand. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs review, v. 18, May 1968: 49-51. JX1591, A35, v. 18

New Zealand's Representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations outlines the nonproliferation treaty and calls for its support from all nations. Ambassador Farrell concedes that, although the ideal world is one where no power possesses nuclear weapons, the international community must accept the "nuclear five." The choice is between holding the figure at five or seeing it climb to 10, 15, or even 20. He concludes that the treaty will not make the world safe and secure; however it is an indispensable first step toward future nuclear-weapons control.

341

Foster, William C. THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY: A PREVENTIVE AND A POSITIVE MEASURE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, June 24, 1968: 836-838. JX232, A33, v. 58

"Address made before a luncheon sponsored by 'Nuclear Week in New York' at New York, N. Y., on May 23, 1968.

Responds to economic and political objections to the nonproliferation treaty. Foster argues that, far from hindering the peaceful application of nuclear energy in nonnuclear-weapon states, the nonproliferation treaty will do much to promote it. Economically, the treaty will also be beneficial to the United States. But Foster puts primary emphasis on the significance of the treaty as a further step toward more far-reaching arms control agreements. He states that the treaty will be ineffective unless it is followed within a reasonable time by other measures such as an agreement regulating the arms race between the superpowers. He argues that the logic of nuclear armaments points inexorably in the direction of agreement and declares himself encouraged by recent Soviet statements on this issue.

342

Goldberg, Arthur J. UNITED STATES DISCUSSES SECURITY ASSURANCES AND DRAFT NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, June 10, 1968: 755-761. JX232, A33, v. 58

Statement delivered in the General Assembly's Political and Security Committee by the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, which outlines annex B of the 18-Nation Committee's report on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and defends the treaty's prohibition against

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the development of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Ambassador Goldberg asserts that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have united in support of annex B, despite their views on other matters, and "consider that their respective vital national interests demand that there shall be no nuclear aggression . . . from any quarter." He clarifies the peaceful uses of nuclear energy provisions in the treaty, noting they do not restrict nonnuclear-weapon states from enjoying the benefits of nuclear technology and research.

343  
Hoarner, Craig. THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY--AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY. In American Security Council. Washington report, Sept. 9, 1968: 1-4.  
P&G PR

The nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) assumes that nuclear spread is bad and that concessions must be made to prohibit it. But there "can be a price in terms of concessions too high to pay for" even a treaty with absolute guarantees against spread, and the United States did pay a high price for concessions made for the NPT. Specific criticisms of the treaty point to its disruptive effect on NATO and its alienation of allies who desire more integration of mutual nuclear defenses. The treaty requires that the United States surrender its option to selectively proliferate defensive nuclear systems to allies in critical situations; encourages countries to "go nuclear on their own," thereby acquiring not only arsenals usable for defense but also for offense; and eliminates the "soothing effect" that the limited spread of independent nuclear weapons could have "in certain tinderbox areas"; i.e., the Indo-Chinese border. Further, the treaty provides no effective safeguards to enforce its signer's promises; nations' pledges not to make H-bombs are left up to side agreements to be negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Because the NPT's failure is inevitable, the United States should be calculating the status of the world "with a somewhat larger Nuclear Club and be devising ways to live with it." But in spite of the treaty's defects the United States has made heavy commitments to induce nonnuclear nations to sign. By assuring support to nonnuclear nations threatened with nuclear blackmail, the administration has increased security commitments "about two and one-half times over our present nuclear . . . burden being carried for forty nations under existing treaties." As safeguards against the NPT's consequences, the United States should define the limits of its obligation: to defend cosigners against nuclear aggression and continuously monitor not only proliferation possibilities but also adverse consequences of the treaty. The United States should also start negotiations to amend the NPT's safeguards provisions, improve their quality and provide financing, and adopt a firm policy against possible deterioration of the U.S. strategic nuclear position.

344  
Huglin, Henry C. PERSPECTIVE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 48, Aug. 1968: 41-50.  
Z6723.U35, v. 48

Nuclear weapons have been the major bulwark of Western freedom in a postwar world menaced by Communist expansionism. Yet these same weapons threaten mankind with total nuclear destruction, and understandably men seek to bring them under firm control. Armaments are not themselves the cause of war;

indeed in some circumstances they may offer the best available means for averting violence, and arms control negotiators will have to take this into account. The superpowers have succeeded in eliminating the danger of accidental or spasmodic war, but the nuclear proliferation peril grows apace. The one significant attempt to deal with this problem, the nonproliferation treaty, is seriously defective. The United States can encourage wider acceptance of the treaty by adopting policies that will remove, or at least reduce, incentives that might tempt some states into acquiring nuclear weapons of their own. As to those nations that persist in refusing to sign the treaty, the United States should apply whatever sanctions necessary, short of force, to convince them to open their nuclear installations to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. If the United States and other concerned countries fail to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, America will have no choice but to continue its primary reliance on its armed strength. At the same time, however, it must continue to press for sound and enforceable arms control agreements and work to eliminate the major causes of war.

345  
Inglis, David R. NUCLEAR THREATS, ABM SYSTEMS, AND PROLIFERATION. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, June 1968: 2-4.  
TK9145.A84, v. 24

Doctrine and practice have converged in the notion that under the strategic nuclear umbrella national interests can be advanced by conventional "brush-fire wars." The United States is now committed to such a war in Vietnam. The precarious military situation at Khe Sanh a few months ago raised fears that the United States would be provoked into using nuclear weapons. The administration's refusal to state unequivocally that tactical nuclear weapons would not be used amounted to a veiled threat against the Vietnamese and was short-sighted and foolish. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should be high on the list of national priorities, but if nuclear weapons are used to threaten nonnuclear powers, it becomes advantageous to these states to obtain a nuclear deterrent of their own. To avoid this consequence the United States should retract its implied nuclear threat against North Vietnam and firmly renounce the use of nuclear weapons against any nonnuclear state. However, this is insufficient. Some way must be found to gain the adherence of the "almost nuclear" states to the nonproliferation treaty. The problem is how to convince the U.S. and Soviet governments to adopt the kind of foreign policy restraint that will encourage the nonnuclear states to forgo the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The U.S. decision to deploy an ABM system was a step in the wrong direction. Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is an attainable goal only if the United States is willing to defer deployment of the ABM system as a first step in halting the arms race with the Soviet Union.

346  
Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S., and Dean Rusk. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY TRANSMITTED TO THE SENATE FOR ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION. In U.S. Dept. of State Department of State bulletin, v. 59, July 29, 1968: 126-134.  
JX232.A3, v. 59

Texts of the Presidential message transmitting the proposed nonproliferation treaty to the U.S. Senate, together with the Secretary of State's accompanying

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letter of transmittal and his statement in support of the treaty made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on July 10, 1968. All three documents urge prompt Senate ratification of the treaty. In his letter of transmittal, Secretary Rusk reviews the major steps in negotiating the treaty and clarifies the meaning of each of its articles.

347

Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S. A TESTAMENT TO REASON. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 58, July 1, 1968: 1-2.

JX232, A33, v. 59

Address "made before the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, N.Y., on June 12," 1968.

Remarks on the occasion of the adoption of a General Assembly resolution commending the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. President Johnson pledges himself to push for rapid ratification of the treaty by his own and other nations so that the treaty can enter into force at the earliest possible date. He commits the United States to carry out its responsibilities under the treaty. But the President puts his greatest stress on the urgent need to press forward to find ways "to halt and to reverse the buildup of nuclear arsenals" and "to eliminate the threat of conventional conflicts that might grow into nuclear disaster."

348

Klefsch, Johannes W. [EFFECTS OF THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Die Wirkung des Atomsperrvertrags. Atomzeiter, June/July 1968. 366-373. P&GPRR

The McMahon Act of 1946, which bars the United States from passing the means and the know-how of nuclear-arms production to other nations, was the earliest ovule of the present nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Since then, spread of technological knowledge has undermined that ban; only costs or political considerations now prevent many nonnuclear-weapon states from embarking on the production of nuclear weapons. Associated with the treaty, the U.N. Security Council's guarantee to nonnuclear-weapon signatories against nuclear threat and blackmail signifies the price the nuclear-weapon powers who sponsor the treaty are willing to pay for its success. Moreover, unless smaller states cause these powers to begin nuclear disarmament, the guarantee has merely declaratory value. If the arms race between the nuclear powers continues, the working of the treaty will depend on the variable strategic conditions under which those powers will have to conduct their state policies. As long as each superpower's defense system remains disproportionate to its counterpart's offense system, an all-out confrontation between the two powers is unlikely. Geo-strategic and organizational considerations also speak against direct conventional or subconventional war. But their use of third nations in their competitive world game and the higher sophistication of weaponry may cause numerous crises of far more devastating potential than those that occurred in the late forties and early fifties. Herein lies the main danger when a nonnuclear-weapon state allies itself with a nuclear-weapon one. Apparently the only means to check the terrorist tendencies of the superpower would be a threat by smaller nations to arm themselves nuclearly or to increase their nuclear armaments. No safeguard exists against a world power's nuclear attack on a third state except the potential world political consequences, which themselves might be an adequate deterrent.

349

THE LONG ROAD TO NON-PROLIFERATION [editorial] Swiss review of world affairs, v. 18, Aug. 1968: 1-3. D839, S2, v. 18

Switzerland, like many other nonnuclear-weapon countries, has reservations about signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Although Russia and the United States have attempted to accommodate some of the demands of the nonnuclear powers by issuing a declaration of security guarantees and revising the original treaty to broaden the opportunities for peaceful applications of atomic energy by nonnuclear powers, the treaty is still basically one-sided in favor of the nuclear powers and leaves many questions unanswered regarding inspection arrangements. Moreover, revision of the treaty will be very difficult since changes can be made only at intervals of 5 years and must be approved by all the nuclear powers and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The situation is further complicated for Switzerland because the Swiss people have voted twice against renouncing nuclear weapons, and according to the Swiss Constitution the treaty must be submitted for popular approval. "To balance the many reservations there are only vague hopes of further steps toward disarmament." Yet Switzerland does not want to risk isolation and suspicion by hastily rejecting the treaty. It will await the decisions of the U.S. Senate and the nations with the technological potential for developing nuclear weapons before acting on the treaty.

350

Mishra, Indu Shekhar. THE NPT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR INDIA. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 24, June 1968: 4-5. TK9145, A84, v. 24

The nonproliferation treaty benefits only the superpowers. Furthermore, it will never be effective because no state that intends to procure nuclear weapons will agree to the inspection procedures. The only hope for peace is for all countries to adopt "live and let live" foreign policies, thus putting an end to mutual fear. Security assurances are meaningless, since the big powers have a record of not fulfilling their commitments to smaller states and in general act in such a way as to force others to look to their own resources. Of course, all well-meaning people favor a nonproliferation treaty, recognizing that the usual arguments against one are fallacious. But in the developing countries public opinion overwhelmingly supports "going nuclear" and governments have difficulty resisting this pressure. If the treaty is to be accepted the superpowers must find a way to include China and then agree to dump their nuclear weapons into the sea. This would eliminate the great fear of China and demonstrate the superpowers' sincerity about arms control. It is unfortunate that these really simple problems have not been turned over to the scientists and engineers, but these men continue to be "exploited by selfish and power hungry politicians."

351

THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND GERMANY. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Aug./Sept. 1968: 227-250. DB200, I, S74, v. 16

An enquiry on the nonproliferation treaty signed by the USA and the Soviet Union. Its purpose is to disclose the danger to the security of the non-nuclear states, 30 of which are conferring in Geneva on the treaty, and to show the possibility of hampering the peaceful use of atomic energy through a misuse of the

treaty. In the USA there have likewise been a number of voices warning against the treaty, such as that of the well-known atomic physicist, Edward Teller, "father of the hydrogen bomb." The Federal Republic of Germany is the only state in the world to have solemnly refused to produce atomic weapons as well as bacteriological and chemical weapons, and may not sign the pact until the question of guaranty has been clarified by both signatories. Doubts about entering into the treaty and as to the agreement's latent dangers have been expressed in this issue of the Journal by the Federal Minister for Scientific Research, Dr. Stoltenberg; Federal Minister of Finances, Dr. Strauss; the Dutch Lieutenant-General, M. Broekmeijer; Bonn's Parliamentary State-Secretary Karl Theodor von Guttenberg; Professor Walter Hallstein; Professor S. Possony (U.S.A.); Lt-Col F. O. Miksche (France); member of the Bonn Bundestag, Ernst Paul, and Editor-in-Chief of *Aussenpolitik*, Dr. H. Bechtold. (Abstract supplied)

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**NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS NOW A REALITY.** In *Federation of American Scientists*. F.A.S. newsletter, v. 21, June 1968: 1-2.

Q11. F422, v. 21

Summary of the main provisions of the nonproliferation treaty and a chronology of related developments from mid-April to mid-July 1968.

353

**NONPROLIFERATION TREATY SIGNED BY 56 NATIONS AT WHITE HOUSE CEREMONY.** In *U.S. Dept. of State*. Department of State bulletin, no. 59, July 22, 1968: 85-88. JX232, A33, v. 59

Remarks by President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Ambassadors Patrick Dean and Anatoliy Dobrynin on the occasion of the signing of the nonproliferation treaty. All agreed that the treaty was a valuable step toward world peace and security.

354

**[THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY THREATENS TO DISLOCATE EURATOM]** Le traité de non-prolifération risque de disloquer l'Euratom [by] H. S. Europa, v. 35, Sept. 1968: 5-6. illus.

P&GP RR

A résumé of Felix Oboussier's exposé which maintains that the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) contradicts the Euratom treaty on several points, notably inspection and verification. Oboussier indicates that ratification of the NPT and acceptance of its inspection provisions by the five nonnuclear-weapon states of the Common Market would not only invalidate essential clauses of the Euratom treaty but would create an intolerable inequality of treatment between these nations and France, which would not have to submit to any control. Indeed, the five states would be subject to a double control, that of Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, ratification would create a privileged French nuclear industry, free of all external controls, that would eventually destroy the Euratom community. Oboussier concludes that the NPT must not replace the Euratom treaty with respect to verification and that the judicial conflict between the two treaties on this point is far from being resolved.

355

Ruggieri, Nicholas. **THE 6-YEAR ROAD TO A HISTORIC TREATY.** In *U.S. Dept. of State*. News letter, no. 87, July 1968: 4-6.

JX1. U542, 1968

Chronology of events leading to the General Assembly's approval of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, from its beginning as a U.N. General Assembly resolution in 1961 to the commendation of the revised treaty in 1968 by the U.N. Political Committee and approval by the General Assembly. When the Security Council finally adopted a resolution upholding security guarantees for nonnuclear states, "six years of painstaking deliberation marked by initiative and hesitation, retreat and advance, objection and compromise" came to a close.

356

Sacher, Wilhelm. **[THE STATE AND THE WORLD OF STATES AT THE CROSSROADS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY]** Staat und Staatenwelt am Scheideweg: Überlegungen zum Atomwaffensperrvertrag. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau; Zeitschrift für die europäische Sicherheit, v. 18, Aug. 1968: 421-441.

U3. W485, v. 18

"Article will continue."

As long as nuclear-weapon states are not under a clear and concrete treaty obligation to disarm themselves, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty will be ineffective in its *raison d'être*, the prevention of nuclear war. The proposed treaty would institutionalize in international law a hegemony of nuclear-weapon states over nonnuclear-weapon ones and tend to deprive the latter of the inalienable right to decide on the "security of their own physical existence." Articles 1 through 3--which prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons and explosives to nonnuclear-weapon states, forbid such parties to accept such materials, and subject them to international control--constitute the treaty's substance. All other articles are merely sedatives for nonnuclear-weapon states to accept its discriminatory provisions. The complexity of matters dealt with by the treaty calls for separate analyses of its contents from the standpoints of jurisprudence, political science, the psychology of nations, and state ethics. A legal analysis of the treaty shows that it undermines the axioms on which the philosophy of state and the law of nations base their structures. General international law is based on sovereign states all equal in law, and statehood depends on the effectiveness of sovereignty. A sovereign state cannot renounce a weapon without which it would become politically and militarily helpless. The treaty contravenes the United Nations Charter inasmuch as it establishes "discriminatory class-order . . . the world of states." A political analysis of the treaty raises serious doubts as to its viability in the Hobbesian world it would further. Some argue that such discriminatory class order would reduce the chances of nuclear war, but this is not valid since such danger now comes mainly from the big powers, not from the nonnuclear-weapon states. After all, if it were not for the superpowers' veto of peaceful change in China, Germany, Korea, Vietnam, and Israel, the problem of division that plagues each of these nations and the world would already have been solved.

357

Shestov, V. **MAJOR SUCCESS FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE.** *International affairs* (Moscow) Aug. 1968: 3-9. D839. I465, 1968



## V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

An interpretation of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Soviet Union's Memorandum on Some Urgent Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament, submitted to the United Nations on July 1, 1968. Shestov asserts that the treaty is proof that states belonging to different social systems can find solutions for international problems concerning the vital interests of mankind. The treaty will strengthen the security of the nonnuclear countries and should be signed by all because it is a very important step to complete and general disarmament.

358

SIGNING THE TREATY [editorial] New republic, v. 159, Sept. 28, 1968: 7-8. AP2. N624, v. 159

Although the nonproliferation treaty fails to restrict many facets of the arms race, it at least represents a significant step in the direction of arms control, and its defeat by the U.S. Senate would be a serious setback to further disarmament negotiations. Even a delay in Senate ratification is harmful, for it would discredit American diplomats and offer encouragement to key opponents of the treaty, such as India and West Germany. Contrary to the belief of some Senators, postponement of action on the treaty is not a particularly effective means of chastising the Russians for their intervention in Czechoslovakia. The treaty is principally an American project and does not substantially "impress Krenilin realists." Because the treaty only inhibits the activities of nonnuclear nations the Russians agreed to cosponsor it but "with a shrug of the shoulders." Yearning for a personal monument of his contribution to world peace, President Johnson is avidly urging the immediate approval of the treaty. While acceptance of the nonproliferation treaty will not make up for Johnson's lack of forceful initiatives in all other aspects of arms control, the treaty should be gratefully accepted by the Senate as a small but meaningful advancement toward world peace and security.

359

Skowroński, Andrzej. NON-PROLIFERATION AND POLAND. Polish perspective, v. 11, July 1968: 11-16. DK401. P7947, v. 11

As a longtime advocate of regional denuclearization, Poland enthusiastically welcomed the conclusion of a draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Not only does the draft treaty represent a significant step toward broader disarmament goals but it also may prevent West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons and could promote regional disarmament agreements, including the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Although 10 years ago the Western Powers rejected Poland's suggestion for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, the majority of the Western countries are now beginning to recognize the merit of the proposal. As revised in 1964 the Polish plan calls for all participants to agree not to produce or import nuclear weapons and asks the nuclear powers to promise to freeze, at existing levels, their nuclear arsenals deployed in the area covered by the agreements. Since the nonproliferation treaty could pave the way to easing tensions in Europe through regional arrangements, it should be adopted without delay.

360

Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands. Zentralkomitee. [FROM WILLI STOPHS REPORT ON THE

MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY HELD ON MARCH 6 AND 7, 1968, IN SOFIA] Aus dem Bericht Willi Stophs über die Tagung des Politischen Beratenden Ausschusses der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 6. und 7. März 1968 in Sofia. Dokumentation der Zeit; Informations-Archiv, v. 20, no. 405, 1968: 37-38.

DD261. D4, v. 20

Excerpts from a report to the 5th plenum of the Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee, held on Mar. 21, 1968. Reprinted from the Mar. 22, 1968, issue of Neues Deutschland.

West Germany's "claim to sole representation of the German Democratic Republic"; its refusal to recognize existing boundaries, declare the Munich Agreement null and void, and negotiate a mutual renunciation of the use of force with the German Democratic Republic; as well as its continued efforts to include West Berlin in the German Federal Republic and its ambitions in the area of nuclear weapons—all this undermines Bonn's Eastern policy as a continuation of its aggressive plans. Bonn's reluctance to support the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty can be explained by its present building of an autarkic nuclear-fuel cycle in West Germany that will enable it to produce nuclear weapons on its own. The Warsaw Treaty Organization's most important task now is to prevent West Germany from ever "acquiring access to nuclear weapons." Therefore the Sofia meeting strongly supported the nonproliferation treaty, which would contribute to European security. It also supported proposals by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam for a just solution of the Vietnamese question.

361

Tanaka, Ken. PACIFIC HYSTERIA. Far Eastern economic review, v. 60, June 20, 1968: 609-610. HC411. F18, v. 60

Although Japan has proved it can develop an atom bomb, the strong anti-nuclear-arms sentiment will probably deter its entry into the nuclear-arms race. But attitudes toward an arms buildup and expansion of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have changed, as shown by the present 5-year defense buildup program. The most important aspects of the program are its qualitative rather than quantitative expansion and the boost it gives to Japanese industry. Japan has supported the U.S.-Soviet resolution on nuclear nonproliferation but intends to maintain its security nevertheless.

362

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY COMMENDS TREATY ON THE NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, July 1, 1968: 3-11. JX232. A33, v. 59

Statements by U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in Committee I (Political and Security) and in plenary session of the General Assembly, along with the text of an Assembly resolution of June 12, 1968, commending the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In his statement in Committee I, Goldberg comments on Committee revisions to the draft resolution and draft treaty that relate to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, measures to halt the arms race, and security assurances and reviews the safeguards provisions of the draft treaty. In his plenary

session remarks, Goldberg states the U.S. view that the accession clause of article IX, which opens the treaty to "all states," does not "affect the recognition or status of an unrecognized regime or entity which may elect to file an instrument of accession to the non-proliferation treaty." The United States, he says, reserves the right to object if "an unrecognized entity should seek to assert privileges such as participating in a conference called under articles VIII or X of the treaty."

363

UN POLITICAL COMMITTEE APPROVES "NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY UNDER US-SOVIET MANIPULATION. Survey of China mainland press, no. 4200, June 18, 1968: 24-27.

Micro 01327

Hsin hua tung hsin shé [New China News Agency] release, English, Peking, June 12, 1968.

DS777.55.H656, 1968

In manipulating U.N. approval for the so-called nuclear nonproliferation treaty the U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists have taken another step in their unlawful collaboration against the revolutionary peoples of the world. Under the guise of the treaty the American imperialists and their Soviet lackeys hope to preserve their nuclear monopoly and continue their nuclear blackmail policies. By offering protection to those nonnuclear countries that support the treaty, the two outlaws are attempting to isolate the Chinese people and vilify China's great nuclear achievements. A product of big power politics, the treaty "is detrimental to the sovereignty and dignity of other countries." Confronted by spreading decay in the capitalist world and the Soviet revisionist bloc the U.S. outlaws and Soviet renegades colluded in railroading the treaty through the United Nations in a last-ditch attempt to save themselves from their inevitable doom. However, far from helping them, the treaty merely demonstrates the unsavory ambitions of the American aggressors and the Soviet betrayal of revolutionary interests.

364

Willrich, Mason. THE TREATY ON NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CONFRONTS WORLD POLITICS. Yale Law Journal, v. 77, July 1968: 1447-1519.

LI.

A detailed legal commentary to the draft "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," recommended on June 12, 1968, by the U.N. General Assembly after the draft was adopted by the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. Willrich analyzes at length the existing and potential differences in interpretation of the treaty provisions and assesses their major implications for the future. He doubts that the safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities provided by the treaty can alone prevent their diversion to nuclear weapons programs if a nonnuclear-weapon party is really determined to start such a program. Thus, the challenge to the international system presented by continuing nuclear innovation will need to be met by further structural innovation in that system. The commentary is preceded by an outline of technological prerequisites for a nuclear capability and by a description of the existing international legal framework affecting nonproliferation.

4. Other (Accidental War, Command and Control of Weapons, etc.)

365

Brandt, Willy. BEYOND THE ATOMIC NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: WAYS TO PEACE FOR A WORLD UNDER ARMS. In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-). Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, a weekly survey of German affairs, v. 18, Sept. 10, 1968: suppl. 1-4. DD259.A35, v. 18

Address presented on Sept. 3, 1968, by West German Foreign Minister Willy Brandt before a conference of nonnuclear-weapon countries in Geneva.

Emphasizes the tremendous security problems confronting the nonnuclear-weapon states and stresses the importance of international cooperation in the field of arms control. In order to safeguard the sovereignty of all states, Brandt urged the prohibition of actual or threatened aggression by any type of weapon. While staunchly opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons he advocated that the benefits of peaceful uses of atomic energy be shared by all nations. He reviewed West Germany's past efforts to ease tensions in Europe and reaffirmed its support of arms reduction measures on the Continent.

366

CAN BIOLOGICAL WAR BE STOPPED? Nature, v. 219, Aug. 17, 1968: 665-666.

Q1.N2, v. 219

Great Britain's recent proposals on the control of chemical and biological weapons were motivated in part by domestic politics, but this should not be allowed to obscure their real significance. These proposals have the merit of going much beyond the Geneva Protocol of 1925, while at the same time avoiding any temptation to replace it. The Protocol has become an international institution and should be preserved. The British suggest that the disarmament conference concentrate first on getting biologicals under control. This is a sensible idea, but a second suggestion that agreements might be policed informally by the international scientific community is not, there being no evidence to suggest that scientists as a group have either the knowledge or the inclination to act collectively as an international inspection agency. The problems of verification are not insurmountable, but even an unpoliced agreement would be worthwhile. Consideration of chemical and biological warfare cannot be detached from the more frightening possibility of nuclear war. Because of the technical sophistication required to wage chemical or biological war, it is likely that these agents will be deployed only by states already possessing nuclear weapons, and this reduces greatly the possibility that they will ever be used. The nuclear balance of terror operates here and is still the most effective way to avoid war.

367

Hokawa, Chihito. MISCALCULATIONS IN DETERRENT POLICY: JAPANESE-U.S. RELATIONS, 1938-1941. Journal of peace research, no. 2, 1968: 97-115.

ASJ.26, 1968

Notes: p. 112-115

This article explores an action-reaction process which occurred between Japan and the U.S. in the years preceding World War II, focusing on the U.S. imposition of economic sanctions. It maintains that these sanctions failed to deter the Japanese from pursuing their expansionist policy, and instead stimulated

## V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

Japan's southward expansion and even its determination to go to war with the U.S. Miscalculations of the deterrent policy are ascribed to lack of understanding of the hard-line faction within the U.S. Government as to the structure of Japan's foreign policy decision-making, and the psychology of the Japanese, in particular the military. (Abstract supplied)

368

Huey, Sam L. UNITED STATES STRIKE COMMAND: "HAVE COMM, WILL TRAVEL." Signal, v. 22, Aug. 1968: 30-32, 38-40, illus.

UGI, M65, v. 22

Explores the organization and strategic responsibilities of the U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) and the role of its Communication Support Element (CSE). USSTRICOM is one of seven unified commands operating directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The commander-in-chief of USSTRICOM (CINCSTRIKE) is responsible for contingency operations in the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, and South Asia (MEAFSA) and augmentation of other unified commands as directed by the JCS. To meet any threat in his area CINCSTRIKE has at his disposal combat-ready troops from the U.S. Continental Army Command and the U.S. Air Force's Tactical Air Command. These forces must be furnished from the United States and deployed swiftly because CINCSTRIKE has no combat-ready forces stationed in the MEAFSA area. The effectiveness of deployment operations depends on the command-communications system. Although inadequate communications caused delays in troop deployment to Korea and Lebanon, standardized operating procedures developed by CSE now ensure excellent communications not only within the objective area but also between Washington and its unified commands. The CSE organization is divided into four parts: element headquarters, two field communications units, and a support unit. Huey concludes that the success of the joint task force missions in Chad, Mexico, and the Congo can be largely attributed to the flexibility and reliability of the communications support provided by CSE.

369

Lawrence, Robert M., and William R. Van Orsavel. ASSERTIVE DISARMAMENT. National Review, v. 20, Sept. 10, 1968: 498-505.

AP2, N3545, v. 20

The United States should consider the option of "assertive disarmament" in dealing with the Chinese Communist nuclear threat. By destroying China's nuclear weapons capacity, America could save itself and China's neighbors from nuclear blackmail and decrease the danger of nuclear proliferation among those states that fear Chinese aggression. Although China could respond by attacking neighboring nations or intervening in Vietnam, it probably would be restrained from doing so by fears of America's retaliatory strength. The anti-Soviet system and Russia's reluctance to risk a nuclear confrontation with the United States would most likely restrict Soviet reaction to verbal attacks upon the United States. America's allies would undoubtedly be shocked and would have to be painstakingly convinced that force was necessary in order to negate aggressive exploitation of nuclear weapons by the Chinese. In planning a strike against China's nuclear weapons facilities the United States would be faced with the options of sabotage, armed invasion, or air attack. The latter would be the most effective alternative and should be

conducted directly by American forces and not indirectly through a proxy nation. To prevent assertive disarmament from escalating into general war it should be justified by provocative Chinese actions other than those involving a direct confrontation with the United States. Advance warning could be given for moral and humanitarian reasons, although then American losses would be greater and the Chinese might have an opportunity to minimize if not negate the damage from the attack. Whenever possible the targets selected should be divorced from the non-military aspects of Chinese nuclear operations. Low-yield tactical nuclear weapons would prove more effective than chemical explosives, but political as well as military considerations enter into the choice of weapons. Although the Chinese now appear to be contained by America's overwhelming strength, the United States should be prepared to invoke assertive disarmament if China is someday tempted to undertake aggression threatening to American security.

370

Raven, Wolfram von. [DISARMAMENT, DOES GENEVA FORBID POISON GAS?] Abrüstung, Weidt Genf dem Giftgas? Christ und Welt, v. 21, Aug. 9, 1968: 6.

BR4, C37, v. 21

In World War I both the Central Powers and the Allies used poison gas, and it caused 7.2 percent of all war deaths--an enormous toll, considering its early stage of development. Since then, chemical warfare has been conducted only against enemies unable to retaliate in kind, e.g., against the Abyssinians in 1935-36 by the Italians, and against the Chinese in 1937-43 by the Japanese. In recent years a school of thought developed arguing that under certain conditions chemical warfare is more humane than other kinds of conventional war. Great Powers' arsenals now abound in a great variety of chemical and biological weapons, from most deadly ones to those leaving no lasting harmful effect on the human organism. Recently Great Britain submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Conference a draft treaty for banning the production and use of chemical and biological weapons. International bans on the use of certain weapons (for example, such bans date back to the Second Lateran Council of 1139). The Brussels Declaration of 1874, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the 1922 Washington Treaty, and the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, represent limited international agreements banning the use of chemical and biological weapons. A universal ban, if accepted, would hardly be more effective than all known precedents of international prohibition of certain types of weapons. For one thing, it would be almost impossible to establish effective international control of the production of chemical and biological agents that may be used as weapons.

371

Wheeler, John Harvey. THE STRATEGIC CALCULATORS. In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press, 1968. pp. 91-114.

104, C55, 1968

Computers are expected to have an ever-increasing impact upon the conduct of modern war. Already, they are used extensively to speed up the response of advanced weapons systems and improve their accuracy in crisis situations. By absorbing far more data than a human operator could process, computers have enabled a complex war machine to adapt systems analysis techniques as an aid in its policy formation and

decisionmaking. Strategic planning is now heavily influenced by cost-effectiveness analysis. Automation gives the top command and control echelon more timely and plentiful information on field operations than ever before. Increased knowledge has led to increased responsibility for directing operations; data processing has tended to centralize military decisionmaking and tie it closely to diplomatic and political considerations. Thus tactical problems have become diplomatic problems. Computers have increased the precision and efficiency of military managers in allocating the support requirements of military operations. In the future computers can be expected to play an even larger combat role. Unfortunately the almost instantaneous transmission of information from remote areas will tend to turn a situation that may have previously gone unnoticed into an international crisis. Moreover, further refinement of centralized control techniques could encourage a tendency to resolve political issues by military rather than diplomatic means. As international relations become more and more militarized, national leaders become increasingly dependent upon assessments of reactions to potential policy moves. Individual pragmatism and judgment will be overshadowed by computerized intelligence and war game techniques. By enhancing the ability to predict enemy actions, computers will probably promote the ascendancy of preemptive wars.

### C. REGIONAL

#### 1. Tension Areas

372

Bluhm, Georg R. [THE ODER-NEISSE QUESTION] Die Oder-Neisse Frage. [Hannover] Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschichte [1967] 89 p. maps. DD80L O35B57

Contents. --Introduction. --The present world political conditions. --The German-Polish boundary in the past and in diplomacy during World War II. --The Eastern territories in Poland's structure today. --Incorporation of the expellees into the Federal Republic. --Policy of the expellees' organizations. --The official policy of the Federal Republic on the boundary question. --Discussion of the Oder-Neisse problem in the present. --Prospect.

Considers Bonn's official position regarding the Oder-Neisse Line untenable in terms of political realities and points to growing Western sentiment for recognition of the boundary as final, for the sake of peace stabilization in Europe.

373

Bolling, Landrum R. WHAT CHANCE FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST? Friends journal, v. 14, Sept. 1, 1968: 431-433. BX760L F66, v. 14

Since the June war there has been a radical shift in the thinking of educated and responsible Arab leaders. Egyptian and Jordanian leaders are now willing to accept the permanent existence of Israel and to cooperate with the U.N. plan for a peaceful settlement. Although acts of terror and counterterror continue, peace is still possible because the desire for it is greater than ever.

374

Buzzard, Anthony. ISRAEL AND THE ARABS: THE WAY FORWARD. Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 8, autumn 1968: 173-177.

UG635.G7A1252, v. 8

Pts. 1 and 2. Pt. 3 will appear in the winter issue.

Before order can be restored in the troubled Middle East, the basic causes and implications of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli confrontation must be clearly delineated. Despite British promises that its advocacy of the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine would not result in the subjugation of the Arab population, the State of Israel was created at the cost of Arab lives and property. The Arabs resent the injustices of the past and feel they are justified in trying to expel the Israelis because of the "Israeli use of force in imposing the Jewish State on their territory." Increasingly hostile moves on the part of the Arabs, including border raids by Syria, Nasser's mobilization in Sinai and his removal of U.N. forces stationed there, and the recent conclusion of defense pacts among Arab nations, finally led to Israel's preemptive attack on June 5, 1967. Without firm assurances of Western assistance, the Israelis apparently did not want to risk an Arab attack. The 6-day war demonstrated the inability of the U.N. Security Council to keep the peace without the joint backing of the superpowers and pointed out the need for "a guarantee of frontiers by some 'intermediate force' between the levels of the UNEF and the two super-powers." Moreover, the war indicated the need to balance the offensive weapons in the Arab-Israeli arsenals with more defensive weapons in order to make surprise attacks less attractive.

375

Cavallari, Alberto. MOSCOW'S REAL OBJECTIVE-- 'COLD WAR' ON ISRAEL. Atlas, v. 16, Nov. 1968: 29-32. AP1.A83, v. 16  
Translated from *Corriere della sera*, Milan. Newsp

Russia has transformed the Middle East into a Soviet bloc by establishing a system of bases in the area. Since it plans to maintain and strengthen this bloc, Russia is against a peace that would reduce the Arab demand for arms and jeopardize the agreements on the bases, but it is also against a war with the United States and involvement in irrational Arab-provoked crises. Therefore, it favors a well-calculated cold war that aims to strangle Israel politically and thereby effect a change in the East-West power balance. Under these circumstances the disagreements between the Russians and the Arabs cannot be viewed as large-power moderation against small-nation extremism; instead, they must be seen as a gap between the interests of Soviet imperialism and those of Arab nationalism, with the Soviet Union more extremist than the Arabs in their desire to maintain continual discord in the Middle East. The reality is that Israel faces Soviet encirclement; the challenge is even greater now that the Soviet Union is a Mediterranean power.

376

CONFERENCE OF BLOCs, THE GERMAN PROBLEM AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, HELD AT THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE IN VIENNA ON 6TH AND 7TH MARCH 1968. In International Institute for Peace. Active co-existence, no. 17, July/Sept. 1968: 1-31.

P&GP RR

## V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

Contents. --Introduction. --Common interests and proposals for European security, by Dr. Thomas Bacskai. --Can blocs pave the way to security in Europe?, by Dr. Jerzy Sawicki.

Bacskai states that the nondissemination of nuclear weapons is a prerequisite for solving European problems and cites the specific danger of the German Federal Republic's possession of nuclear weapons. He emphasizes the common points present in different proposals for European security submitted by the East and West: i. e., nuclear-free and limited armament areas, a nonaggression treaty, between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and an all-Europe security treaty. Dr. Sawicki points to "the narrow margin assigned to the Atlantic Alliance as a mechanism which might be used to some purpose in the process of détente" and concludes that "the more the détente encompasses problems decisive for security... the less apt will be the mechanism of the Alliance for the purpose of participating in détente." Progress toward security will be made through bilateral channels and, perhaps eventually, through a multinational mechanism in which European members of NATO could pursue their national interests more effectively than through the alliance. He concludes that German reunification, which would destroy the existing political and military balance, will not lead to security.

377

Conquest, Robert. COMMUNISM HAS TO DEMOCRATIZE OR PERISH. New York times magazine, Aug. 18, 1968: 22-23, 81-84.  
AP2. N6575, 1968

The events in Czechoslovakia might well have been a first, perhaps decisive, step toward a peaceful and democratic world. This development is not accidental, because totalitarian methods sooner or later ossify into dogma and the rulers become incompetent. "Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of the press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution. Political liberty and the rule of law are an essential defense against the corruption and ruination of the state. A democratic Communist state is a contradiction in terms, because no democratic state can have a single party. If a compromise like the Czechoslovak form of government evolves, the country will probably develop into one resembling the Scandinavian mixed economies, and the Communist Party will be transmuted into a kind of democratic Communist Party, supported by the majority and purged of its despotic associations. Change will not be easy, but even in Russia social, economic, and intellectual forces are increasing pressure on the political system. Russia is ruled by a group, not by a single will; the rulers are generally mediocre, and therefore the present system has no great chance of surviving long. However the main problem is reintegration of the Communist movement into the world's political organization, so that the precarious truce based on the balance of armaments can be replaced by a genuine détente, which alone can guarantee world peace. It is hard to outline a policy adequate to a period full of surprises. Either provocations or retreat from the Western intellectual and military positions would strengthen the hard-liners on the other side. A flexible initiative toward German reunification might be a positive step. A greater readiness to cope with unexpected events and a large expansion of diplomatic contingency planning seem to be indicated. The Com-

munist world is in a crisis. Nobody can say for certain that it will democratize itself, but if it does not it might perish.

378

CYPRUS. British survey, no. 231, June 1968: 1-19.  
D410. B7, 1968

A survey of the Cyprus problem that emphasizes its impact on security and the chances for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. The pamphlet describes the economic, religious, and racial roots of Turkish-Greek antagonism in the island and reviews recent diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute. The author suggests that if Turkey and Greece will refrain from further intervention President Makarios may be able to impose his new constitution, which abolishes the Turk's communal rights but grants them equal civil rights in a unitary state.

379

El Naggar, A. M. THE CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Revue militaire générale, June 1968: 23-32.  
U2. R48, 1968

Chronicles the events before and after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and states Egypt's position on a settlement of the Middle East problem. The United Arab Republic will consent to a political approach to the Near East problem and accepts the Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories and the termination of the state of belligerency. However, Egypt rejects the principle of direct negotiations demanded by Israel and will not adhere to a solution that does not render justice for the Palestinian refugees. El Naggar notes that, contrary to popular belief, the Israeli aggression spurred a wave of internal reform, which, paradoxically, strengthened the existing Near East regimes. He concludes that the Middle East is a chronic illness in the world body politic that has reached a critical stage and must be cured.

380

Farman, Christopher. A GARDEN OF EDEN? Socialist commentary, Aug. 1968: 26-28.  
HX3. S74, 1968

Examines developments leading to the Arab-Israeli War. While acknowledging the present stalemate over peace negotiations, Farman sees a "promising possibility" in the development of a Palestinian self-awareness. If the militant young Arab nationalists could accept an independent Palestine Arab State allied with Israel, the Middle East could be transformed.

381

Goppel, Alfons. EUROPE'S WILL TO FREEDOM. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Oct. 1968: 296-297.  
DB200 7. S74, v. 16

The author is prime minister of the state of Bavaria. In 1954 the Bavarian state government assumed the patronage over the Sudeten German ethnical group. Dr. Goppel explains how fifty years ago more than three million Germans in Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia were against their own will reduced to the status of an isolated minority after the disastrous destruction of the multi-racial Habsburg monarchy. The peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain inaugurated this dangerous development in the heart of Europe. The

expulsion of the Sudeten Germans after World War II is only too well known. They now live in Western Germany. Dr. Goppel elucidates the policy of the West German government, which aims at a reconciliation and an understanding with Germany's eastern neighbors, with normal diplomatic and other contacts. The venture seems hopeless since it does not accord with Soviet strategy for the maintenance of the status quo. The author is nonetheless sure that this policy will succeed if Germans will succeed in creating a federated Europe with no frontier problems, with peaceful economic functions, and with freedom warranted to all its peoples. The insistence on the right of peoples to their homeland and to self-determination is one of the strongest weapons in the struggle against despotism and violence. Fundamental values such as personal liberty and human dignity cannot be bypassed in political discussion. These rights are also the rights of those peoples who must now live without freedom. (Supplied summary, modified)

382

Harrigan, Anthony. THE SOVIETS AIM AT GERMANY: THE NEW POWER BALANCE IN EUROPE. In American Security Council. Washington report, Sept. 16, 1968: 1-4. P&G PR

The Czechoslovak situation is important because the Soviet regime has moved a large portion of its armed forces to the West and is poised for a massive confrontation with the NATO countries apparently aimed at neutralization of the Federal Republic of Germany. Soviet military thinking may envision other invasions of Central Europe, possibly a limited ground operation against West German territory. If the West Germans do not obtain security guarantees they may choose cold war neutralism, which would spare them a Red Army occupation, but the entire framework of the free world's defense against the Soviet regime would be cracked. Thus they should receive firm assurance that U.S. troops, armed with tactical nuclear weapons, will prevent a breach of the frontier. Further, they need a permanent security guarantee--their own defensive, tactical nuclear weapons--against the gigantic Soviet military machine. Because of the Central European crisis and the West German need for limited nuclear capability, the United States should not approve the nuclear nonproliferation treaty; instead NATO should be strengthened.

383

Kegel, Gerhard. [GERMAN POLICIES OF THE TWO GERMANIES] Zur Deutschlandpolitik der beiden Deutschlands. Einheit, v. 23, no. 6, 1968: 734-743. HX6.E4, v. 23

The new Constitution of the German Democratic Republic contains a "precise concept" for solving Germany's "national question." As "the Constitution of the socialist state of the German nation," it considers West Germany another state belonging to the same nation. It solemnly commits the people and the Government of the German Democratic Republic, "now and in the coming decades," to the task of ending the division of Germany, which was forced upon the nation by imperialism. It obligates them to work for the gradual rapprochement of the two German states "so they finally unite into one peace-loving Germany on the basis of democracy and socialism." Unlike Bonn's ideas for solving "the national question," this concept is truly "national," for it portends a nonutopian consolidation of the nation. The rule of West Germany by capitalism

makes it increasingly subservient to the global strategy of U.S. imperialism. The emergency laws recently introduced by Bonn aid the authoritarian rule and more intensive expansion of the monopolies. This, combined with the Hallstein Doctrine and Bonn's persistent refusal to recognize the German Democratic Republic, only deepens the division of Germany. By signing the Paris treaties, Bonn has in fact renounced until the year 2000 the Federal Republic's freedom to deal with matters that concern all Germany. Its new Eastern policy aims at camouflaging its revanchist and aggressive goals. The two German states are both subjects of international law, and their mutual relations should be predicated upon equal rights.

384

Klieman, Aaron S. BAB AL-MANDEB: THE RED SEA IN TRANSITION. Jewish spectator, v. 33, Sept. 1968: 12-19. AP92.J66, v. 33

Surveys the Bab el Mandeb region, emphasizing its importance as the only Israeli gateway to Afro-Asian trade and as a factor in Soviet and U.S. global strategy. Viewed as a whole, the troubles of Yemen, Aden, Eritrea, and French Somaliland are directly related to the 1967 Egyptian thrust against Israel. Egyptian involvement in all four disputes stemmed from Nasser's master plan to isolate Israel by gaining shore approaches to the Bab el Mandeb artery. Failing in this attempt, Nasser was forced to shift his isolation campaign to the Strait of Tiran and confront Israel directly. With Soviet encouragement, Nasser will probably turn his attention once more to the Red Sea because Bab el Mandeb is a prize objective in the war against Israel.

385

Lamy, Jean Claude. A RÉALITÉS INTERVIEW WITH KING HUSSEIN OF JORDAN. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 213, Aug. 1968: 19-23, 82. AP4.R2164, 1968

Surveys the numerous problems confronting the 33-year-old Jordanian King. In attempting to maintain the respect he earned from his Arab neighbors during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War without completely alienating the United States, Hussein has placed himself in an extremely precarious position. He cannot break the unity of the Arab front by unilaterally negotiating with Israel for the return of the western bank of the Jordan even though his country cannot survive without this economically important territory. Palestinian refugees now constitute the majority of Jordan's population, and the Organization for the Liberation of Palestine is continually undermining Hussein's prestige by its terrorist activities. Only through a relaxation of tensions in the Middle East can Hussein hope to pull his country through this perilous time.

386

Mates, Leo. THE UNTENABILITY OF THE PRESENT CONSTELLATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Review of international affairs, v. 19, July 20, 1968: 1-3. D839.R4, v. 19

The Near East is quickly becoming a dangerous hotspot which could erupt at any moment. The incidents along the Jordan River and the Suez Canal are manifestations of an untenable situation; the cease-fire line separating the Arab countries from Israel affects the Arabs' vital interests so intensely and cuts so deeply into their territory, "that it cannot even

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be considered temporary to say nothing of long-term." The line exists because those powers that could pressure Israel in terms of the U.N. Charter lack the will to do so. Consequently, the Arab States view the U.N. as powerless to achieve its aims in an area that involves its vital interests, and they now believe that the only means of rectifying the situation is by force. Whether there will be another war will depend on whether those powers "supporting Israel's occupation perceive the perils of the policy they pursue." A revival of war would aggravate the international situation and detrimentally affect international cooperation.

387

MID-EAST PEACE NOW--OR POSSIBLE WORLD WAR III?  
Prevent world war III, no. 72, summer 1968: 1-6. illus.  
D731, P75, 1968

Russian Middle East arms shipments and the polarization of the Near East into pro-Western and pro-Soviet camps are the major sources of potential conflict in that area. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War Russia has increased its arms shipments to Egypt until Nasser's armed forces now have a 4 to 1 "theoretical superiority" over Israel. Russian military assistance has included combat aircraft, missile crafts, submarines, and rocket assault vessels. This policy not only "encourages military adventurism by Nasser and his ilk" but threatens the delicate East-West détente. Furthermore, Russia and its allies refuse to accept any U.N. resolution even mildly in favor of Israel and, by threatening a veto, make it "impracticable" for other U.N. members to press complaints against the Arabs." Arab policies such as nonrecognition, border raids, and support of the Palestine Liberation Organization also impede efforts to reach a peaceful settlement. To prove to Moscow its determination to prevent another war, the United States must match Russia weapon for weapon in supplies to Israel; this might also convince the Arabs that they cannot put off a settlement with Israel forever.

388

Mieroszewski, Juliusz. IN CHANGING EAST EUROPE,  
THERE IS ONLY ONE ROAD TO ONE GERMANY.  
Atlas, v. 16, Sept. 1968: 25-27.

AP1, A83, v. 16  
Translated from *Kultura*, Paris.  
AP54, K85

East Germany is a separate nation constituting a threat not only to the Federal Republic by serving as a "Red Prussia" but also to Eastern Europe by serving as its gendarme. A democratic reunification of Germany is possible only if West Germany counterbalances the ideology of a "Red Prussia" with a policy of reconciliation and freedom toward Eastern Europe. Since the East Germans and the Russians can only be resisted in the East, a policy of cooperation with Eastern Europe is paramount.

389

MILITARY POLICIES IN OCCUPIED AREAS. In U.S.  
Joint Publications Research Service. Translations on  
the Near East, no. 272; May 15, 1968. Washington.  
(JS JPRS 45, 379) p. 29-36

AS36, U57, no. 45, 379  
Translated from *Bamahaneh*, Mar. 12, 1968, p. 6-7,  
16-17.  
Hebr

Examines the Israeli occupation of Arab territory.  
The occupation has the potential to foster Arab-Israeli

understanding because it presents an opportunity for direct contact with the Palestinian Arabs without foreign interference. Although international disputes based on economic, political, and geographic factors will persist in the region, any arrangement with these Arabs would lead to an abatement of tensions.

390

Münch, Fritz. GLEANINGS ON THE GERMAN QUESTION. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Oct. 1968: 298-302.  
DB200.7, S74, v. 16

Propaganda is running high in Germany to persuade everybody to accept "matters as they stand" and to minimize the legal points of view. The author attempts in his documentation to put before the reader some of the by-products of the research carried out during the discussions on the German question. He gives an account of the status of territories under military occupation. The occupying power administers the land, but only the peace treaty can modify the status. The Potsdam Protocol on August 2, 1945, established Soviet and Polish administration over the Eastern territories of Germany. It is also evident that the Powers of Potsdam could not determine new European frontiers. (Supplied summary, modified)

391

Papcke, Sven G. [MILITANT POLICY--HELMUT SCHMIDT'S MODEL OF VIOLENCE] Wehrhafte Politik -- Zum Gewaltmodell Helmut Schmidts. Marxistische Blätter, v. 6, Sept./Oct. 1968: 57-63.  
P&CP RR

Considers various theorems of Schmidt's model of national defense and German reunification irreconcilable, such as his notion for achieving West Germany's overriding policy goal, German reunification, and his concept of a deterrence policy.

392

Plischke, Elmar. GERMAN REUNIFICATION--AN OPTIONS ANALYSIS. Central Europe journal, v. 16, Oct. 1968: 311-318.  
DB200.7, S74, v. 16

Analyses the possibilities for a reunification of Germany. Plischke states that the aims of the Federal Republic of Germany will be the restoration of German unity in freedom and peace, a Germany in control of its own international affairs. Germany's vital interests, as defined by the late Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the 1950's, have since remained relatively constant and unchanged. The focal point of this concept, a "national security/reunification/Berlin" relationship, was shifting by the mid-1960's so that the policy complex was more accurately depictable as a "national security/Germany reunification/European unity/power-prestige/détente" configuration. "Détente" has become the central cementing component of the West German policy system. The process of reunification might be pursued in any of seven ways. The most obvious alternative is that "the German people" would serve to elect an all-German agency to consummate the action. This possibility has thus far failed owing to the Communists' attitude. In the foreseeable future the most negotiable way to reunification may be to begin with a loose confederation of West and East Germany, a "federative continuum" that may lead to greater national integration. Finally, with the simple incorporation of one Germany into the other being unlikely, an entirely new, united German govern-

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mental system could be designed. The opinion's analysis shows clearly that there is a relationship between German reunification and security policy. (Supplied summary, modified).

393

Ross, Michael. **NAGAS DEMAND INDEPENDENCE FROM INDIA.** *Toward freedom*, v. 17, July/Aug. 1968: [1-2] P&GP RR  
 "The London Observer. Reprinted with permission of Los Angeles Times/Washington Post News Service."

Reports that serious clashes between Indians and Nagas have recurred in Nagaland and the prospect of full-scale war exists. Having agreed to an extension of the 1964 cease-fire agreement, the Nagas still demand independence and are seeking an internationally controlled plebiscite. They feel certain that if war with India resumes, the Chinese will recognize their cause and supply arms.

394

Sedlaczek, Bruno. [DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT SINCE THE ARMISTICE OF JUNE 10, 1967; ON THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST] *Die Entwicklung des Nahost-Konfliktes seit dem Waffenstillstand vom 10. Juni 1967; Zur Lage im Nahen Osten. Dokumentati n der Zeit; Informations-Archiv*, v. 20, no. 406, 1968: 1-4.  
 DD261.D4, v. 20

Points out the strengthening of "the alliance between progressive Arab states and Socialist nations" against Israel's aggressive plans, to effect a political solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and about permanent peace in the area. Sedlaczek attacks American support for Israel.

395

Stockell, Charles W. **MENACING BEARS AND PAPER DRAGONS.** In *U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review*, v. 48, July 1968: 47-53. illus.  
 Z6723.U35, v. 4

Outlines the history of the border disputes between Russia and China. Stockell argues that, because of Chinese weakness, war between the two powers is unlikely for some time to come. Nevertheless, unresolved territorial issues are a continuing source of Sino-Soviet friction, and should the Chinese reach a point where they feel themselves capable of directly challenging the Soviet Union militarily open warfare could result.

396

Tao, Jay. **MAO'S WORLD OUTLOOK: VIETNAM AND THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA.** *Asian survey*, v. 8, May 1968: 416-432. DSI.A492, v. 8

In recent years Mao Tse-tung's major concern has been to preserve the purity of the Chinese Communist revolution. This concern is the source of his violent antipathy toward the Soviet Union, of his decision to pursue an independent course to world power and leadership, and of his refusal to accept Soviet offers of "joint action" in Vietnam. But Mao's determination to continue on a provocative course vis-a-vis the United States in Vietnam, while at the same time deliberately taking China outside the Soviet strategic defense area, has aroused growing opposition in China. Every escalation of the Vietnam War has

strengthened this opposition, widened the division in the Chinese Communist Party, and further deepened the split between China and the Soviet Union. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution must be seen as a spectacular but futile attempt to suppress this opposition and thus ensure the integrity of Maoist foreign policy. Ever since China's detonation of a nuclear-armed missile in November 1966 Mao has claimed that he has a credible deterrent against a U.S. nuclear attack. But this line is for domestic consumption and Mao must know that his nuclear forces are still inadequate. Although this certainly will not prevent his continuing to give aid to the North Vietnamese--and thus risking general war with the United States--it will restrict China's support to serving as a "rear base" of the Vietnam revolution.

397

Thomsen, E. H. **THE OPINION OF A GERMAN ON THE SOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM.** *NATO's fifteen nations*, v. 13, Apr./May 1968: 32-34, 36.  
 UA646.F5, v. 13

The danger of war in Europe will persist as long as Germany is divided. The gravest threat to peace comes from the Soviet Union, which still clings to its hope of unifying the world under Soviet communism. A permanent solution to the problem of peace will come only with a change in Soviet policy, and this will come only when Soviet leaders are convinced beyond any doubt that the will of NATO cannot be broken or the demand for freedom in Eastern Europe stifled. Consequently NATO must resist every hostile Soviet pressure and encourage every manifestation of resistance to Soviet hegemony in the East. It must insist that any settlement in central Europe be based on the Potsdam agreements, which recognized the unity of the German nation and specified that the German-Polish border would be fixed by treaty. Once the Russians have abandoned their imperialistic ambitions and permitted European tensions to relax, Germany can be reunited and a solution to the German-Polish dispute negotiated. The next step would be a unified Europe with an associated status for the East European states. This federation would be a third world power and is the only form in which an independent Europe can survive. But the key to this progress is NATO, which must be steadfast, courageous, and prepared "to make sacrifices and to intimidate effectively when necessary."

398

Toynbee, Arnold J. **ASPECTS OF ARAB HISTORY** *Listener*, v. 80, Sept. 5, 1968: 293-295.  
 AP4.L4165, v. 80

Ascribes the rise of Arab nationalism largely to the influence of Europe, the cradle of modern nationalism. Toynbee considers the United States Middle East policy unduly biased in favor of Israel, which drives some Arab countries into the hands of the Soviet Union.

399

Vung, Gial. **FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM.** *Far Eastern economic review*, v. 61, Aug. 15, 1968: 316-318. illus.  
 HC411.F18, v. 61

The various minority peoples' independence movements in India and Burma are no longer internal affairs because of the increasing Chinese influence in areas of separatist activity. Trends in the U.S. attitude toward Burmese "swinging" neutrality and Burmese and Indian efforts to draw closer together are



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alarming because the movements might be forced to rely further on Chinese support, thereby threatening Burma's existence and thwarting efforts of the Indian Government to maintain the status quo in Sikkim, Bhutan, and Assam. The situation in Assam and other areas along India's international border is chaotic. The hill people of Assam are divided: one group demands complete independence and the other, autonomy within an Indian Union, but the influence of the latter group is diminishing. The Burmese situation is critical because the minority peoples' separatist demands seem irreconcilable. The future of these areas depends upon the situations in China, India, and Burma; China may become the sole beneficiary of these internal disputes because of Indian and Burmese economic difficulties. The solution to this problem will ultimately depend upon those nations directly involved, with assistance from "friendly neighbors"; i.e., the Thais, but India's and Burma's allies must aid in finding an adequate and peaceful settlement.

### 2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

400

**CAMBODIA, ONE OF THE TARGETS OF U.S. AGGRESSION.** In *International Institute for Peace. Active co-existence*, no. 15, Jan./Mar. 1968: 1-22.  
P&GP RR

Attempts to arouse public sympathy for Cambodia, whose neutrality and independence are seen as targets of American imperialism. Cambodian history is surveyed from ancient to modern times, with emphasis on the Geneva agreements and claims of recent violations against Cambodian neutrality by the United States, Thailand, and South Vietnam. "Under the fallacious pretext of preventing the Indochinese from becoming communists, American imperialism massacres them and tries to make them slaves to its policy."

401

**Cottrell, Alvin J. GUANTANAMO AND U.S. PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN.** *Marine Corps gazette*, v. 52, June 1968: 26-32. VE7. M4, v. 52

As the "heartland" of the Western Hemisphere, the Caribbean region is as vital as ever to the strategic welfare of the United States. Although the introduction of long-range aircraft, nuclear-powered vessels, and guided missiles has somewhat lessened its importance, the significance of its proximity to the United States and its value as the gateway to the Panama Canal have by no means been eliminated. While the threat of a conventional military attack upon any of the Central American Republics is now minimal, Soviet efforts to infiltrate and subvert existing regimes are jeopardizing the security of these states. If the United States is to successfully fight Communist inroads into the Caribbean it cannot afford to diminish its military presence in the area and, particularly, must not consider withdrawing from its naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Although to date Castro has avoided a direct confrontation with the United States over its right to maintain the base on Cuban territory, he is expected to eventually denounce the 1903 treaty that gave the United States territorial rights to the base area, on the ground that the agreement was concluded when Cuba was under foreign military occupation. Castro has already started his campaign against the treaty by refusing to cash the annual checks sent by the United States for use of the base and by building fortifications in its vicinity to propagandize the need

for protecting the "outpost of socialism" against the "threat of imperialism."

402

**Harries, Owen. SHOULD THE U.S. WITHDRAW FROM ASIA?** *Foreign affairs*, v. 47, Oct. 1968: 15-25.  
D410. F6, v. 47

If America is defeated in Vietnam, the critics of the war may win support for their views that the U.S. military presence in other parts of Southeast Asia is undesirable. However, the fact that they predicted America's failure in Vietnam does not necessarily justify following their prescriptions for the rest of the mainland. Their assertions that Southeast Asia is not vital to America's national interests and that America would eventually meet political or military defeat on the mainland are highly debatable. Moreover, their analyses of the consequences of withdrawal are far from infallible. Those who do not foresee an ultimate Chinese takeover of the mainland believe that a balance of power can be achieved in the area, either through the offshore presence of the United States or by the Asians alone. Yet the American experience in Vietnam demonstrates the weakness of offshore military power, and the lack of effective leadership and stability in the Asian states would seem to preclude a viable coalition in that region. Furthermore, the arguments that China would be stopped from southward expansion by the emergence of Titoist-type regimes in the south, deficiencies in Chinese military strength, or the absence of Chinese aspirations for additional territory are not particularly convincing. Thus great caution must be exercised in drawing generalizations from the Vietnam experience and uncritically following the lead of anti-war critics who now advocate total withdrawal from Southeast Asia.

403

**Maratov, M. NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE FOR LATIN AMERICA.** *International affairs (Moscow)* July 1968: 34-39.  
D839. I465, 1968

Reviews the U.S. position in regard to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The United States has spared no effort to protect its military strategic interests in Latin America. It refuses to include its territories (Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) in the nuclear-free zone and insists on guarantees for uncontrolled transportation of nuclear weapons through Latin American countries. Although Cuba has refused to take part in the disarmament negotiations until the United States agrees to include its territories in the nuclear-free zone, it supports "the endeavours of Mexico and other Latin American countries to save the continent from the danger of a nuclear war."

## D. OUTER SPACE

## E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

### 1. Violation Inspection Verification

404

**Allkoter, O. C., and M. Simon. BETA-RAY SPECTROSCOPY OF RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT.** *Kernteknik. Isotopentechnik und -Chemie*, v. 10, July 1968: 378-383.  
TK9001. K4, v. 10

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The design and operation of a beta-ray spectrometer with two lithium-drifted silicon semiconductor detectors in stack assembly are described. Examples [accompanied by diagrams] are given illustrating the rational application of this spectrometer to nuclide analysis of fallout samples. The examples given relate to the strontium isotopes Sr 90 and Sr 89, the ruthenium isotopes Ru 103 and Ru 106, and the transuranium nuclide Np 239. (Abstract supplied, modified)

405

Bolt, Bruce A. ESTIMATION OF PKP TRAVEL TIMES. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1305-1324.

QE531.S3, v. 58

A set of travel times for the core-waves PKP is derived from observations and tabulated. All values are tied to the 1968 P travel times for a surface-focus for  $75^\circ < \Delta < 95^\circ$  due to Herrin et al. Times for both the branches DF ( $110^\circ < \Delta < 180^\circ$ ) and GH ( $125^\circ < \Delta < 156^\circ$ ) are listed in more detail than previously, together with an extension for PKIKP waves, from  $110^\circ$  back to  $105^\circ$ . Checks on the DF branch for  $120^\circ < \Delta < 150^\circ$  using observations from the 1955 LONGSHOT explosion provide no evidence for further revision of the first section of this branch. Special attention is given to the times of the DF branch (PKIKP) for  $150^\circ$ . Delays at  $153^\circ$  and  $162^\circ$  of order 3 sec. reported by K. Ergin in 1967 are not confirmed. There is a group of small arrivals about 1 sec. earlier than predicted by the present PKIKP tables for  $156^\circ < \Delta < 160^\circ$ , approximately. These may indicate an error in the curvature of the present curve and, perhaps, a slight discontinuity in the inner core near a radius of 850 km. No evidence is found for a layer of any consequence with reduced P velocity in the inner core. Revised times for the branch AB (denoted by PKP<sub>2</sub>) are based mainly on readings from the Indian Ocean earthquake of February 17, 1966, and the Jeffreys-Bullen times. For  $\Delta > 155^\circ$ , the new empirical times confirm the curvature of the Jeffreys-Bullen curve for PKP<sub>2</sub>; however, near  $\Delta = 152^\circ$ , the observed curvature appears to be greater than that of the latter curve. The new times are of the order of one second earlier; this result is highly sensitive to the precision of the epicenter estimated for the 1966 shock. PKP<sub>2</sub> is traceable at least out to  $185^\circ$ . Depth allowances for PKP have been computed, by T. Qamar, to provide a set consistent with the model Earth used by Herrin et al. in the 1968 P tables. (Abstract supplied)

406

Engdahl, Eric R., and others. COMPUTATION METHODS. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1339-1344.

QE531.S3, v. 58

The surface-focus P travel times estimated by Herrin et al (1968) entail a P velocity distribution from which smoothed travel-time tables of P, pP, PP and PcP are constructed. Theoretical considerations and computational procedures used are described. It is shown that computational errors in the new travel-time tables are less than 0.01 second. (Abstract supplied)

407

Freedman, Helen W. SEISMOLOGICAL MEASUREMENTS AND MEASUREMENT ERROR. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1261-1271.

QE531.S3, v. 58

A seismological measurement, such as arrival time or, less directly, origin time, is an example of a

measurement variable which can be considered as the sum of a parameter---the quantity being measured---and an error variable. Optimal methods for the estimation of this parameter vary with the probability distribution of the error variable. In particular, estimation in the presence of bias or of gross errors is discussed, together with the related problem of precision versus accuracy of the estimate. Errors in estimates of arrival times, origin times and hypocentral location contribute to variation in travel-time estimates; these are analyzed separately. Each of these, with the exception of focal depth, has a distribution which can be fitted to a mixture of a normal distribution and some contamination. The degree of contamination varies; methods for truncation are suggested. The presence of possible, often undetectable, bias in locations and travel times may make confidence statements about these parameters unreliable. (Abstract supplied, modified).

408

Greenberg, D. S. ARMS CONTROL: U.S., BRITISH CONDUCT BIG TROOP INSPECTION EXPERIMENT. Science, v. 162, Oct. 4, 1968: 106-107.

Q1.S35, v. 182

The United States and Great Britain recently completed a complex 3-month field test of techniques for verifying compliance with arms control agreements "at limit troop deployment in a given area. Operation "First Look" was carried out by 80 American military officers who, with the aid of weekly aerial reconnaissance runs, automatic cameras on the runways, and unmanned sensing devices, monitored the activities of 30,000 troops on a 2,000-square-mile training base in southern England. The acting inspectors were divided into subgroups to test different types of inspection techniques and were given varying amounts of freedom to roam about the base and gather information on troop movements. Although the British Defence Ministry and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have not yet completed their analysis of the information gathered during the joint experiment, the preliminary conclusions are that a relatively small number of inspectors can effectively detect changes in military forces within a large area.

409

Gupta, D., and W. Hafele. [PRINCIPLES OF AN INSTRUMENTED SYSTEM FOR SAFEGUARDING FISSILE MATERIAL FLOW IN THE PEACEFUL SECTOR OF NUCLEAR ENERGY] Das Prinzip eines instrumentierten Systems zur Überwachung des Spaltstoffflusses auf dem friedlichen Sektor der Kernenergie. Atomkernenergie, v. 13, July Aug. 1968: 229-236.

QC770.A8, v. 13

The safeguards systems now used by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Atomic Energy Community subject an entire sector of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy to international control in order to detect or prevent the diversion of fissile material for nuclear-weapons production. The systems were introduced in the early development of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, when almost no commercial competition existed in relevant domestic or international markets. But now growing competition and advancing technology call for a modification of the systems to protect the commercial interests of individual companies and nations against harmful infringement. The amount of present control could

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greatly handicap competitiveness in the field. International controls should therefore be applied only at selected stages in the fuel cycle of fissile materials. The control system should be instrumented as much as possible to prevent its use as a cover for industrial espionage. The nuclear research center in Karlsruhe is now developing such a system.

410

Herrin, Eugene, and others. ESTIMATION OF SURFACE FOCUS OF P TRAVEL TIMES. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1273-1291. QE531.S3, v. 58

An iterative technique was used to locate some 400 earthquakes, estimate corrections to the Jeffreys-Bullen P travel times and estimate azimuthally dependent station adjustments (station corrections). An oversimplified model for the upper 700 km. of the mantle was adopted in order to provide a standard for the investigation of regional variations in travel times. In the estimation procedure only data for epicentral distances in the range  $20^\circ$  to  $105^\circ$  were used, and the data were truncated to remove gross errors. The new P travel times are generally 2 to 3 sec. less than those given in the Jeffreys-Bullen Tables. (Abstract supplied, modified).

411

Herrin, Eugene, and James Taggart. REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN P TRAVEL TIMES. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1325-1337. QE531.S3, v. 58

Azimuthally dependent station corrections for 321 seismological stations were estimated using data from 400 large earthquakes (1961-1964) and 30 large explosions. In the estimation procedure only data for epicentral distances in the range  $20^\circ$  to  $105^\circ$  were used, and the data were truncated to remove gross errors. In addition, estimates of variance of station error distributions were computed. (Abstract supplied)

412

"SPIES IN SPACE" THEY MAKE AN OPEN BOOK OF RUSSIA. U.S. news & world report, v. 65, Sept. 9, 1968: 69-72. JKL U65, v. 65

Points to the achievements of U.S. satellites in maintaining surveillance of military activity in the Soviet Union. For the past 5 years the United States "has been steadily stripping away some of the most valuable military secrets of Soviet Russia." Using photographic and electronic data-collecting devices, spy satellites have provided the United States with accurate information on the deployment of Soviet offensive and defensive missiles and on the Chinese nuclear program. On a continuous basis, sky spies are being used to monitor for nuclear test explosions in the U.S.S.R. and to provide an early warning in case of a Soviet missile attack. In time America may be able to improve its spy satellites to the point where on-site inspection of disarmament agreements will be unnecessary, and, if so, a major obstacle to a far-reaching arms control pact would be removed.

413

Taggart, James, and E. R. Engdahl. ESTIMATION OF PcP TRAVEL TIMES AND THE DEPTH TO THE CORE. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1293-1303. QE531.S3, v. 58

Based on a new P velocity distribution and observed PcP travel times from nuclear explosions, the core is estimated to have a mean radius  $\approx 3477 \pm 2.0$  km (depth  $\approx 2894 \pm 2.0$  km). Five velocity models were tested for the lowermost 90 km of the mantle. The PcP data suggest that the P velocity increases slightly with depth in this region. Tables of PcP travel times have been computed for the preferred model and a core radius of 3477 km. (Abstract supplied).

414

Tucker, William, Eugene Herrin, and Helen W. Freedman. SOME STATISTICAL ASPECTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF SEISMIC TRAVEL TIMES. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 58, Aug. 1968: 1243-1260. QE531.S3, v. 58

Some of the statistical aspects of estimating travel-time anomalies and station corrections are considered. In order to estimate these quantities using earthquake data the events themselves must first be located. We investigated the use of the Gauss-Newton iterative technique to obtain a least-squares epicenter location employing Monte Carlo methods. Results of these studies indicate that the Gauss-Newton process converges to an absolute minimum and that confidence ellipses computed by linear techniques are reliable for reasonable networks of well-distributed stations. Also the Monte Carlo studies indicate that a least-squares solution may be inaccurate if appreciable travel-time anomalies or station-error means exist. We then expanded the location procedure to include the estimation of travel-time anomalies and station corrections. In order to obtain these estimates data from some 278 large earthquakes were analyzed by using a modified Seidel iterative process. (Abstract supplied)

## 2. Enforcement

415

Bornstein, Morris. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND REWARDS IN SUPPORT OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS. American economic review, v. 58, May 1968: 417-427. HBL E26, v. 58

Economic sanctions take the form of export and import embargoes, financial, transportation, and communications control, sequestration of property, preemptive purchasing, or other less direct measures to worsen the terms of trade or disrupt the markets of the sanctioned state. The effectiveness of these sanctions depends on the economic vulnerability of the sanctioned state and on the extent of success in isolating it from its sources of trade and financial support. Sanctions are likely to be successful only against the smallest, least developed states, but even here the results are uncertain. Economic sanctions against Rhodesia have failed because of key leaks in the sanctioning system and because the Rhodesian regime has made internal adjustments to offset the impact of the measures taken against it. This experience indicates that economic sanctions are not a promising means of enforcing arms control agreements. Economic rewards--such as those offered in the nonproliferation treaty--would be no more effective than sanctions. A nation will not put itself in danger for mere economic gain. As Adam Smith put it, for every nation "defense . . . is of much more importance than opulence."

## F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

416

Benoit, Emile. THE MONETARY AND REAL COSTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. American economic review, v. 58, May 1968: 398-416.

HB1, E26, v. 58

Estimates in purchasing power equivalent (PPE) dollars the real costs of defense in 120 countries. Benoit describes his method of computing these costs from monetary costs expressed in units of local currency and stresses the tentative character of his results. He concludes that a realistic estimate of the benefits of disarmament must await more precise knowledge of the kinds and quantities of goods and services actually subtracted from or added to civilian economies by defense establishments. Even then, prediction would be uncertain because the extent of benefits depends to a large degree "on the social utility and productiveness of the new uses to which the released defense resources were shifted." If the policies adopted are wise, partial disarmament or the reorientation of military establishments to civilian tasks "could have benefits going considerably beyond those hinged directly to the reductions in national defense programs."

417

THE PROMISES OF PEACE. Business week, July 27, 1968: 56-58, 62, 64-66, illus.

HC431, B37, 1968

With Vietnam peace negotiations underway and the United States and Russia in the first phase of arms control talks, "the hope of beating at least some of the nation's swords into plowshares flickers dimly." Already Washington is studying the problems of how to smooth the economic transition to a more peaceful world and divert freed defense resources to urgent civilian programs. The crucial questions are what immediate and long-term effects a defense cutback would have on the economy as a whole and how much of this cutback would be available for attacking civilian problems. Experts claim that if the Federal Government remains committed to high employment and social reconstruction, the transition to a peace economy will be smooth. But this forecast has been challenged on the ground that inflation and balance of payments difficulties will limit Washington's flexibility in dealing with economic problems. Experts are also divided over the size of the "peace dividend" that can be expected for the civil sector. Optimists feel that if a new President resists pressures to maintain a high level of military spending, if Congress trims nonessential programs, and if all recognize that the danger of increased unemployment makes an attempt to reduce the budget deficit unwise, then the peace dividend may go as high as \$30 billion in the first year. So far, few have been swayed by these arguments, which would hold up only in the case of a sudden breakthrough to an arms control agreement. And this is not likely to happen.

## G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

418

Borisov, V. S. SOVIET INSTRUMENTS FOR REGISTERING EARTHQUAKES. Sovetskoye Gerzhe (for Erdbebenregistrierung). Zeitschrift für Geophysik, v. 33, no. 6, 1967: 425-438, illus.

QC801, Z4, v. 33

The paper gives a brief review of new seismic equipment, developed at the O. J. Schmidt-Institute of Physics of the Earth, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and used for the recording of earthquake generated seismic waves. Instruments for the recording of weak and strong earthquakes on photographic, electrostatic sensitizable and heat sensitive paper as well as on magnetic drums are described, including equipment for long term recording and instruments with automatic starting devices. Principles of operation and significant data of the instruments are mentioned briefly. (Abstract supplied, modified)

419

Elcheberger, Clark M. THE PEACEFUL USE OF THE SEA. Saturday review, v. 51, Oct. 5, 1968: 20, Z1219, S25, v. 51

The proposals that the seabed be reserved for peaceful purposes and its resources used for the benefit of mankind will be debated in the forthcoming sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. The two drafts of principles under consideration both state that an area of the seabed lies beyond national jurisdiction and urge the formation of an international regime to govern the exploitation of the sea's resources. Because it will take years to draft a treaty, the General Assembly must adopt principles quickly. Simultaneously, nations should adopt a self-denying ordinance, agreeing not to extend their claims beyond the present jurisdiction or beyond the 200-meter limitation of the Continental Shelf until the boundaries are fixed. Two main problems in need of solution will be to determine the area to be subject to international administration, and to define the use of the sea for peaceful purposes. The United States will have much influence in determining the extent of the area reserved for mankind and the kind of international regime that will administer it. An agreement would help greatly to eliminate the threat of conflict and bring nations together under world law.

420

Gerrard, Jim. PATHOS LAOS. Far Eastern economic review, v. 61, July 11, 1968: 111-113, illus.

HC411, F18, v. 61

A neutral Laos is a fantasy, internal war is the reality. As the activity of the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese increased, the South Vietnamese, Americans, and Thais extended the Vietnam campaign into southern Laos. Although the United States claims that it has followed the 1961 Geneva Agreements to withdraw all troops from Laos, the pretension that air strikes are made without the support of ground forces is senseless. More significant is the presence of South Vietnamese troops and U.S. "advisers" and intelligence spotters on Laotian territory bordering the Northern provinces of South Vietnam not only do they gather information, but they also act as guerrillas, harassing the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao. When the Vietnam War ends, negotiations for peace must include provisions relating to Laotian problems.

421

Kortz, Maurice K. NUCLEAR EXCAVATION RESEARCH. Military engineer, v. 60, Sept. Oct. 1968: 327-332, illus.

TAF, P55, v. 60

Cites data obtained from laboratory and field experiments and project feasibility studies in nuclear excavation research. The evidence indicates that nuclear explosives can be used in the construction of navigable channels, harbors, reservoirs, dams, underground

## V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

storage facilities, and in rock quarrying. The advantage of nuclear excavation over conventional methods is economy of both money and time. The future development and application of civil nuclear explosives will depend largely upon the interest shown by the engineering profession.

- 422  
Nierenberg, William A. **MILITARIZED OCEANS.** In Calder, Nigel, ed. Unless peace comes: a scientific forecast of new weapons. New York, Viking Press [1968] p. 115-127. U104.C155 1968

Advances in oceanography and submarine technology will tremendously increase the strategic and economic importance of the deep seas. Submarine warfare will no longer be related solely to protecting surface seaplanes but will also be directed at protecting national exploitation of undersea resources. By the 1980's submarines will be able to operate for longer periods of time at greater depths than at present and will be equipped with more sophisticated communication and defensive devices. Missile-carrying submarines will be far safer than they are now, thus greatly adding to their deterrent strength. However, the new submarines will not be totally secure because of the development of highly effective antisubmarine surface vessels and aircraft, leading to a new concept of total naval warfare in which all the elements are engaged at once. Naval warfare could assume global proportions since rival contenders for undersea resources will not be bound by traditional national boundaries. If the oceans are not to become the battleground of the future, the nations of the world must soon work out cooperative agreements regarding their utilization.

- 423  
Pardo, Arvid. **WHO WILL CONTROL THE SEABED?** Foreign affairs, v. 47, Oct. 1968: 123-137. D410.F6, v. 47

As the last great frontier, the oceans may soon become the setting for international competition unless a clear definition of ownership can be agreed upon by all nations. Recent advances in ocean technology and an increasing realization of the importance of oceanic resources have greatly intensified commercial and governmental interests in exploring deep-sea resources. Projected breakthroughs in the construction of deep-submergence vessels and in the reclamation of man to great ocean depths should substantially increase the accessibility of ocean resources in the near future. Governments have greatly expanded their oceanographic research programs, partly out of concern that land resources alone will not provide for man's future needs but mainly because of the oceans' strategic possibilities. The seas could be used to conceal ABM systems, mobile nuclear-weapons systems, sonar systems, navigational aids, communications facilities, and fixed military installations. Undersea military facilities could have grave consequences for world order. By impairing the now near invulnerability of missile submarines, they would seriously destabilize the tenuous strategic balance. Use of the seas floor for military purposes would probably escalate the arms race and could lead to the unilateral proclamation of jurisdiction over large areas of the oceans. Unfortunately the current laws governing jurisdiction of the seas are inadequate for coping with these potent

tial dangers. Some jurists claim that the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf does not pertain to the deep seas, whereas others claim that it authorizes a coastal state to extend its jurisdiction over the ocean floor as far as is technically possible. The situation is further complicated by national laws or constitutional provisions containing conflicting definitions of the Continental Shelf. The international community is faced with two alternative solutions to the problem of jurisdiction over the high seas--either the division of the ocean floor among coastal states or the establishment of an international regime over the seabed. The "national lake" solution is fundamentally unequal and would tend to impede scientific research. On the other hand, the second alternative could be designed to safeguard the interests of all states and to encourage the orderly exploration and exploitation of the ocean floor. Last year Malta proposed a resolution to the U. N. General Assembly urging the establishment of a group to study the implications of an international regime over the deep seas and draft a treaty to preserve the international character of the seabed. The resolution was not passed, but the General Assembly did establish a committee to prepare a report on international cooperation in the utilization of deep-sea resources.

- 424  
Popper, David H. **THE DEEP OCEAN ENVIRONMENT: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY.** In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 59, Aug. 12, 1968: 171-177. JX232.A33, v. 59

An address made before the Symposium on Mineral Resources of the World Ocean by the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, urging arms limitation on the deep ocean floor. Popper believes that the U. N. General Assembly should request the 16-Nation Disarmament Committee to take up this question, "with a view to defining those factors vital to a workable, verifiable, and effective international agreement." The use of the seabed as a platform for nuclear weapons would be a great potential danger to international stability and security.

- 425  
SEALAB III. Undersea technology, v. 9, Aug. 1968: 25-29, 33-40, 44-52, illus. V210.A1U5, v. 9

Contents. --Introduction--Sealab III, by William M. Nicholson. --Sealab III: a dramatic change in deep ocean experimentation, by Jackson M. Tomasky. --Sealab III complex, by W. J. Eager. --Ocean floor experiments, by Donzil C. Pauli and M. Scott Carpenter. --Medical aspects of undersea living, by George F. Bond. --Aquanaut training and equipment, by Walter F. Marzette. --Command and medical control via an support vessels. --Logistics and surface support, by E. P. Carpenter and T. S. Cooke. --Sealab III contractors.

Articles describing the chief features of the U. S. Navy's upcoming Sealab III experiment in deep-sea living and working. Sealab III will attempt to increase man's knowledge of the commercial, scientific, and military potential of the ocean floor, and to test the capabilities and limitations of man and his technology to function productively in a deep-sea environment. Major research projects will be conducted in the fields of oceanography, engineering, construction, salvage biology, and human performance.

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